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This thesis weaves together the themes of complexity, technology, and power. It 
does so by examining how actors in world politics gain leverage over complex 
systems through the use of specialised ‘representational technologies’ that make 
these systems intelligible and amenable to manipulation. In response to the 
increasing complexity of regional and global systems, political actors are expanding 
their use of these representational technologies in order to augment limited 
individual and institutional means for cognition. A first conclusion from this 
research is that through these technologies, power is being expanded in novel and 
unique ways. Building upon an insight from actor-network theory (ANT), power is 
examined here as something that must be constructed via material technologies. 
Yet unlike previous research which has focused primarily on infrastructural 
technology, this thesis examines the unique role of representational technologies in 
constructing power. Following constructivism, this thesis accords a significant role 
to knowledge, discourse, and representations in how world politics are presented 
and acted upon. However, a second conclusion of this thesis is that the standard 
idealist accounts in constructivism must be expanded by examining the increasingly 
material means through which such ideational representations are constructed. 
Thirdly, this thesis aims to illuminate a neglected type of technology within 
International Relations (IR) scholarship – by moving away from the standard 
analyses of military and communication technology, and instead showing how 
representational technology contributes to the practices of world politics. Lastly, in 
emphasising the materiality of power and knowledge, this thesis also aims to revive 
a moderate version of technological determinism by arguing that technology is a 
platform which shapes both possible political behaviours and pathways for 
technological development.  
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“What has happened? Simply that our means 
 of investigation and action have far outstripped 
 our means of representation and understanding. 
 This is the enormous new fact that results from 
 all other new facts. This one is positively 
 transcendent.”1 
 
-Paul Valéry 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
This thesis weaves together the themes of complexity, technology, and power. It 
does so by examining how actors in world politics gain leverage over complex 
systems through the use of specialised ‘representational technologies’ that make 
these systems intelligible and amenable to manipulation. In response to the 
increasing complexity of regional and global systems, political actors are expanding 
their use of these representational technologies in order to augment limited 
individual and institutional means for cognition. A first conclusion from this 
research is that through these technologies, power is being expanded in novel and 
unique ways. Building upon an insight from actor-network theory (ANT), power is 
examined here as something that must be constructed via material technologies. 
Yet unlike previous research which has focused primarily on infrastructural 
technology, this thesis examines the unique role of representational technologies in 
constructing power.2 Following constructivism, this thesis accords a significant role 
to knowledge, discourse, and representations in how world politics are presented 
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2 Callon and Latour, “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macrostructure Reality and How 
Sociologists Help Them To Do So”; Guldi, Roads to Power: Britain Invents the Infrastructure State; 
Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century; 
Schouten, “The Materiality of State Failure: Social Contract Theory, Infrastructure and Governmental 
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and acted upon. However, a second conclusion of this thesis is that the standard 
idealist accounts in constructivism must be expanded by examining the increasingly 
material means through which such ideational representations are constructed. 
Thirdly, this thesis aims to illuminate a neglected type of technology within 
International Relations (IR) scholarship – by moving away from the standard 
analyses of military and communication technology, and instead showing how 
representational technology contributes to the practices of world politics. Lastly, in 
emphasising the materiality of power and knowledge, this thesis also aims to revive 
a moderate version of technological determinism by arguing that technology is a 
platform which shapes both possible political behaviours and pathways for 
technological development. 
One of the most common themes amongst the major crises of the modern world is 
the repeated reminder that our world is increasingly complex. Compared to 
previous periods of history our world is more interconnected (spreading crises 
further and less predictably), more dynamic (diffusing risks at a quicker pace), and 
more fragmented (with experts becoming specialised in solving local problems 
rather than systemic problems).3 This complexity involves a massive amount of 
elements, nonlinear dynamics, unintended effects, sensitivity to initial conditions, 
and feedback loops.4 These features of complex systems strain the limits of the 
human mind’s finite and embodied capacities.5 The 2008 financial crisis, the 
ongoing climate change crisis, the 2003 North American electrical blackout – all of 
these point to widely distributed complex systems which already surpass human 
capacities to cognise. If rational action requires a minimal capacity to represent the 
problems to be confronted, then the complex systems of today’s world are 
threatening to undermine the cognitive basis of political action. Given that 
                                                 
3 Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Technologies; Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in 
Political and Social Life. 
4 Cederman, “Complexity and Change in World Politics: Resurrecting Systems Theory”; Geyer and 
Rihani, Complexity and Public Policy: A New Approach to 21st Century Politics, Policy and Society, 
chap. 1. 
5 Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life, 45. 
“legibility [is] a central aspect of statecraft”6, then the world today is characterised 
by systems that outpace any actor’s ability to comprehend them. 
According to the cultural theorist Fredric Jameson this situation indexes a 
lack of ‘cognitive mapping’ – the means to make our own world intelligible to 
ourselves through a situational understanding of our own position.7 Here Jameson 
draws upon urban theory which argues that in designing liveable spaces one must 
take into account how people navigate their way around cities. In encountering a 
new city, the individual is left without any cognitive map of the space and is forced 
to develop one through habit. The urban designer can in turn assist this process by 
strategically situating landmarks and other easily recognizable symbols in order to 
provide the grounds for the development of a cognitive map.8 
 In Jameson’s work, this idea of cognitive mapping encompasses not only an 
individual’s relation to a city, but also their relation to an entire socioeconomic 
system. As he states, the function of cognitive mapping is “to enable a situational 
representation on the part of the individual subject to that vaster and properly 
unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of society’s structures as a whole.”9 
In charting through a loose set of historical periods from national to imperialist to 
globalised capitalism, Jameson argues that at one time the nature of capitalism was 
such that one could potentially establish a correspondence between our local 
phenomenological experiences and the economic structure that determined it. We 
could, in other words, establish a cognitive map of our economic space, thereby 
making intelligible the world around us. With the rise of globalisation, however, 
Jameson claims that this is no longer the case. We can no longer simply extrapolate 
from our local experience and develop a map of the global economic system. There 
is a deficiency of cognitive mapping, i.e. there is an essential gap between our local 
phenomenology and the structural conditions which determine it. 
 This separation between experience and the system within which we 
operate results in increased alienation – we feel adrift in a world we cannot 
                                                 
6 Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, 2. 
7 Jameson, “Cognitive Mapping.” 
8 Lynch, The Image of the City. 
9 Jameson, Postmodernism: Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, 51. 
comprehend. For Jameson, the proliferation of conspiracy theories is symptomatic 
of this situation. Conspiracy theories act by narrowing down the agency behind our 
world to a single figure of power (whether it be the Bilderberg Group, Freemasons, 
or some other convenient scapegoat). Despite the extraordinary complexity of some 
conspiracy theories, they nevertheless provide a reassuringly simple answer to ‘who 
is behind it all’. They, in other words, act precisely as a cognitive map. 
Other responses to the lack of cognitive mapping include the extrapolation 
of everyday experiences to model global problems – often a manipulation designed 
to further some political goal. The use of the household metaphor to understand 
national economies is particularly prevalent today. Here, government debt is 
equated with household debt and the former denounced on the basis of the 
comparison.10 In the process, the unique complexities of government debt are 
effaced.11 In other cases, the problem of African underdevelopment becomes 
embodied in the figure of a starving child, acting as a synecdoche for the complex 
structural problems that maintain states of poverty. The act of ‘charitable giving’ 
takes on the appearance of a meaningful gesture, without ever encroaching upon 
the systemic problems. These representations and the actions that issue from them 
demonstrate that cognitive mapping is crucial for political action, precisely because 
our actions are often strongly shaped by the representations we construct of 
complex systems. 
The problem of complexity is therefore that it is outpacing human cognitive 
abilities to map and manipulate; the solution this thesis proposes is ‘cognitive 
assemblages’. One of the main hypotheses of this work is that it is technology 
which is allowing individuals and institutions to extend their cognitive and 
practical capacities in such a way that complex global systems become intelligible.12 
                                                 
10 My thanks go to Alex Williams from whom this example originates. 
11 Wray, Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems. 
12 For Jameson, the answer to the problem of cognitive mapping is dialectical thought and aesthetic 
representations. These options are rejected here on the basis that dialectical thought is no longer 
sufficient for a world better characterized by complexity science, and that aesthetic representations avoid 
the necessity of scientific inference for epistemic claims. 
Through the development, diffusion and use of various representational 
technologies, human actors have come to create novel cognitive maps of today’s 
world. For instance, computer simulations are being employed to generate 
representations of the global climate; specialised models are used to produce visible 
diagrams of global finance; and automated software is being used to filter through 
social media data and present a geographical image of a crisis. It is through 
technology that humans are enriching their world and coming to terms with 
complexity. 
 As such, the central conceptual element of this thesis will be ‘cognitive 
assemblages’, defined as: 
 
Cognitive assemblages are hybrid systems comprised of individuals, 
institutions, norms and representational technologies which have as 
a primary goal the production of linguistic, numeric, and/or visual 
representations about some phenomenon in the world. 
 
This definition is broad enough to include scientific laboratories and the 
experiments of big science (e.g. the Large Hadron Collider or the climate change 
observation network). This definition is also broad enough to encompass both 
small-scale assemblages (e.g. individuals employing hand-held devices) and large-
scale assemblages (e.g. global data sensors analysed by large scientific communities 
and modelled by massive supercomputers). It is also a broad enough definition to 
include relatively apolitical cognitive assemblages. 
The past few years alone have witnessed a variety of such assemblages 
emerge and expand. The US Federal Reserve is experimenting with sentiment 
analysis to monitor consumer confidence and more accurately represent the 
current state of the economy.13 There have been proposals for a financial 
monitoring system that replicates the climate observation and modelling system.14 
Others are planning an Earth simulator to provide a real-time simulation of health 
                                                 
13 Sentiment Analysis and Social Media Monitoring Solution RFP. 
14 Haldane, “To Navigate Economic Storms We Need Better Forecasting.” 
pandemics, economic bubbles, and conflict hot spots – all in an effort to make 
global dynamics intelligible.15 Global cities now routinely use centralised systems to 
monitor and modulate traffic flows. And macroeconometric modelling has been 
used for decades now as a policy tool by governments.16 The expansion of 
representational technologies has been accelerated by both drastic improvements in 
computing power and increasingly ubiquitous data collection. As late as 2000, 25% 
of data was non-digital; today a striking 98% of it has been digitised.17 With the 
surge in recorded and digitised information, ‘big data’ has become a mainstream 
term featuring in numerous news articles and spawning a number of popular 
books.18  
Similar to the disciplinary and biopolitical tactics that Michel Foucault 
analysed in his work,19 these new technologies centred on complexity and 
computation are being created in a variety of places and then dispersed throughout 
the social fabric. They do not reside in governments alone. Casinos use algorithmic 
behavioural recognition software in order to uncover probable cheaters;20 
companies are adopting sophisticated big data analytics in order to fine tune 
marketing and pricing mechanisms;21 and governments are constructing databases 
to track and code the risk threat of individuals.22 Once generated, these techniques 
go on to filter through the social fabric. Machine learning techniques are optimised 
in high-frequency trading firms and adopted by governments in facial recognition 
software; algorithmic advancements are constructed by climate scientists and put to 
use in the modelling of social unrest; and corporations create new analytics for 
sorting big data which then get employed by politicians in their elections 
                                                 
15 Helbing, “The FuturIcT Knowledge Accelerator: Unleashing the Power of Information for a 
Sustainable Future.” 
16 Kenway, From Keynesianism to Monetarism: The Evolution of UK Macroeconometric Models. 
17 Cukier and Mayer-Schoenberger, “The Rise of Big Data.” 
18 Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, 
and Think; Lohr, “Big Data’s Impact in the World.” 
19 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison; Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: 
Lectures at the College de France 1975-1976; Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the 
College de France 1977-1978. 
20 Identity Management’s Role in an Application-Centric Security Model. 
21 Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets.” 
22 Ansorge, “Digital Power in World Politics: Databases, Panopticons and Erwin Cuntz.” While little is 
known about the details at this time, the National Security Agency’s PRISM program appears to be the 
largest and most prominent example of this particular technology. 
campaigns. There is no single centre of production: this is rather a multi-centric 
production of representational technologies. The creation and use of such 
technology as a means to augment our cognitive abilities is becoming pervasive. 
The focus of this thesis, however, is on the role of cognitive assemblages 
within the politics of global phenomena. In fact, it will be argued that it is these 
cognitive assemblages which are increasingly necessary to make the global visible as 
such. By making the global visible, one significant consequence is that 
representational technologies provide a new means through which power can be 
constructed. They can allow a small group of individuals to construct levers of 
power by producing actionable representations of complex situations which can 
provide them with a comparative epistemic advantage over other actors. A major 
theme of this thesis will be to demonstrate how such epistemic power is being 
constructed and employed today. 
The products of such technologies – representations themselves – can be 
approached in at least two different ways. On the one hand, they can be 
approached as truth-bearing (or obscuring) entities, which can be subject to 
ideology critique in order to unmask the real entities and relations behind them. 
On the other hand, they can be approached as entities which have real effects on 
what it is possible to say and do, regardless of their truth value. The approach 
taken here is a combination of both approaches, with an emphasis on the latter 
aspect. Representations are important in this thesis because of what they make 
possible, yet in many ways these representations develop over time as a result of 
norms of truth.23 
It should therefore be made clear from the beginning that the emphasis in 
this thesis is not on a critical approach – this thesis does not aim to provide an 
ethical critique of these new technologies, modes of knowing, and rationalities of 
governance. Instead it seeks to analyse the possibilities they are creating: the 
                                                 
23 In fact, in many ways, this is a process that has developed over centuries – from the first efforts to 
quantify probability and risk, to more recent efforts to generate statistical images of the national 
economy, and to modulate populations via statistical tools. See: Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit 
of Objectivity in Science and Public Life; Tooze, Statistics and the German State, 1900-1945: The 
Making of Modern Economic Knowledge; Desrosières, The Politics of Large Numbers: A History of 
Statistical Reasoning. 
statements they make it possible to say and the actions they make it possible to 
do.24 While my own inclinations are towards a critical approach to power, the goal 
here is to describe and analyse what are largely new phenomena, and to clarify what 
the stakes are. This attempt to analyse the developments without making explicit 
prescriptions in part stems from the belief that the traditional criticisms of 
technology are inadequate here – new ethical approaches are required. 
With the representational technologies employed in world politics being produced 
by multiple types of actors, this study necessarily has to avoid the traditional IR 
focus on the inter-state system and instead focus its attention to technology’s effects 
on the interconnected system of states, NGOs, international organisations, and 
other political actors.25 It is networks of humans and nonhumans which are 
combining together to generate the infrastructure and dynamics of world politics. 
Therefore, instead of a state-centric approach, this thesis embodies an assemblage 
approach. Drawing from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s work,26 we can outline 
four aspects of assemblages: (1) they consist of heterogeneous entities, both social 
and material; (2) they are assembled through historical (intentional and 
unintentional) processes; (3) they function together to produce an emergent whole, 
while also (4) maintaining the potential independence of parts from wholes. 
This independence of the assembled parts implies a particular 
understanding of their essence. Rather than any particular property being the 
essential core of an entity, these objects consist of particular capacities to interact – 
only some of which are capable of being exercised in any particular assemblage.27 A 
knife, for instance, has the emergent property of ‘being sharp’ since none of the 
                                                 
24 In this sense, this thesis follows in the Foucauldian line within IR: Dean, Governmentality: Power 
and Rule in Modern Societies, 2nd Edition; Miller and Rose, Governing the Present; Sending and 
Neumann, “Governance to Governmentality: Analyzing NGOs, States, and Power.” 
25 Fritsch, “Technology and Global Affairs”; Herrera, Technology and International Transformation: 
The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, and the Politics of Technological Change. 
26 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia; Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus. 
27 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, 10. 
individual atoms of a knife have this property.28 A knife also has the capacity ‘to 
cut’ – a capacity which may never be exercised, depending on whether the knife is 
ever used or not. The capacities of such an object always exist, though as 
unactualised potentials rather than actualised properties. While the past provides 
an empirical indication of the various potentials comprised within any particular 
entity, the essential openness of the future means that this list can never be closed. 
As Deleuze often quoted of Spinoza, “we know not what a body can do”. 
While the components of an assemblage maintain independence, they do 
enter into relatively coherent (and empirically contingent) relationships in order to 
form the emergent wholes known as assemblages. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, 
there are process of ‘territorialisation’ which make an assemblage more unified, 
and processes of ‘deterritorialisation’ which tend to break apart the coherence of a 
particular system.29 The unity and individuality of an assemblage is therefore always 
capable of changing, making it an empirical matter of delineating their existence. 
Finally, the ontology taken here is also realist in the sense of arguing for the 
existence of a mind-independent reality. In terms of social ontology, total mind-
independence is impossible since the entities under discussion only exist in minds. 
However, the autonomy of social entities (such as social structures) above and 
beyond our conceptions of them points to their realist character – they are not 
reducible to an individual’s idea of them.30 This will be particularly important for a 
discussion of technology, the study of which has too often ignored the autonomy 
of socially-constructed materials. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 DeLanda, Philosophy and Simulation: The Emergence of Synthetic Reason, 3–4. 
29 DeLanda, A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity, 12. The 
similarity of ‘capacities’ to critical realism’s notion of ‘dispositions’ can perhaps help in bridging the gap 
between this philosophical work and the more traditional philosophy of IR. In both cases, the real 
aspect of an object is its dispositions or capacities which may go unexercised in any particular situation 
due to the multiple causal influences in effect in any non-laboratory situation. 
30 Ibid., 1; Elder-Vass, The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. 
This ontological notion of assemblages is also implicitly in tension with the 
standard readings of the ‘global’ within International Relations.31 Typically in IR, 
three analytically distinct conceptions of the global are often invoked either 
explicitly or implicitly: (1) the global as container; (2) the global as the highest 
position in a hierarchy; and (3) the global as a level of detail. 
The first conception of the global visually imagines it as being the larger 
container within which regional and local dynamics occur. The global, in such a 
perspective, is what provides the basic framework for the dynamics occurring inside 
of it. We see this most explicitly in analyses of social structure, as a limiting 
construct within which other processes occur. Similarly, analyses which see 
economic globalisation as a constraint on state action also tend to subscribe to this 
sort of ‘container’ approach. 
The second conception of the global visualises it as being situated at the top 
of a hierarchy, with the regional and local placed below it. Contrary to the first 
conception, the other regions are not necessarily embedded within the global. 
Rather, what makes this visual metaphor unique is that the global is seen as 
operating at a largely independent level, rather than a foundational level. Each 
level has its own unique dynamics, which may or may not have any effect on the 
others. A classic example of this is Robert Putnam’s work on ‘two-level games’, 
where the domestic and international levels each constitute their own separate 
dynamics with interaction between them occurring at regulated points.32 
The third common conception of the global is an epistemological one 
which visualises it as a level of resolution. Like a microscope, one can zoom out to 
the global macro features of the phenomenon under investigation, or one can 
zoom in to the local details involved. Depending on whether one is interested in 
generalised features or a singular case study, one chooses to examine a 
phenomenon at either a global or local level. This clearly occurs in the 
                                                 
31 It should be made clear that this thesis will focus on the global rather than the international. As the 
previous section argued, assemblages and the networks of entities they incorporate have ontological 
priority over bounded units such as states. In addition, the next section will argue that the global is a 
more encompassing idea than the international, with the latter being only a partial perspective. 
32 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” 
compromises between case studies and large-N studies, but it is also explicit in 
David Singer’s work on the levels of analysis when he notes the “dearth of detail” 
that a focus on the international system requires.33 In these conceptions of the 
global, the ‘large’ is assumed to be aligned with the ‘general’ and the ‘abstract’.34 
The problem with these notions of the global is that they presuppose 
multiple levels of reality and are intelligible only in such a framework. Yet, each 
level of reality produces an insurmountable gap between them, or it requires 
wilfully ignoring the connections that lead out to other levels. Moreover, whenever 
we go out into the field looking for these multiple levels of reality, all we see is the 
single, same world. One goes to look for neoliberalism, and finds economists and 
macroeconomic models working at the World Bank. One goes to look for financial 
globalization, and finds traders and computer systems in New York and London. 
One goes to look for global governance, and finds diplomats arguing at Security 
Council meetings. Everywhere we look, we run into more and more local networks, 
and never some independent realm labelled ‘the global’. The question is therefore 
what are global (and other macro-level) phenomena if they are not a separate 
ontological space? 
What appears before us is a single plane of existence, rather than differing levels of 
reality. There are no discrete realms; the local and the global are not separate. 
Instead the argument that will be made here is that there are only actors of 
different sizes. Some actors, simply put, are capable of exerting force on a wider 
range than others and are therefore larger than others. Yet the existence of these 
macro-actors causes us to run into a theoretical problem. If, as assemblage theory 
suggests, the world consists of independent parts acting according to their own 
immanent dynamics and logic, it would appear unlikely that something like a 
macro-actor would ever arise. The chaos of multiple, conflictual, divergent actors 
would seemingly be too much for something like an institution, a rebel group, a 
                                                 
33 Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” 80. 
34 Brey, “Theorizing Modernity and Technology,” 63. 
state, or a state system to ever emerge. They presuppose too many actors, acting in 
cooperation (though not necessarily harmony),35 to appear achievable in a world of 
divergent actors. Yet macro-actors clearly do exist, and so the question becomes, 
‘how?’ Following the insights of actor-network theory, the answer is that macro-
actors are constructed through a process of associating durable materials: 
 
“By associating materials of different durability, a set of practices is 
placed in a hierarchy in such a way that some become stable and 
need no longer be considered. Only thus can one ‘grow’. In order to 
build the Leviathan it is necessary to enrol a little more than 
relationships, alliances and friendships. An actor grows with the 
number of relations he or she can put, as we say, in black boxes. A 
black box contains that which no longer needs to be reconsidered, 
those things whose contents have become a matter of 
indifference.”36 
 
Thus, for instance, a monarchy does not rely solely on transient social 
relations, but rather develops on the basis of a palace, an array of status symbols, a 
mercenary force, inherited wealth, various legal documents, claims to divine 
authority, papal support, property, etc. Crucial here is the fact that these networks 
of force rely not simply on social relations, but instead incorporate more durable 
materials as well. It is the latter which overcomes the fragility, fluidity, and 
flightiness of pure social relations and begins to build up a solid foundation for 
complex societies to emerge.37 The introduction of material mediators between 
individuals helps to stabilise social relations and raise them out of an anarchical 
                                                 
35 Robert Keohane makes the important distinction between cooperation and harmony. The latter 
occurs when actors act together out of mutually shared interests – in this case, there is no discord that 
needs to be overcome. Cooperation, on the other hand, only occurs when there is discord among 
actors, and they must be brought together in order to operate as a cohesive unit. Keohane, After 
Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, 51–55. 
36 Callon and Latour, “Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macrostructure Reality and How 
Sociologists Help Them To Do So,” 284. 
37 Strum and Latour, “Redefining the Social Link: From Baboons to Humans.” 
state of nature.38 Such networks of material and social components must be slowly 
and patiently constructed (not always intentionally) and arranged so as to be taken 
as ‘black boxes’ – relatively stable conduits of force that can be relied upon under 
normal circumstances.  
But the notion of a black box highlights a distinction that can be drawn 
between two types of global actors. On the one hand, there are the established 
(institutionalised, organised, materialised) networks for creating a global actor – the 
realm of black boxes that Callon and Latour examine. On the other hand, there 
are the global actors which operate without the need for a series of black boxes. In 
this regard, al-Qaeda perhaps exemplifies the macro-actor that need not rely on 
black boxes. Instead, al-Qaeda used the tight interconnections of modern networks 
against those very networks, in order to act upon key nodes which then created 
disproportionately large effects. Al-Qaeda required only a minimal construction of 
conduits through which it could exert itself reliably; yet it remains a global actor 
because it caused a wide range of other actors to be affected. From this it can be 
concluded that a minimal condition for being global is the capacity to affect large 
numbers of actors that are widely dispersed throughout a series of assemblages. 
Whether an actor is global or not is determined as much by the range of effects it 
can carry out, as it is by the conduit of networks it can ally itself to.39 The 
consequence is that there is no intrinsic property of an actor that makes it global – 
instead it dependent upon the network it finds itself within and the particular 
structural position it occupies.40 This is particularly the case insofar as we exist and 
operate within complex and unpredictable systems. It is a basic property of such 
systems that small acts can have large consequences, meaning that what consists of 
a global actor is always up for renegotiation. We can therefore make a distinction 
between macro-actors that are founded upon a network of ‘intermediaries’ (i.e. 
black boxes) and macro-actors that are founded upon a network of ‘mediators’ (i.e. 
                                                 
38 Schouten, “The Materiality of State Failure: Social Contract Theory, Infrastructure and 
Governmental Power in Congo,” 559–562. 
39 Daniel Drezner comes to a similar conclusion. See: Drezner, “Contagion in World Politics.” 
40 The field of social network analysis has done much to analyse the particular structural properties of 
formal networks, delimiting the specific points at which power can be disproportionately leveraged 
from. 
relatively independent actors). Contra Callon and Latour, what makes an actor 
‘macro’ or global is not just its construction of conduits for power and the use of 
durable materials, but also the potential range of the effects stemming from an 
action. A single pedestrian standing in front of a tank in Tiananmen Square is 
therefore comparably as global an actor as the CEO of Goldman Sachs. The Board 
of Governors of the International Monetary Fund is as global as the individuals 
responsible for the destruction of Iraq’s Al-Askari mosque.41 
The ‘global’ is therefore not a separate ontological realm, nor is it 
independent of the local, nor is it foundational, nor is it more general. An analysis 
of the global must focus on the interactions between macro-actors, specifically by 
tracing their actions through the networks they have organised and affected. The 
global is an extension of the local, but precisely for this reason, an examination of 
global actors and events must focus on the local. What this all entails is that any 
given social field is constructed by actors of varying sizes, materials, relations, and 
degrees of systemic importance. The analysis of a situation must examine micro-
level dynamics and ‘follow the actors’ in order to determine how macro-structures 
arise. This thesis will undertake this project by examining precisely the interface 
between practitioners and the technologies of the global they use, with the wager 
that disproportionately large effects emanate from this space. This general ontology 
of assemblages and macro-actors therefore provides the basic framework for 
examining the elements and effects of technology. 
With an ontology of assemblages set out, and the global refigured as a series of 
constructed macro-actors, the notion of power takes on new connotations as well. 
In one of the most widely cited frameworks of power in IR, Steven Lukes argues for 
a common definition of power: “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a 
manner contrary to B’s interests.”42 Yet in his additions to the second edition of 
                                                 
41 The Al-Askari mosque is one of the holiest sites for Shiite Islam, containing the remains of the 10th 
and 11th Shia Imams, and was attacked in June 2007, nearly bringing Iraq to a full-out civil war, and 
eventually leading the entire American military system to change direction. 
42 Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Second Edition, 30. 
the book, Lukes revises this position and argues that power must not be equated 
with its use. Rather power is a capacity which may or may not be exercised.43 If 
power is a capacity though, and (as we will argue) capacities can be altered through 
technological augmentation, then power itself is something that can be constructed 
and augmented. 
Power is therefore in accordance with the notion that macro-actors are 
constructed: it is not something that a priori exists or that is a natural attribute of 
an actor. It is something that must be built and woven together. 44 As something 
that must be constructed, power can therefore be altered by changing the material 
and social infrastructures of societies. Indeed, the operation of power only travels 
through such conduits.45 Therefore, one of the main ways in which macro-actors 
consolidate their control is through the construction of networks of materialised 
power:46 “artefacts such as statistics, vessels, maps and sextants start to explain how 
humans can arrive at keeping relations stable and controlling them from a 
distance.”47 In general, therefore, building power involves (1) constructing multiple 
chains of allied actors, (2) maintaining and expanding these chains, and (3) the 
effort required to propagate a command through them. From this understanding 
of power being constructed as a capacity, 
 
“Generalised historical sociology can thus focus on the development 
of collective and distributive power, measured by the development of 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 109. 
44 As Latour will argue, “power and domination have to be produced, made up, composed.” (Latour, 
Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory, 64. )  As a side note, this notion of 
networks of power should make clear that the notion of networks being used here is not in any way 
opposed to hierarchy. Rather, networks consist of a set of actors who function together in a coherent 
way – this can be both centralized and decentralized systems. 
45 ‘Power’ must be understood in all of its multi-faceted senses here – it is a capacity for limiting, 
commanding, constructing, organising, creating, determining, etc. In this sense, it is a capacity of every 
actor. What is variable is only its strength. 
46 Barry, “The Translation Zone: Between Actor-Network Theory and International Relations,” 415. 
47 Schouten, “The Materiality of State Failure: Social Contract Theory, Infrastructure and 
Governmental Power in Congo,” 560; Law, “Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The  Case of 
the Portuguese Expansion.” 
infrastructure. Authoritative power requires a logistical 
infrastructure; diffused power requires a universal infrastructure.”48 
 
As this quote makes clear, traditionally approaches which have adopted this 
conception of power have focused on infrastructure as a primary medium of power. 
By contrast, the focus in this thesis will specifically be on how representational 
technologies construct power capacities and conduits for action. These 
technologies are similar to the means through which one can “see like a state”, yet 
these new technologies are distinct in being more flexible and more dispersed than 
those of state institutions.49 By constructing a representation of a complex system, 
such technologies allow particular actors to intervene, manipulate, modulate, and 
control these systems in ways that other actors are incapable of. Whereas 
infrastructural forms of power alter the speed and extent of power’s reach, 
representational technologies create new points of intervention within a 
sociotechnical assemblage. These technologies also give actors a comparative 
epistemic advantage and allow them the leverage to spread their actions 
comparatively further than actors without such technological advantages. This 
thesis will undertake an examination of how these representational technologies 
are constructing power and allowing various actors to become larger (in the sense 
of expanding their range of effectiveness) and carry out new interventions. 
To demonstrate these claims, the methodological approach taken here will be 
heavily reliant on a case studies approach. This method has been employed here 
since it provides the best means to examine the causal mechanisms and effects of 
technology on actors’ practices. In the first place, given the proposed ontology of 
the global, the singular nature of these sociotechnical assemblages puts limits on 
the usefulness of large-N statistical studies. Secondly, the intention of this thesis is 
to generate new theoretical approaches and entities, and as such is better served by 
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10. 
49 Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. 
detailed accounts of individual cases.50 Thirdly, by focusing on individual 
technologies, one can open up the black box of technology.51 If one wants to 
understand a particular technology’s effects on society, then one can adequately 
understand it by black boxing the internal technical details. Yet if one also wants to 
argue that technologies develop in a certain way and that this has effects on society, 
then it is required that one look at the internal details of a technology. This thesis 
will be arguing for the latter claim, and so the internal details of technologies are 
therefore significant – something that is missed by high-level methodological 
approaches. Fourth, and more generally, the nature of technologies is such that 
making general statements about them is incredibly difficult. It will be argued in 
this thesis that it is their very nature to constrain and make possible actions, but 
beyond this broad effect it can be difficult to narrow down a clear causal statement 
about ‘technology’ in general. As a consequence, the study of technology is best 
accomplished through focusing on individual cases.52 
The case studies have been chosen to provide a broad enough range of 
empirical material to begin to draw out some interesting conclusions.53 These cases 
are chosen to range from the very well-developed and infrastructurally large-scale 
(climate change models) to the relatively recent and meso-scale (option pricing 
models) to the new and (so far) small-scale (crisis mapping software). In addition, 
each draws upon a different area of interest to world politics: nature, markets, and 
crises. They span a broad variety of issue areas – from climate policy, to financial 
trading, to humanitarian relief efforts. Finally, each case offers a different type of 
representational technology: climate models are simulations, option pricing models 
operate as heuristics, and crisis mapping software is effectively a real-time data 
synthesiser. From this broad range of examples it is hoped that some preliminary 
conclusions can be drawn for further research on representational technologies. 
                                                 
50 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 20–21. 
51 Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves, 14. 
52 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 19–20. 
53 Alternative cases that could also have been chosen include the macroeconometric models used by 
central banks. Particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the prominent role of monetary 
policy in responding to this crisis, such models have come to play a major role. 
In choosing case studies this way, the potential problem of case selection 
bias arises. However, given that general studies of technology are blind to the 
specific variations of how different technologies operate, this is an unavoidable risk 
– cases must be chosen on the basis of their likelihood of providing interesting 
material. This need not be a problem though, as one researcher writes, 
 
“The important thing is to ask similar questions of each case to 
consistently apply the theoretical framework developed, and to 
explore the possibilities of variance within each case – process-
tracing – to establish the strength of the claims being made.”54 
 
This will be the approach taken here, with the aim of examining unique cases in 
detail in order to illuminate and test the strength of the theoretical claims being 
made. 
A caveat is necessary first though. With case studies on such technical 
issues, combined with my own outsider status with regards to these areas, it is 
possible that some errors have arisen in the technical details. Nevertheless, I believe 
that the broad picture will stand up to scrutiny. In addition, it should be specified 
that this thesis does not aim to make an original contribution to evidence or data 
on the history of these technologies. For most of the technologies examined here, 
thorough histories have already been written by people far better positioned than 
myself to do so. Instead this thesis aims to contribute by bringing together 
disparate fields and technologies in order to try and highlight the commonalities 
between them, and to organise them according to a unique theoretical framework. 
In its general inclination, this thesis is guided broadly by a similar 
worldview to that of actor-network theory. Actor-network theory has, at this point, 
become a wide-ranging and internally pluralistic approach. Claims about ANT in 
general are therefore inevitably bound to miss the mark. Instead we will here briefly 
take Bruno Latour as representative of a dominant ANT approach and highlight 
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Politics of Technological Change, 42. 
what is problematic and what is useful. In the first place, there is the problematic 
reduction of different entities to a basic level of ‘actors’ – a reduction that 
overlooks important distinctions to be made between entities. Second, there is a 
lack of scientific realism in his work. Despite claiming to move beyond the 
realism/anti-realism debate, Latour tends to situate himself on the side of anti-
realism by eliding the distinction between concepts and object.55 Finally, and most 
problematically for our purposes, Latour tends to explicitly reject the goal of 
producing explanations.56 This stems from Latour’s desire to look at the sociology 
of knowledge – how knowledge is diffused and is legitimated – yet it means that he 
can (ostensibly) make no contribution of his own. This is not to say that Latour’s 
work does not make contributions (it most certainly does), but it means there is a 
tension between the explicit methodological prescriptions that Latour makes57 and 
the explicit knowledge claims he draws elsewhere. For the purposes here, what is 
most important about ANT is three factors. First, as we have already seen, the 
notion of macro-actors and their conception of the local-global relationship is a 
significant advance upon previous theorising about the ‘global’. Second, there is 
the minimal sense of agency that ANT argues exists in nonhuman objects, which 
correctly acknowledges their relative autonomy from humans. This leads directly to 
the third point which is the general (and useful) prescription that one should 
attend to both material and social elements in trying to understand a 
phenomenon. For the most part, IR has left aside the material aspects as mere 
background and neglected how they contribute to explaining events. 
The remainder of this thesis builds upon the theoretical proposals set forth here, 
and is oriented around three case studies: general circulation models in climate 
change policy, option pricing models in financial markets, and crisis mapping 
software in humanitarian relief projects. 
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The next chapter will begin by outlining a theory of technological 
autonomy, establishing the mechanisms through which technology shapes society 
and shapes its own development. It will put forth a theory of technology as a 
platform upon which social dynamics operate, thereby emphasising the 
contributions that materiality makes to the social world of global politics. The third 
chapter will turn towards specifically representational technologies, drawing upon 
research in cognitive science, media theory, and philosophy of science. It will 
articulate a theory of the ways in which representational technologies augment 
cognition, and highlight how this alters traditional conceptions of knowledge 
production within IR. 
 The fourth chapter turns to the first case study: the development and use of 
general circulation models in making the global climate visible and intelligible. 
Here it is shown how frictions within the materiality of these models helped 
channel the development of these technologies along certain paths. These models 
then served to make new perceptions of the global climate available, which in turn 
have made possible a new series of behaviours that political actors are beginning to 
employ. The fifth chapter looks at option pricing models in global financial 
markets. In the face of an increasingly complex ecosystem of financial actors and 
products, options traders have repurposed an existing technology in order to 
compare, contrast, and simplify the available data. Through the technologically 
produced representation of implied volatility, traders are able to enter into the 
market and conduct interactions. The sixth chapter turns to the more recent 
technology of crisis mapping software. Initially developed to map post-election 
violence, it is now being employed by humanitarian institutions as a means to 
generate real-time situational awareness of crisis situations. This chapter will look at 
the development of this technology and how it is altering the possible behaviours 
of humanitarian actors. 
The final chapter steps back from the detailed case studies in order to 
summarise some of the general conclusions from the evidence. In addition, it sets 
out a framework for understanding the politics of these particular representational 
technologies. Significant here is the ways in which such technologies alter the 
infrastructure of power and where a critical approach to these technologies might 
lead.
 
 
 
 
“Yes, society is constructed, but not socially constructed.”1 
 
-Bruno Latour 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
In the introductory chapter, the basic problem of cognitive mapping was laid out 
and a wager on the solution put forth. On the basis of the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological framework set out there, this chapter will 
attempt to lay the theoretical groundwork for understanding the role of technology 
in world politics. The argument will be made here that the technological 
infrastructure of the world contributes to the practices and thoughts of political 
actors, and that technology and its effects must therefore be given due 
consideration. The first part of this chapter will examine the nature of technology 
and explicate the basic analytical categories of research. The second section will 
undertake a review of existing work in IR on technology, while noting its 
limitations. The third part will argue for the relative autonomy of technology – i.e. 
its irreducibility to social explanations – which therefore makes it an important 
independent factor in understanding world politics. It will be shown that 
technology operates as a platform for social practices and for further technological 
development. The overall aim of the chapter is to make distinct what type of 
technologies are being examined in this thesis, at what level of technology this is 
being approached, and how technology factors into explanations of political events. 
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As the term ‘technology’ often conflates a number of different aspects, it is 
important to clarify these distinctions and establish the level of technology that is 
being examined. Generic invocations of an all-encompassing Technology are often 
of little use for making sense of how technologies interact and affect the 
surrounding world. Instead, the following section will examine three distinct levels 
of technology – first as an ontological category, second as an object (i.e. 
technologies), and third as a large sociotechnical system (i.e. assemblages).2 These 
will help to specify the uniqueness of technology, and provide the analytical 
framework for understanding technology’s capacity to act. 
At the broadest level of analysis one finds technology to be understood as a 
particular mode of being. Martin Heidegger’s analysis of technology is the most 
prominent of these approaches, having influenced generations of critical humanist 
scholars since its initial publication. He begins his analysis with a description of the 
standard answers to ‘what is technology?’: “Everyone knows the two statements that 
answer our question. One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: 
Technology is a human activity.” However, according to his project, this 
“instrumental and anthropological definition of technology […] makes us utterly 
blind to the essence of technology.”3 In arguing that instrumentalist and 
anthropological approaches miss the essence of technology, Heidegger proposes an 
alternative: to understand technology as a way of Being revealing itself – a mode of 
Being that turns it into mere ‘standing-reserve’ which makes possible the 
instrumental view of nature in the first place. Yet problems with this generic and 
overarching conception of technology quickly arise. Placed at an abstract 
ontological level, Heidegger’s analysis largely ignores actual technologies in favour 
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technology as an ecosystem with its own holistic dynamics. The most suggestive and sophisticated 
approach here is arguably: Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves. Though 
also see: Kelly, What Technology Wants; Basalla, The Evolution of Technology. 
3 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” 4. 
of philosophically elaborating his own metaphysical system.4 Moreover, Heidegger’s 
ontological reading of technology compels him to efface the differences between 
technologies, as well as ignore the dynamics of technology. Pitched in such a 
generic formulation (as a mode of Being’s unconcealment), technology has 
significance only for the broadest of analyses (e.g. epochal shifts in Being). In other 
words, Heidegger’s analysis is both too simple and too general. By contrast, while 
the philosophy of technology since Heidegger remains influenced by his work, it 
has predominantly taken a distinctly empirical approach since. 
 This empirically-grounded work has since made it clear that Heidegger’s 
own implicit sense of technology is of industrial technology.5 While arguably 
appropriate for his time, particularly with the rise of mechanised warfare, his view 
of technology neglects more recent developments in information technologies, 
biological technologies, nanotechnologies, and representational technologies. 
What Heidegger’s analysis of technology demonstrates is that a focus on its 
ontological nature necessarily obscures the ontic (empirical) variation in 
technological objects. The problems with this approach arise not only in 
Heidegger’s classic text, but also in similar attempts to pitch technology at overly 
abstract levels. With the empirical specificity lost, technology is set against some 
other equally grand abstraction – one which almost invariably is taken to be the 
“human” side of the equation.6 Lifeworlds, selves, phenomenology and so on, are 
articulated in opposition to technology, leaving their mutual interconnections and 
their empirical variations to the side. Moreover, the abstraction of technology-in-
general inevitably leads to despairing and unjustified conclusions about 
technology’s dominance over humans.7 An analysis of technology should therefore 
begin with technologies themselves and work from the ground-up, rather than 
beginning with the most general aspects and ignoring important empirical 
differences. 
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5 Ibid., 119. 
6 Misa, “The Compelling Tangle of Modernity and Technology,” 8–9. 
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If technology is not usefully characterised as an ontological mode of being or as a 
singular entity in itself, one must instead turn towards the multiple technologies 
which act in the world according to a variety of means. The definition of 
technological objects used here will therefore follow Langdon Winner’s definition: 
“tools, instruments, machines, appliances, weapons, gadgets – which are used in 
accomplishing a wide variety of tasks.”8 This formulation excludes technical know-
how and excludes immaterial technologies such as institutions. On the basis of this 
definition, we can also draw an initial distinction between individual technological 
objects and the larger sociotechnical assemblages they are embodied within. Each 
of these analytic categories encapsulates unique dynamics. 
 The first general aspect of technological objects concerns their invention. 
The creation of technologies appears to be summed up in the common sense 
notion that “necessity is the mother of all invention” – a phrase which sets 
technological innovation as the response to a particular need. Yet both empirically 
and theoretically this claim falters. An examination of the historical record shows 
many (often important) examples of inventions created without any pre-given need 
for them. An exemplary case here is the automobile, which was invented without a 
prior need or problem to respond to. It was originally the preserve of a few wealthy 
individuals and considered a frivolous gadget. Its creation, however, shifted the 
very space of possibilities and eventually created its own need.9 It became a 
necessity retroactively. Theoretically, as well, the argument that necessity produces 
invention falters on the inability to precisely determine what is a ‘need’ and what is 
a ‘solution’. Basic agriculture may be a need, for instance, but is the tractor a need? 
This is not to deny that necessity can be the mother of invention in particular 
cases, yet many inventions originate in more speculative ventures (with Leonardo 
da Vinci’s sketchbooks of wild inventions being a paradigmatic example here). 
 A second general aspect of technological objects has to do with their 
relationship to their environment – both material and social. Here we can follow 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s insight when they write, “The principle behind all 
technology is to demonstrate that a technical element remains abstract, entirely 
undetermined, as long as one does not relate it to an assemblage it presupposes.”10 
As was argued in the previous chapter, any given technological object consists of 
multiple potentials, and particular sociotechnical assemblages act to reinforce 
particular capacities while restraining others. Consider for instance, the wheel 
which is often taken as the paradigm of human invention – a seemingly clear cut 
case of technological advancement. Yet in Mesoamerica, the wheel was used widely 
in toys but not for transportation. In other words, while these polities evidently 
had the capacity to produce wheels, they never put them to what we consider to be 
their archetypal use. The answer to this apparent puzzle is to recognise that in their 
geographical context, the wheel-as-transportation was ill-suited to an environment 
with dense jungles and a lack of domesticated pull-animals. Similarly, in North 
Africa and the Middle East, wheels were invented but eventually superseded by 
travel via camels.11 The particular social and material assemblage this technological 
object found itself within constrained the capacity of the wheel to provide efficient 
transportation. The need for quick transportation and large hauling capacity were 
more efficiently solved by camels in this case, rather than oxen pulling wagons. 
With these examples, we can mirror the important distinction made earlier 
between capacities and properties with a distinction between capacities and uses. 
While the latter is what technology is most often reduced too, ontologically 
speaking it is capacities which are primary. Uses are derivative and secondary 
characteristics of objects, grounded in the last instance upon their capacity to do 
things.12,13 A wheel, for instance, has multiple potential capacities (as transport, as 
toy, as mechanical cog, etc.), yet the actual uses it is put to are dependent on the 
sociotechnical assemblage. Whereas uses are reliant on humans, capacities are 
based primarily on the physical properties of the object. If the nature of 
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technological objects is not reducible to their uses but rather to their capacities, 
then technology is already relatively independent of social forces. 
A similar independence arises in relation to their environment, where 
technological objects do not merely adapt to an existing context but also shape 
their context. In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, there is a mutual becoming between 
the two. Important here are two types of mutual adaptation by technologies to 
their environment: first, one which leaves the autonomy of the object intact, the 
second which makes it inseparable from the environmental conditions. The former 
case arises with early planes, for instance, which were capable of taking flight and 
landing in any flat space; most modern planes on the other hand require a built-up 
environment in the form of long landing strips and the social organization of air 
traffic controllers.14 These later planes have become inextricably intertwined with a 
very specific environment – a more restricted environment than earlier planes 
required (though with more capacities in other areas as a result). There has, in 
other words, been a co-evolution between the object and its environment. 
Technological objects also enter into pre-existing assemblages and must undergo 
some process of transformation in order to be slotted into these networks – a 
process which both shapes the object and its specific assemblage. For instance, the 
nature of the automobile varies when it enters into assemblages comprised of 
different weather conditions, legal structures, national driving habits, etc.15 
Similarly, a “tool or contrivance that has been designed to function in one natural 
setting often must be altered if it is to work properly in a new environment.”16 To 
reiterate Deleuze and Guattari’s point, individual technologies are therefore 
abstract when not related to the sociotechnical assemblage within which they 
function at particular times and places. 
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15 Basalla, The Evolution of Technology, 91. 
16 Ibid., 88. This mutual conditioning of airplanes and their environment has of course brought about 
numerous advances in the capacities of flight, yet the point still remains that this flight technology is 
now reliant upon a much larger sociotechnical system. 
These discussions of the environment of a technology – both the environment that 
it depends on, and the environment that depends on it – demonstrate that 
technological objects already implicate larger sociotechnical systems.17 It is here that 
a second sense of technology emerges: in the notion of a large technical system 
(LTS) or sociotechnical system that has a distinct nature and operates with unique 
dynamics. Sociotechnical systems such as railroad networks, electrical grids, water 
supply systems and telephone infrastructures are all comprised of multiple 
individual technological objects that function synthetically, but that also include 
organizations, legal systems, and natural resources (hence the ‘socio’ prefix).18 The 
importance of these massive infrastructures is hard to overstate: 
 
“[These] ‘large technical systems’ [are seen] as new, human-made 
‘deep structures’ in society. Strongly influencing where and how 
people live, work, play, and make war, they may have surpassed 
politics and natural geography in prominence.”19 
 
The massive scale of these systems can be seen in the worldwide sociotechnical 
system for computing networks which now involves over 170 quadrillion computer 
chips, and is alone responsible for nearly 5 per cent of the world’s energy 
consumption.20 In addition to providing a basic deep structure to society, 
sociotechnical systems are also important for understanding the regional and global 
infrastructures that make particular technologies functional. 
Analytically at least two different types of sociotechnical systems can be 
discerned. In the first place, there are those which enable some material to 
circulate – whether it be people, goods, energy, or information. Secondly, it is also 
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possible to speak of sociotechnical systems that take certain inputs, perform some 
transformation on the material, and produce certain outputs – such as global 
climate observatories, financial networks, and scientific research communities. The 
spatial scale of these systems also provides another variable factor, ranging from 
relatively regional systems to more expansive systems that encompass global 
networks. 
 The origins of sociotechnical systems tend to result from the concerted 
efforts of multiple actors. Thomas Hughes’ now famous examination of Thomas 
Edison and his creation of the electrical system demonstrates the multiple actors 
who came together to produce that specific LTS. The political actors changing legal 
regulations, the business people modelling electrical distribution after gas 
distribution, the engineers creating new mediums to transfer electricity, along with 
Edison himself and his innovative vision.21 In other words, the social and the 
technological were irreducibly intertwined. Yet the building of a sociotechnical 
system is never entirely completed. Most notably, there is always an internal 
tension within these systems between the aims of the system-builders and the 
requirements of individual users. Whereas the former aims at a homogeneous, 
standardised system, the latter group individualises technical interfaces for their 
own purposes. Sociotechnical systems are, in other words, co-constructed by users 
and technology.22 
 While this thesis will choose to focus primarily on technologies rather than 
sociotechnical systems, the analytic distinction between the two is nevertheless 
useful to keep in mind. Before examining how technology has featured in the IR 
literature, two final comments are necessary to both complicate and clarify the 
nature of technology. First, at a fundamental level, there is little to distinguish 
between technical objects and sociotechnical systems: both consist of components 
that cohere together in functional, physical, and social ways. As both Gilles 
Deleuze and Brian Arthur will argue in different ways, assemblages consist of 
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components, and these components are themselves assemblages.23 It is assemblages 
all the way down. The second point to make is that the dominant approach today 
is to approach these assemblages as immediately sociotechnical in nature – and to 
argue that it makes no sense to separate out the social from the technical.24 While 
in practice one always finds these two in mixtures, it is nevertheless revealing that 
these recent approaches still retain terms like ‘social’ and ‘technical’ in their works. 
There is an analytical usefulness to separating out the two, even while recognising 
that they are always mixed together in the world.25 It is for this reason that this 
thesis will self-consciously choose to employ terms like the social, the technical, the 
ideational, and the material. 
Within the IR literature, technology has rarely been the central focus of research, 
instead typically acting as a background given or a derivative factor.26 In the 
instances where technology has been taken as a central component, the dominant 
emphasis has been on technological objects rather than sociotechnical systems.27 
More specifically, this attention on technology has tended to focus narrowly on 
three types: communications, military, and interaction. This section will examine 
the existing research on technology in IR in order to uncover how technology is 
typically understood to play a role in world politics. The final part of this section 
will turn to analyses of materiality in IR as well, whose approaches parallel some of 
the arguments that will be made later for technological autonomy. 
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Perhaps the most obvious type of technology IR has focused on has been military 
technology. From the role of the stirrup in producing the possibility of knights, to 
the role of cannons in siege warfare, to the role of aviation and industrialization in 
modern war, and nuclear weapons in the stalemate of the Cold War – technology 
has clearly been an important element in determining the dynamics of war. While 
there are many general studies of technology and war,28 two specific examples can 
illustrate how technology is typically incorporated into IR: the machine gun and 
nuclear weapons. 
 With the introduction of the machine gun into the military assemblages of 
WWI, it has been argued that this innovation wrought repercussions throughout 
the entire system. It was already clear after the American Civil War that “repeating 
rifles, large calibre artillery, armoured ships and Gatling guns were the new 
weapons of the Industrial Revolution and as such were bound to fundamentally 
alter the most basic concepts of war.”29 Yet the military strategists of WWI had 
largely ignored this shift and continued to wage war with standard military 
organizations, tools, tactics, and strategies. The result was the utter disaster of 
WWI’s war of attrition. On the one hand, the generals believed war was still a 
matter of wills – the stronger willed would be the victors. (In fact, there are even 
instances of generals explaining the success of machine gunners by attributing to 
them stronger wills.)30 On the other hand, there was the sheer firepower made 
available by the new machines of war. The success of battles was no longer 
determined by will, courage, moral strength, or intentions – it was a war 
determined in the last instance by machines. 
What can be seen here is how, despite ingrained attitudes resistant to 
change, the introduction of the machine gun revolutionised warfare by altering the 
behavioural possibilities. It coerced military strategists to (eventually) reject 
centuries of doctrine, bias, and tradition. It changed the education of soldiers, and 
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the production of weapons. Finally, it changed the tactics of war, the strategies 
formulated by the generals, the organization of battalions, and the entire 
institutional culture of the military. The old values of a gentleman’s war, premised 
upon romantic ideals of heroism and courage, were tossed violently aside by the 
inhuman force of the new weapon. It led to the new era of defensive, entrenched 
war rather than offensive war. The battles of the past, with armies facing each other 
and duelling in close quarters, were gone.31 
 A similar paradigm shift in warfare occurred with the invention of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear weapons provide one of the more intriguing cases of how 
material entities can shape international politics because unlike the machine gun, 
nukes produce effective change even (and perhaps, particularly) when they are not 
actively used. Their mere existence is sufficient to alter behaviours and strategic 
calculations because of the rapid advance in force capacities they represent.32 As 
Waltz argues in a somewhat overstated way, “Nothing can be done with them other 
than to use them for deterrence.”33 The entire theory of deterrence is premised 
upon this effective and passive power of nuclear weapons. Rational actors are taken 
to understand the retaliatory consequences of attacking a nuclear power, and 
therefore change their own behaviours as a result. It is this certainty of mutual 
destruction which alters the entire international system: “The superpower 
relationship is now deprived of the basic principle defining an anarchic 
international system: the ever-present possibility of recourse to force.”34 The types 
of calculations that derive from a state of deterrence – whether the number of 
nuclear weapon is sufficient for deterrence, whether second-strike capabilities are 
credible, whether extensions of deterrence to allies are viable, etc. – are all 
impositions on the actions of actors by inert material forces. With nuclear 
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weapons, therefore, we see perhaps one of the clearest cases where technology 
shapes international politics just by virtue of its existence. 
In addition to military technology, with neoliberal institutionalism and 
globalisation theorists comes an increased recognition of the effects of 
communications technologies on world politics. Globalisation, the rise of complex 
interdependence, and the ensuing changes in the nature of the international 
system are all considered to partially result from advances in transportation and in 
communications technologies. For instance, in an influential account, David 
Held’s first ‘driver of globalisation’ is listed as “the changing infrastructure of 
global communications linked to the IT revolution”.35 Such changes are considered 
to bring communities closer together, knitting them into a global web of 
communication. 
Yet for all the importance attributed to technological changes, technology 
and its dynamics remains exogenous to these theories. Neoliberal institutionalists 
recognise that technology plays an important role in setting the conditions for 
increased interdependence and the rise of non-state actors, yet these are considered 
to be events that occur outside of the system and which slowly dissipate their way 
into affecting the international system.36 It is considered that technological 
dynamics can safely be left outside IR theory. 
One major exception to this tendency has been Ronald Deibert’s work. 
Here the attention has been on the specific materiality of communications 
technologies, focusing not on the content of communication but rather on the 
medium of communication. In this view, the technology of communications has 
produced effects along two lines: distributional consequences, and social 
epistemological consequences. In both cases, the effective action of technology 
operates not in terms of linear causal relations, but instead in terms of evolutionary 
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selection, i.e. a structural cause.37 Distributional consequences refer to the changes 
in social forces that result from a new communications environment. For instance, 
the rise of the printing press facilitated (that is to say, selected) those interested in 
breaking down the medieval Church’s monopoly on communication and 
knowledge.38 Cheaper, easier, and more ubiquitous texts were made available and 
increasingly rendered Church censorship impotent. The breakdown of the 
medieval world order is thus partially attributable to the capacities of action made 
possible by these new tools. Along another dimension lie changes in social 
epistemology. In this case, communications environments select not for social 
forces, but instead for ideas and beliefs about the world. To cite just one example, 
ideas about the individual (modernist) self were aided with the printing press as 
well. With the diffusion of this technology it became easier to attribute a single 
author to a work, texts could be mass produced and standardised, and the shift 
from oral communication to silent reading fostered a sense of internal space.39 In 
neither case of distributional and social epistemological changes did the content of 
the works have to be taken into account. It was the sheer material nature of these 
tools which brought about changes in politics and society. In Deibert’s work, 
therefore, there is a sophisticated and nuanced approach to how technology shapes 
behaviours and international politics. 
While most studies of technology in IR have focused on specific types of 
technological objects, there are a handful of more recent approaches which have 
begun to examine the influence of sociotechnical systems on world politics. Barry 
Buzan and Richard Little’s work on international systems, along with recent 
extensions by Geoffrey Herrera, have placed these systems into a prominent role in 
understanding international relations. In explaining the shifting structures of the 
                                                 
37 Deibert, Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation, 
32–35. 
38 Ibid., chap. 3. 
39 Ibid., chap. 4. 
international system over world history Buzan and Little give a major explanatory 
role to what they call interaction capacity, which they define as: 
 
“The amount of transportation, communication and organisational 
capability within the unit or system: how much in the way of goods 
and information can be moved over what distances at what speeds 
and at what costs? [...] It refers to the carrying capacity of a social 
system, its physical potential for enabling the units within it to 
exchange information, goods, or blows.”40 
 
Interaction capacity is here considered to place fundamental limits on what a given 
social system is capable of – it provides the ‘capacity’ and ‘potential’ that outline 
the possibilities of a system.41 It is within such confines that international systems 
can arise and act. In particular, the ability to wage war over long periods of time 
and space is a relatively recent achievement. Such an ability is dependent on the 
possibilities afforded by high levels of interaction capacity: the existence of supply 
lines, transportation routes, and communication capacities. As a result, these 
physically-determined abilities make possible both the units of the international 
system as well as the system itself.42 (Technologically-based interaction capacity also 
highlights the mutability of even natural factors like geography – seas are 
transformed from limits to possibilities once seafaring technology becomes 
available, for instance.) 
 A recent work from Geoffrey Herrera has extended this concept and 
operationalised it in terms of sociotechnical systems.43 The goal of his work is to 
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bring technology into international relations as an endogenous source of systemic 
change.44 This occurs in two ways – first, by noting that some technological systems 
are systemic and not unit-based; and second, that technology is political (e.g. the 
development of the atomic bomb). As a consequence, the development of global 
sociotechnical systems must be analysed in both their international development 
and diffusion, and then in terms of their effects on the interaction capacities of the 
system. 
Despite the sophisticated systematic approach taken by Herrera, he tends to 
remain bound within a socially-mediated vision of reality by claiming that, “If 
technologies are systemic but not political, we would have no need to think about 
them as inside the international system.”45 In other words, despite the nuanced 
theorisation of how technology affects international politics, Herrera claims that if 
technology were autonomous from politics and humans it would therefore be of 
little theoretical interest. By contrast to such a thesis, it will be argued later that 
technology has a variety of autonomous dynamics that must be acknowledged by 
any theory of the international system. These have political effects, yet they are not 
reducible to their uses, effects, or the intentions behind them. To say that 
technology’s effects interact with political and social entities is one claim; yet to say 
that technology has no autonomy from these entities is to entirely neglect their 
physical and systemic nature. 
In addition to communications, military, and interaction technologies, various 
strands of IR have also attempted to incorporate materiality in general. While 
being a broader category than technology, materiality in IR has occupied a similar 
explanatory role – seeking to demonstrate that something outside of the social 
world impinges on that world and shapes it in some way. Constructivism, despite 
being typically associated with the role of ideas, norms, and intersubjective 
structures, is also notable for various attempts to incorporate some modicum of 
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materialism. In an effort to maintain the independent role of ideas while avoiding 
the (purported) excesses of ungrounded poststructuralism, constructivists often pay 
token allegiance to the idea of a material world. In Emanuel Adler’s work, for 
instance, matter is taken to provide resistance to human individuals – yet nothing 
more is said about it.46 
 Alexander Wendt’s work elaborates on this constructivist materialism 
slightly more in his notion of rump materialism. In outlining this materialism, 
Wendt points to three areas where materiality has an independence from any social 
meaning: the physical distribution of states’ material capabilities, the nature of 
these material capabilities (i.e. the specific type of weapons and tools), and the 
geographical landscape and natural resources of a state.47 Yet considering the lack 
of any reflection on how these factors affect international relations or how they 
change in themselves, this rump materialism remains – at best – an exogenous 
variable in the theory.48 Worse, in two aspects, Wendt backs away from even this 
minimal materialism, thus remaining stuck within a more ideational-based 
ontology that reduces materiality to a secondary status. 
 In the first place, Wendt argues that – in principle, if not yet in fact – all 
materiality is alterable by human intervention and therefore could be reduced to 
the human intentions behind this intervention.49 The implicit argument here this 
is that technology has no autonomy beyond its uses and intentions – technology is 
at least potentially explainable as a derivative effect of human intentions. Secondly, 
Wendt states that “ultimately it is our ambitions, fears, and hopes – the things we 
want material forces for – that drive social evolution, not material forces as such.”50 
In other words, despite according independence to material factors Wendt remains 
convinced that they do no explanatory work in understanding social dynamics. 
They provide a background element to human action, but do not themselves act. 
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A similar understanding of materiality occupies much of geopolitics. In this 
tradition, a focus on geography was crucial because it was considered to form one 
of the most permanent factors involved in a state’s struggle for existence and 
power.51 The early geopolitical theorist Harold Mackinder’s most basic thesis was 
that with the completion of world exploration, there had occurred an epochal shift 
to a closed world system.52 Such a transition dramatically altered the nature of great 
power strategy as a result, and made possible the ability to produce universal 
generalizations about the effects of geography (since there was no longer an outside 
to interfere with the system). In geopolitical thinking, the history of conflicts has 
been shaped by the affordances offered by different geographical features. Thus, 
throughout history the steppes of southern Russia had provided the open space for 
nomadic peoples to rush into the more settled lands of Eastern Europe and Russia. 
Yet once they reached these settled civilizations, their effective power was altered by 
the new geographical territory and nullified.53 Similarly, the ‘pivot’ of power was 
determined by material locations and features – Russia’s great interior and 
situatedness between Asia and Europe made it into the key area for regional and 
world dominance.54 Other geopolitical theorists extended this project by analysing 
the ways in which territorial size and the location of capitals within states affect 
defensive capabilities.55 
Similarly, modern-day geopolitical thinkers have continued these lines of 
argument and contended that there are shifts occurring in the spatial centres of 
world power.56 Again, the determination of this shift is premised upon the 
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geographical positioning of the great powers and the locations of crucial resources. 
With the emerging multipolar structure of power, it is argued that the geographical 
focus of strategic attention is shifting to Eastern Eurasia (roughly from Pakistan to 
Japan and Australia). 
Notably for the purposes here, there is a recognition by contemporary 
geopolitical thinkers that technology alters the effects of geography on states.57 In 
its most sophisticated varieties, geopolitics is deemed to be concerned with the 
‘forces of destruction’ understood as the conjunction of technology and 
geographical features.58 In this vein, the introduction of railroads mitigated the 
negative aspects of sizeable territories; and the revolutions in communications 
technology made long-distance control a viable possibility.59 Some have gone so far 
as to argue that geopolitics is now obsolete as the old constraints of geography and 
space have withered under the advance of new technological means.60 Yet a quick 
glance at the mountainous terrain of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border or the supply 
logistics of the Khyber Pass – and the difficulties these have posed for the most 
powerful military in human history – demonstrates that this claim overstates the 
significance of technology. 
Throughout this literature, geography is often taken explicitly as a 
conditioning factor, not a determining factor. As Nicholas Spykman wrote, 
 
“Geography does not determine, but it does condition; it not only 
offers possibilities for use, it demands that they be used; man's only 
freedom lies in his capacity to use well or ill or to modify for better 
or worse those possibilities.”61 
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Similarly, others have rejected any geographical determinism and spoken of 
uncovering the ways in which geography “disciplines” politics.62 When 
contemporary geopolitics expands its concerns to include the ‘material context’ not 
only of geography but also of technology, it comes to formulate the role of 
materiality in a way that will closely mirror the approach of this thesis. Material 
contexts end up providing a series of constraints and opportunities for political 
actors to then face up to and take advantage of.63 
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From all of this research on technology and materiality in IR, a few conclusions 
can be drawn. In the three primary paradigms of contemporary IR, the role of 
materiality tends to be reduced to a minimal shell of action. 
 First, and most obviously, there is a focus on social factors to the detriment 
of material factors. While physical elements are often casually mentioned as 
important factors, the focus of the mainstream paradigms is resolutely on social 
interactions. Secondly, the research that does look at technology has been 
dominated by attention to military and communications technology (and to a 
lesser degree by interaction technology). The representational technologies that 
form the focus of this thesis have been overlooked in the existing research. Thirdly, 
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when materiality does enter into these accounts, it tends to instrumentalise 
technology and other material elements. The reason why technology can be 
profitably ignored in these accounts is because of the argument that it contributes 
nothing in itself. It may accelerate existing intentions and dynamics, but these are 
ultimately explainable in social terms (interests, ideas, power, etc.). To explain these 
underlying factors is therefore considered to be an explanation of technology as 
well. This is supplemented by the tendency to see technology as a transparent 
conductor of human intentions. That is to say, there is no acknowledgement of the 
ways in which technology shapes and channels intentional actions. Lastly, there 
remains a certain irony in IR’s neglect of technological structure, made most 
apparent by its enthusiasm for exploring international social structures. In the first 
place, while no reasonable theorist has made the claim that social structure 
determines agency completely, when technological structure is referenced it is often 
collapsed into such an unrealistic and deterministic position. Secondly, while IR 
theorists have long acknowledged that international social structure provides a 
constraining role on states – and is therefore an important element of international 
politics – similar considerations are not given to technological structures. This is 
despite the widespread belief that technological structures operate in the same way 
as social structures: through constraint. 
Ultimately, the major point to draw from this review of mainstream IR is 
that protests to the contrary, it is imbibed with a thorough immaterialism. 
Disembodied actors, interests, intentionality, and instrumental rationality are the 
substance of much IR. The effects of technology, weapons and nature are casually 
mentioned, yet these remain exogenous to most IR theories. The result is theories 
of the international system which operate between disembodied rational actors and 
the objective social structures which constrain them. 
This chapter turns now to approaches in the philosophy of technology which have 
explicitly sought to understand the ways in which technology contributes to the 
production, maintenance, and transformation of social formations. In broaching 
this question, a number of different theoretical positions present themselves. 
Ranging from determinism to social constructivism to momentum, each of these 
positions proffers different responses to the question of what role technology has 
in understanding and explaining social phenomena. Put simply, determinism 
accords an all-important role to technology by making it the key driver in social 
changes and developments. Social constructivism instead sees technology as an 
expression of deeper social forces. Finally, the more recent theories around 
momentum seek to show how technology can come to take on some of the 
qualities ascribed to it by determinists. More specifically, each of these positions 
diverges on three separate questions: 
 
1) Do social and/or technological factors64 explain how a 
technology shapes society? 
2) Do social and/or technological factors shape the temporal 
development of a technology? 
3) Do social and/or technological factors shape the spatial diffusion 
of a technology? 
 
The following sections will present each position in an idealised form (a form 
which few individual thinkers would adhere to) in order to examine the answers 
and arguments each position has for these questions, before proceeding to put 
forth a moderate version of technological determinism. The aim here is to explicate 
a conception of technology which avoids the extremes of both technological 
determinism and social constructivism, while recognising the implicitly social 
nature of many momentum theories. In the end, we intend to demonstrate that 
technology has some modicum of autonomy above and beyond social forces. 
The significance of this autonomy postulate is that if accepted, it entails 
that social scientists’ typical categories like class, interests, identities, and so on are 
necessary but not sufficient for understanding social phenomena. As one theorist 
notes, “the influence of technological artefacts on human action can be of a 
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nonlingual kind. Artefacts are able to exert influence as material things, not only as 
signs or carriers of meaning.”65 The influence of technology can therefore operate 
at a different level than that of intentions and meanings. Yet we need to be clear 
from the beginning that the claim of autonomy for technology is not simply that it 
resists human actions. The political theorist Jane Bennett puts this point well when 
she declares, 
 
“By 'vitality' I mean the capacity of things - edibles, commodities, 
storms, metals - not only to impede or block the will and designs of 
humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, 
propensities, or tendencies of their own."66 
 
Yet while incorporating tendencies, technological autonomy must also be 
distinguished from intentional actions, which remain the prerogative of rational 
entities. So autonomy here cannot be about resistance, nor can it be about 
intentional action. These are the basic parameters of the discussion. 
 It is also important to note the differences between technological matter 
and matter in general: namely, that technology has an ontological dependence on 
human beings. Technology cannot exist without some human (or primate) having 
created it. Oftentimes this is taken as a knockdown argument against the idea of 
technological autonomy – technology cannot do anything without humans 
creating, designing, implementing, modifying, and maintaining technologies. But 
the question of technological autonomy is not about whether or not humans must 
be involved; it is a question of what is the source of directedness for these actions? 
If technological creation and development turn out to be entirely the product of 
self-conscious choices by individual human actors, then autonomy for it would be 
refuted. If, on the other hand, technological creation and development turn out to 
have their own intrinsic directedness, then humans will turn out to merely be 
pawns in a technological game. The comparison to make here is with social 
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structures: just as technology relies for its existence on human beings, so too do 
social structures rely for their existence on a substrate of rational beings. To say 
that either of them is ontologically dependent on a world of humans is not 
equivalent though to saying they are reducible to that substrate. Likewise, just as 
social structures have a relative autonomy, so too – it will be argued here – does 
technology. 
It is also important to be clear that technological agency has an ontological 
dependence on meta-social imperatives as well – in particular, what Robert Friedel 
has called a ‘culture of improvement’.67 (Though others have argued that these 
meta-social imperatives operate instead at a religious level.68) This culture of 
improvement is a particular social norm that drives the process of change by setting 
an imperative that holds throughout society. Importantly, though, it operates on a 
very generic level – there is very little intrinsic content to the idea that technology 
must be improved, as ideas of improvement vary both across history and across 
cultures. It is a necessary social condition for technological change though. One 
can imagine a counterfactual situation where the drive for improving technologies 
was absent, and it is unlikely here that technology would ever change. But the 
generic quality of its imperative means that it is up to the material aspects of 
technology to provide some measure of specificity. A meta-social norm of 
improvement and a substrate of rational beings are therefore the two ontological 
foundations for autonomous technology. Remove either of them and technology 
loses even the relative autonomy it has. With these preliminary remarks, we can 
turn now to three dominant positions on technology. 
Technological determinism occupies perhaps the most prominent standing in the 
popular eye, though it has been academically discredited for some time now. From 
this perspective, the introduction of a technology imposes a clear effect onto 
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society.69 The technology requires – and in fact causes – a social transformation 
once it enters into a given social formation. For the determinist, moreover, 
technology (both in general and in terms of individual objects) follows a linear and 
progressive path. It determines where and how individual actors must develop a 
technology, irrespective of interpretations or social interests.70 Lastly, the 
technological determinist position exerts a force on societies which lack the latest 
technology, compelling them to follow and adopt the infrastructures of “modern” 
societies. 
Prominent historical cases in international relations include ideas that the 
printing press caused the Reformation, along with the ensuing transformation of 
the international system. Similar determinist notions emerge in claims that the 
emergence of gunpowder transformed feudal relations and led to a competitive 
arms race. More recently there has been claims from a number of commentators 
that the Arab Spring was caused by the rise and spread of social media platforms, 
which lowered the boundaries to organisation and eventually led to the downfall of 
a number of regimes.71 
In terms of the organising questions about the society-technology 
relationship, in its idealised form technological determinism adheres to three 
claims: first and most importantly, that technology uniquely determines social and 
political formations, and does so with a force approaching necessity.72 The 
examples of the printing press and contemporary social media give two instances of 
this claim, but it is particularly the case with large-scale technological systems. 
According to the determinist position, such systems end up coercing humanity into 
maintaining their existence. To give one example, 
 
“The people of Japan have learned a lot about technological 
[necessity] since the tsunami hit the Fukushima reactors. They’d love 
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to get rid of nuclear power altogether, but their leaders are telling 
them that to do so invites economic disaster. In much the same way 
we Americans, along with most of the rest of the developed world, 
are trapped by our automobiles. We know that for lots of reasons 
we’d be better off if we stopped driving them tomorrow, but we 
can’t. If we did, life as we know it would collapse, since in one way 
or another we depend on the internal combustion engine for our 
jobs, our food, and virtually everything else we need.”73 
 
It is important to clarify what is being maintained here though: it is not the 
technological system of nuclear power or the automobile per se, but instead it is 
the standard of living that is being maintained. If an alternative technical 
infrastructure was possible with the same standard of living, nuclear power would 
be on its way out. Similarly, if society changed its values about the standard of 
living, the apparent necessity of the automobile could quickly evaporate. So contra 
the determinist position, the necessity of a technological system ultimately stems 
from the social values of a particular culture – not from the materiality itself. 
With regards to the second question, the pure determinist position holds 
that technology develops temporally according to some internal and unilinear 
logic, with human individuals being mere means to this technological evolution.74 
From such a position it is claimed that, 
 
“Technology moves steadily onward as if by cause and effect. This 
does not deny human creativity, intelligence, idiosyncrasy, chance, 
or the wilful desire to head in one direction rather than another. All 
of these are absorbed into the process and become moments in the 
progression.”75 
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The crucial point is the necessity involved: it approaches mechanical causation in 
its certainty. Those working to develop a technology are compelled by physical 
constraints and an internal imperative to follow a unique path of developmental 
progress. Typically these imperatives stem from a pursuit of innate instrumental 
rationality, efficiency, or from economic necessities (classical Marxism being an 
exemplar here).76 In either case though, technology is argued to develop 
progressively and necessarily along a single track. It coerces individuals into 
developing it in such a way. 
Thirdly (and less commonly stated), determinism holds that technology 
spreads spatially according to certain patterns of diffusion.77 Often put forth under 
the rubric of modernisation theory (and implicit or explicit in many Eurocentric 
theories), technology is here taken to “naturally” spread from advanced to less-
advanced societies. In classical modernisation theory, there was a single pathway 
from traditional to modern societies, and this path was one heavily shaped by 
technological forces.78 Countries seeking to “catch up” to advanced nations were 
taught to rationalise society and to incorporate the latest technologies into their 
cultures, following the lead of the most modern countries.79 Similar assumptions 
about technology (and particularly its symbolic power) played a significant role in 
establishing the US as a world power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.80 
In direct opposition to the technological determinist thesis lies the social 
constructivist thesis. Central to this approach is the idea that “one should never 
take the meaning of a technical artefact or technological system as residing in the 
technology itself. Instead, one must study how technologies are shaped and acquire 
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their meanings in the heterogeneity of social interactions.”81 In its purest form, this 
position holds that technologies are radically underdetermined and open to 
contestation over their design and development, and open to interpretation about 
their uses and role in society. Any idea of technological autonomy is therefore 
typically left aside in these approaches (though there is usually no explicit rejection 
of all autonomy). 
In the IR literature, prominent examples have focused on military 
technology and argued, for instance, that the categorisation of a military 
technology as offensive or defensive in fact stems from social perceptions on these 
technologies, rather than from any intrinsic material capacity.82 As a result, the 
offensive realism versus defensive realism debate falters at its core theoretical level, 
and the implicit theoretical basis for a number of arms control treaties falls apart. 
Yet even in this case, the conclusions remain constrained to claiming that “it is 
difficult to categorise the impact of technological change in offense-defence 
terms.”83 Outside of these narrow terms, the possibility of technology determining 
social forces is left open. In other research, the development of ballistic missiles is 
analysed from the perspective of competing social interests. Here it is shown that a 
wide variety of paths were taken, with different groups prioritising different 
problems and different values. While some emphasised accuracy, others focused on 
reliability, for instance.84 The temporal developments of this technology were 
therefore initiated and sustained by a variety of social groups – and not by any 
imperatives internal to the technology itself. 
In relation to the questions which divide these positions, the social 
constructivist presents arguments opposed to the determinist on each account. 
First, it is argued that social and political forces determine which technology gets 
developed and what effects it has on society.85 From this perspective, the creation 
and initial design of a technology is open to multiple choices, with social groups 
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and powerful interests struggling to determine the eventual design and the point at 
which a technology gets stabilised.86 In its purest form, the socially constructed 
origin of a technology “means that all aspects of this sociotechnical ensemble [are] 
subject to variation”.87 This variation includes not just which material components 
are used and how they are fit together, but also the purpose of the technology itself. 
In other words, how a technology is going to shape society is flexible and 
determined by competing interpretations about what its function should be. 
Second, the social constructivist position argues that the evolution of a 
technology is shaped by economic and political factors instead of by some internal 
teleology. Once a new technology arises, the initial stages of technological 
innovation almost always suggest multiple paths that can be taken. It is rare for one 
path to be the clear way forward. In the first place, even the use of an object may 
not be particularly clear and must be made precise. The tape recorder, for instance, 
floundered as a product and eventually had to be marketed with a pamphlet 
entitled ‘999 Uses of the Tape Recorder’. It was not until it became used to record 
music that it finally took off as a successful invention.88 There are also contentions 
over technical requirements, over different solutions to the same problem, and 
over moral imperatives, for instance.89 Each of these provides the space for conflict 
between alternative paths. From its very origins, therefore, technology evolves not 
according to any linear plan, but instead according to a multidirectional path.90 It is 
one of the significant advances of social constructivist approaches to demonstrate 
that it is only retroactively, once a path has been chosen for various contingent 
reasons, that a linear model of development can be discerned. 
Lastly, with respect to spatial development, the social constructivist position 
argues that the diffusion and adoption of technologies is explainable by economic 
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and political contexts.91 Research which has attempted to reproduce the dynamics 
of technological adoption, for instance, has focused on advertising and early 
adoption by small groups of innovators as key factors in the speed and distribution 
of new technologies.92 In these cases, fashion and trendsetters are important for the 
diffusion of technology, more than any inherent material properties. 
Between the opposed poles of social constructivism and technological 
determinism, recent work has attempted to clarify a middle ground for 
technological autonomy. The consensus here has settled upon what is commonly 
called ‘momentum’.93 Momentum stems in part from the fact that technologies 
have a logistical footprint: any given technology implies an entire system of 
production, distribution channels, technical experts, and subsidiary technologies. 
A technology, in other words, always already implies a larger sociotechnical 
assemblage, and as a result a set of shifts that emerge from adopting it. For 
instance, gunpowder, and the military advances it enabled, drove a number of 
shifts.94 In the first place, the production of gunpowder required intensive capital 
investment and generated economies of scale as a result. Warfare became 
increasingly the preserve of wealthy groups. But secondarily, gunpowder changed 
the logistics of war. No longer were soldiers capable of living off the land; instead 
they now had to receive and transport large quantities of guns and gunpowder. 
This drove the production of new managerial systems that were capable of 
organizing these logistical networks. We can see, condensed in this example, the 
primary source of momentum. A technology is adopted for some reason (here, 
comparative military advantage), but individual technical objects rely on larger 
sociotechnical assemblages (e.g. factories and transportation networks). So the 
adoption of a technology also implies (logically and materially) the adoption of the 
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larger system which produces it. A more recent example is the mobile phone. 
Adopting this technology means also adopting the higher demand for rare earth 
minerals, which means also adopting China’s dominance in this resource, as well 
as adopting the role these minerals play in funding conflicts in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. So momentum emerges from the adoption of an entire 
associated assemblage if one wants to adopt an individual technology. Technology 
forces society to readjust. 
With respect to the first organising question, momentum approaches tend 
to agree with social constructivists about the radical flexibility of a technology’s 
initial design. The emergence of a technology or a sociotechnical assemblage is 
itself open to a series of political contestations over the design of every aspect. 
These can involve entrenched interests, powerful corporations, influential 
individuals, and many others.95 However, once a technology reaches a certain stage 
of stabilisation, it comes to exert a force on the social environment surrounding it. 
Particularly with sociotechnical systems, they can “become severed from the ends 
originally set for them and, in effect, reprogram themselves and their environments 
to suit the special conditions of their own environments.”96 In this sense, 
technology not only introduces new possibilities into assemblages, but also 
introduces new demands – both in the form of economic demands for the 
resources necessary to keep it working, and in the form of operational demands for 
the technologies and environment which a particular technology relies upon.97 
Certain organisations of labour and capital arise from these demands of the 
system.98 The rise of the railroad in the 1850s, for instance, brought forth the 
requirement of a highly centralised German military structure.99 
As a result of momentum, the temporal development of technologies can 
tend to push in one direction. This is particularly the case with large sociotechnical 
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systems, which research has suggested follows a loose temporal pattern.100 The 
internal dynamic of sociotechnical systems arises from their interrelated 
components. Thomas Edison once noted that since the components of a large 
technical system must be compatible, in some sense the whole itself was simply a 
large machine.101 Much like individual technologies, this entails that changes in one 
component can and do often have effects on the other components. The early 
electrical infrastructure highlights the ways this occurs – a change in a generator, 
for instance, required changes in a motor’s resistance, voltage and amperage, which 
can cause even further changes being needed.102 As a result, the system is internally 
dynamic and often in constant fluctuation. This leads to what are termed ‘reverse 
salients’, which are “components in a system that have fallen behind or are out of 
phase with the others.”103 As aspects of a sociotechnical system shift over time, they 
create internal pressures for other components to continue apace, thereby letting 
the system take on its own relative autonomy independently of our intentions or 
conceptions of it. Moreover, the individuality and unity of a specific system must 
be recognised as always contingent and open to change. While the literature on 
sociotechnical systems has tended to install a strict separation between a system 
and its environment, the notion of assemblages prohibits such a barrier except as a 
contingent and temporary construction.104 
Once these large-scale systems have been adopted, they then take on a 
further sense of momentum. Beyond the force of their interconnected 
components, sociotechnical systems tend to take on limited goals and some 
measure of velocity, in the first place because of “vested interests, fixed assets, and 
sunk costs”.105 In this vein, Langdon Winner suggests that, 
 
“The freedom to develop technology primarily to serve human needs 
was lost with the spread of industrialization and the growth of 
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modern megatechnical systems in communications, transportation, 
power production, and manufacturing. These gigantic, complex, 
interconnected technological systems overwhelm human values and 
defy human control.”106 
 
Implicitly invoked here is a sense of the path-dependency produced by 
technological systems. As with institutions, technological systems create path-
dependencies.107 This shift from the contingency of initial development decisions 
to the virtual necessity of sociotechnical infrastructures is premised upon their 
fixed and sunk costs, the existence of habits resulting from learning to use a 
technology, the benefits gained from a community of existing users, and the 
expectations of the technology’s continued existence.108 Path dependency helps 
explain why sociotechnical systems evolve a momentum that resists change.109 
The initial limitation with momentum being equated to a form of 
technological autonomy is that, strictly speaking, path dependence is primarily 
conceived as a social constraint and not as a material constraint. So for instance, 
factories took forty years to shift from powering their buildings with steam engines 
to powering their buildings with electrical motors. The reason was because 
adopting the electrical motors involved rebuilding the entire factory, which was an 
expensive and lengthy process.110 Close attention reveals that the most significant 
explanatory factors in such an example are economics, power, interests, beliefs, and 
psychology. We can see this by virtue of the counterfactual situation – if the costs 
of adopting electrical motors had been cheaper, factories would have incorporated 
them much quicker than they did. Instead, the old technology had been locked-in 
for economic reasons, and an essentially obsolete technology continued onwards. 
The second limitation with momentum is that despite the suggestion of active 
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directedness in its name, momentum almost always refers to a resistance of 
technological systems to human intervention. In this regard, it is no different from 
other passive conceptions of matter which take resistance to be the paradigmatic 
quality of matter. 
Lastly, with regards to spatial diffusion, most theorists who subscribe to a 
momentum position tend to (at least implicitly) adhere to a social constructivist 
view of diffusion: economic and social interests determine where a technology goes 
and how it is modified in transit.111 However, while not often stated in the 
literature, one can interpolate a conception of spatial diffusion from the idea of 
momentum. In this case, the pervasiveness and dominance of a particular 
technological form would instil a certain imperative on other actors to adopt the 
same form.112 A commonly cited case – the relatively inefficient QWERTY 
keyboard setup – provides an excellent example of this sort of spatial diffusion by 
momentum.113 Again, however, path dependency in the social sense remains the 
key explanatory factor here, rather than any material imperative. 
Each of these positions contributes to an overall theory of technology and its 
relation to society, yet falls short in certain respects. The social constructivist 
critique of the determinist position clearly makes the latter untenable. Technology 
is not as unilinear, necessary, or autonomous as the determinists claimed (and 
often feared). Yet the social constructivist position tends too far in the opposite 
direction. While rarely explicitly rejecting the materiality of technology, the 
physical impositions of matter typically remain silent in this research program. 
Interpretative flexibility and multi-directional development become the focus at the 
expense of technological constraints. Lastly, momentum marks a significant 
advance in bridging the two positions – demonstrating how determinism can 
appear to come about, while simultaneously recognising the socially embedded 
nature of all technology. Yet even here, this determinism is typically of a purely 
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social kind – stemming not from any physical imperatives but instead from the 
engrained values and interests of a particular society. The materiality of technology 
is again often implicitly side-lined. 
 
 
 
 
By contrast, the position that will be set out here aims to start from the 
materiality of technology and take its significant (and relatively autonomous) 
influence into account, while recognising the important contributions of other 
approaches. The perspective put forth here agrees with the social constructivist 
insight that the development of a technology is always underdetermined. Similarly, 
it accepts much of momentum theory though with more emphasis on the material 
conditioning of effects and development. Yet it also returns to classic determinist 
ideas to argue that technology does orient its uptake and its development in 
particular directions.114 By reviving the determinist emphasis on the materiality of 
technology, this position attempts to emphasise technology’s durability and 
momentum. Technology is seen here to provide a stable, albeit flexible, platform 
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which shapes the movement, interaction, and organisation of social entities.115 As a 
platform, technology functions as a basic ground which sets the constraints and 
opportunities for further development and use.116 In particular, technology 
provides a platform of affordances at three levels: perception, cognition, and 
action. Insofar as it strongly determines what is possible at a given moment, it is 
also possible to refer to technology as a material transcendental of society – 
invoking Kant’s famous transcendental idealism which sought the conditions of 
experience. Figure 2 schematises the argument to be made in the following 
sections.  
The perspective taken here is therefore a platform theory of technology, or a 
qualified version of technological determinism. In the first place, technology does 
shape society – but it does so in a more flexible fashion than classical determinism 
suggests. Rather than there being a singular and unambiguous outcome of a 
particular technology entering into a given society, there are a variety of 
possibilities. What a technology determines is not the specific effect, but instead 
the general landscape of possible actions and thoughts.  A given technology affects 
social interactions by (1) making certain behaviours more likely, by (2) constraining 
other behaviours, and – most importantly – by (3) creating entirely new types of 
behaviours. Technologies have specifiable amplifying and dampening aspects.117 
Technology, in other words, operates as a platform for social forces. For instance, 
the question of whether social media is liberating or not misses the point that its 
effects are to act as a platform which transforms an entire landscape of possible 
behaviours.118 These technologies both lower the costs of communicating with 
geographically dispersed individuals and lower the costs of monitoring this 
communication. How actors make use of these technologies is then open to the 
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influence of economics, politics, and culture – but all within the constrained set of 
affordances that the technology offers. 
Technological platforms do not merely alter existing social possibilities 
though; their most significant function lies instead in their capacity to create 
entirely new possibilities. This novelty can be emphasised with a thought 
experiment in which a technology is replaced by its equivalent in human labour. It 
would appear at first glance that given enough time and resources any technology is 
replaceable (and hence in principle reducible) to such an equivalent. Bruno 
Latour’s famous (and pseudonymous) article on the sociology of a door-stopper 
highlights well the kinds of convolutions necessary to replace even the simplest 
technology with a human equivalent:119 
 
"Every time you want to know what a nonhuman does, simply 
imagine what other humans or other nonhumans would have to do 
were this character not present. This imaginary substitution exactly 
sizes up the role, or function, of this little figure."120 
 
There is a significant problem with this idea though: at best it only holds 
for more mundane technologies. In what sense is an fMRI replaceable by any 
number of humans? Is a nuclear weapon replaceable? Is even a railroad replaceable 
by human labour in any meaningful sense? With the computing revolution, this 
irreducibility is even more striking. To match the world’s currently fastest 
supercomputer would require all 7 billion inhabitants of earth to each process 3 
million calculations per second.121 Meanwhile, the climate modellers behind 
climate change policy are pushing for exascale computers that are 1000 times faster 
than this current supercomputer. From this it is clear that while computing power 
is theoretically reducible to a human equivalent, there is nevertheless a qualitative 
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shift involved here.122 To put it simply: technology is doing things humans are not 
even in principle capable of. There is real novelty here, a real expansion of what is 
possible. 
 With these capacities to expand and alter the material platform of society, 
technology can be seen to operate on three general possibilities: action, perception, 
and cognition. Each of these intermingles, and indeed, the case studies in this 
thesis all demonstrate that changes in perception and cognition can lead to 
changes in what is behaviourally possible. 
The most intuitive notion of how technological platforms shape 
possibilities is simply through what actions they make possible. The most 
prominent social influences that technology produces are often of this type: the 
introduction of a new technology creates and warps behaviours through causal 
interactions which are then diffused outwards into ever larger patterns of social 
change. For instance, the introduction of the automobile changes the behaviours 
of travelling in individuals and (through a longer chain of causes) eventually alters 
the way urban planning is done.  Or the introduction of a new technology such as 
the shipping container makes new behaviours economically possible and 
revolutionises international trade patterns.123 On the level of users, technical 
objects set out specific procedures that must be followed in order for the object to 
be usable in the first place.124 Objects therefore instil patterns and habits of 
behaviour onto individuals and collectivities.125 In the same way that individuals 
have to respond to alterations in their natural environment, so too do individuals 
change in virtue of alterations in their technological environment. 
Technologies can also change the perceptions of individual actors. This can 
be seen most obviously in cases of scientific instrumentation being used to make 
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the previously unobservable into the observable.126 Technology makes different 
spectrums of light visible, or makes complex systems like the climate visible. More 
indirectly, this affection of perception can be seen with the emergence of rail 
networks and their capacity to make long-distance travel easier for many. They not 
only shorten the time between locations, but through their separation of the 
distance travelled from the physical labour of travel they helped produce a new 
experience of distance.127 In a similar manner Paul Virilio notes of modern 
transatlantic air travel that “we have finally achieved states bordering on sensory 
deprivation” with the “thrills of the old voyage […] now compensated for by the 
showing of a film.”128 The very phenomenology of travel (and hence, of distance 
and time) is now partially produced through technology. 
Lastly, technology also shapes the possibilities of conceptual space, 
including shifts in concepts, inferences, economic calculations, and imaginative 
possibilities. This will be the focus of the next chapter, but for now it suffices to say 
that the production of new concepts, new inferential relations, new economic 
calculations, and new imaginations involve some of the most significant shifts 
initiated by technology. It is not only a shift in how the world is interacted with, 
but in how the world is thought about. 
From understanding technology as a platform that shapes the possibilities 
available for action, perception, and cognition, a number of implications follow. In 
the first place, such a framework makes precise the debate over technological 
autonomy. By conceptualising technology’s effects in terms of degrees of possibility, 
a much more nuanced approach can be presented.129 In some cases, technology will 
heavily constrain possibilities, thereby approaching classical determinism. In other 
cases, technology will leave the possibilities relatively open and thereby 
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approximate the social constructivist view. With this in mind, it now becomes 
possible to refine the notion of changes in possibility structure into a series of more 
specific mechanisms (a task that the case studies will attempt to accomplish). 
 Secondly, by understanding technology as a platform which affects an array 
of possibilities, one avoids any clean functionalism or simple rationalism. For these 
approaches, not only is there one optimal social formation from a given set of 
material conditions, but existing social formations can be explained by virtue of 
optimising these given conditions. Yet while there may be certain optimal social 
formations discernible from a given material context, this is distinct from saying 
that a given social formation arose because of its functional optimisation.130 It is the 
latter argument which must be refused, while still recognising that material 
infrastructures do provide a determinate set of affordances. One can theoretically 
derive an optimal social formation (in some cases), while still recognising that 
practically other outcomes are equally possible. 
Lastly, the focus on technology changing behaviour and cognition also 
highlights the specifically political nature of technological objects. It is simply no 
longer plausible to hold the thesis that technologies are politically and ethically 
neutral.131 Their political nature may include multiple possibilities that are in 
tension with each other, but the introduction of a technology still involves changes 
in the behavioural landscape. Bruno Latour’s example of the speed bump is 
emblematic here – as he argues, the speed bump is literally the expression of a 
particular norm. Instead of “appeals to morality, enlightened disinterest and 
reflection”, the speed bump operates to slow vehicles through “appeals to pure 
selfishness and reflex action”.132 It is neither a neutral object nor a simple norm. 
Rather it is a hybrid mixture of both norms and materiality. A similar case of non-
neutrality arises in Langdon Winner’s famous example of a bridge that was 
designed precisely to block public transportation like busses.133 To be clear, actions 
involving technologies do not delegate sole responsibility to the technologies 
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themselves. It is not a case of ‘guns kill people’ rather than ‘people kill people’. 
Instead, the action has to be distributed between these actors involved – both 
human and non-human.134 The production of music, for instance, is attributable 
neither to the musician nor to the instrument – but instead only to the entire 
emergent assemblage of musician-instrument itself. 
The technologies examined in this thesis will follow this platform theory of 
technology and be shown to have made possible a certain set of perceptions, 
thoughts, and behaviours. Yet while evidence will be given to demonstrate that 
actors have made use of these new possibilities, it should not be therefore taken 
that the technology caused these actors to act this way. Instead, by expanding the 
possible space of actions, these technologies have been combined with existing 
social and political forces in order to bring about the observed behaviours. 
Technology, as the theoretical discussion has attempted to show, operates by 
expanding the landscape of possible behaviours, and not by directly forcing actors 
to act in a certain way. (Only in exceptional cases does the latter type of strict 
determinism hold.) 
A similar platform approach holds for the study of technology’s temporal 
development (whether for a given technology or for technology in general). As with 
technology as a platform for society, the materiality again sets the basic ground 
from which future developmental paths can emerge. Physical constraint is the 
initial condition, and interpretation and social contestation can only emerge 
afterwards. Technologies are in a constant state of becoming and this becoming 
takes on a specific tendency by virtue of the frictions between components.135 The 
temporal development of a technology involves an overcoming of the internal 
tensions within it: pieces that produced friction (literal and metaphoric) with other 
pieces compel an evolution of the object towards ever more internally coherent 
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forms.136 These include tensions between computational demands, data demands, 
speed demands, accuracy demands, power demands, as well as frictions between 
non-computational physical components and other mechanical frictions. It is these 
sorts of frictions which set out the broad developmental path forward for a 
technology. They place demands on individuals to overcome these frictions and 
organise the technology into a coherent whole. 
As the philosopher Gilbert Simondon puts it, a technology “evolves by 
convergence and by adaption to itself; it is unified from within according to a 
principle of internal resonance.”137 This somewhat cryptic remark is elaborated on 
by one of his commentators: 
 
“When he looks at the individuation of machines from the angle of 
the process of invention, Simondon sees a passage from an abstract, 
analytical, logical system toward a concrete, synthetic, practical 
system. Inventors begin designing machines with an eye to 
accomplishing a single task, which they diagram in an abstract, 
analytic fashion; but as they actually use the machine, the design 
itself begins to demand practical adjustments, bringing into play 
other aspects of its basic elements, adding new elements, and 
creating new relations among elements. For instance, you design a 
motor to turn a wheel without necessarily thinking about the 
materials, but when building and operating it, you discover that 
certain materials, forged in a such as way as to produce specific 
qualities, work better. In effect, it becomes self-regulating.”138 
 
To put it otherwise, technological objects transition from being a series of 
independent components to merging into a system that resonates internally.139 
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Throughout this process, “the nascent technology must now be based on proper 
components, made reliable, improved, scaled up, and applied effectively to 
different purposes.”140 Or as Simondon puts it, “the antagonisms and reciprocal 
limitations are progressively effaced, the functioning of the machine tending to 
become a global functioning, and in sum, the technological object approaches the 
natural object but by other ways than those of nature.”141 In this sense, therefore, 
technologies have an internal dynamism that exerts an independent pressure on 
those who go on to develop it. The possible paths of progression are set out by 
material factors internal to the object itself.  
This internal process can be seen in a variety of technologies: from 
variations in engine design, and other technologies such as the internal evolution 
of firearms and the dynamics of personal computers.142 Since technologies are 
always internally filled with tensions between material components and different 
functions, the development of a technology involves modulating these tensions to 
minimise them and generate a more efficient technology. For instance, 
 
“The F-35C [carrier-based fighter jet] needs to pull off a set of design 
objectives that conflict. It needs to be structurally strong and heavy 
enough to withstand the high forces of carrier launches and 
tailhook-arrested landings, yet preserve the high manoeuvrability and 
long-range fuel performance. It needs to have excellent low-speed 
control for carrier landings, yet be able to fly at more than 1.6 times 
the speed of sound. And it needs to have the angled surfaces that 
make it almost undetectable to radar, yet fly properly.”143 
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The development of a technology is the process of modulating such internal 
tensions along paths determined by the materiality of the technology.144 
Empirically, this progression can occur in leaps and bounds, as well as with 
minor modifications.145 It should be emphasised though that this direction of 
internal progression is only setting out the possibilities of change in technologies. 
Yet these internal dynamics are entirely material – they are not guided by social 
norms or values, but instead outline a set of strict possibilities for future 
development. The process of development provides an independent material 
dynamic to the evolution of technologies. 
 A similar dynamic of individuation can be perceived at the largest scale of 
technology as well: the entire ecosystem of technologies available at a particular 
time. While a number of theorists have attempted to develop an evolutionary 
theory of technology,146 the classical ideas of evolution cannot explain the types of 
radical innovations that occur in the technological world. Biological evolution does 
not produce radically new species; instead it builds piecemeal upon random 
variations and hereditary mechanisms. Nowhere in standard evolutionary 
mechanisms is there an explanation for how something like radar could emerge 
from radio, despite being obviously related in retrospect.147 The solution complexity 
theorist Brian Arthur argues for is to recognise that individual components of 
technologies can themselves provide the building blocks for radically new 
technologies.148 In addition, technologies are also built out of the use of various 
natural phenomena – for example, the radar uses electromagnetic waves in such a 
novel way that the natural phenomenon becomes a component of the new 
technology. That is to say, new technologies do not spring forth from nothing, but 
instead emerge from the combination of existing technologies, components, and 
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harnessed natural phenomena. Combination becomes the mechanism of global 
technological evolution and the means for the radically new to emerge. 
Emerging from combination, each new technology recursively opens up 
new paths and sets the stage for further technological development.149 For instance, 
the smartphone emerged from the existing conjunction of computer technology, 
cellular technology, camera technology, gyroscope technology, touchpad 
technology, and of course, phone technology. Understood as an ecosystem and 
understood historically, the technological world therefore seems to evolve new 
forms over time – they share a common ancestor in a way.150 But the stronger claim 
from this is that not only does the technological ecosystem shape possible 
developments at any given moment, it also actively drives sociotechnical 
assemblages towards particular outcomes. There is an important sense in which 
once the components of a technology are available, that the new technology will 
inevitably emerge soon after. Much of the literature on invention highlights that an 
invention is rarely – if ever – the product of only one group of people.151 Almost 
always, a new technology is created near simultaneously by multiple groups working 
on the same project.152 This makes sense insofar as technology in general provides 
the material platform of the possible. Given certain conditions set out by the 
technological ecosystem, the evolution of technology will continue apace by virtue 
of its own internal dynamics. Even more specifically, the evolution of the 
technological ecosystem will move ahead in roughly predictable fashion being 
drawn towards particular ends.153,154 As Arthur argues, the next decade of 
technological progression is fairly easy to predict. The paths down which human 
innovation will go are set out by the material systems in place now. As a complex 
system, there are strict temporal limits to prediction though – small changes today 
can invoke unpredictable changes in the future. Yet this does not change the fact 
that the near-term paths of technological evolution are largely predictable. As with 
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individual objects, the material infrastructure of the technological ecosystem 
produces particular pathways. 
So at the largest scales and the smallest scales, technology’s material nature 
provides a platform for temporal development. Its path is individuated within a 
particular set of possible outcomes shaped by internal frictions, and social 
contestation takes places within these materially-delineated possibilities. As we will 
see, each of the three technologies in this thesis illustrates this theory – each 
encounters fundamental frictions in fulfilling their functions and the overcoming 
of these frictions forms the contours of their possible temporal development. This 
means that in order to understand their development, one must understand the 
frictions that arise and the material nature of these technologies. Broadly speaking, 
we will see that climate models face the frictions of calculating capacities; financial 
models face the frictions of speed; and crisis mapping faces the frictions of mobile 
technology. 
This chapter has attempted to cover and synthesise a diverse array of literature on 
technology, while drawing out some broad conclusions: (1) the distinction between 
technologies and sociotechnical systems; (2) IR’s tendency to neglect technological 
dynamics and effects; and (3) the notion of technology as a material platform for 
society and development. Most important is (4) the idea that technology ultimately 
transforms the world by shaping possibility spaces within society. Technology acts 
as part of the material transcendental for the social sphere. It establishes the 
conditions of possibility for a given era and in this sense, the value of a technology 
“lies not merely in what can be done with it but also in what further possibilities it 
will lead to.”155 So just as the materiality of technology grounds the basis for its own 
evolution, it also grounds the transformation of what is possible in a society. (And 
indeed, technology often appears today as the only thing that can accomplish the 
properly political gesture of transforming what is possible.156) 
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 The claim that materiality independently acts by shaping the possibility 
structure of behaviours can therefore be distinguished from: (1) arguments that 
materiality acts as an inert and politically neutral backdrop for social action, (2) 
arguments that materiality is reducible to the intentions, interpretations and uses 
of it, and (3) arguments that technology is exogenous to IR and of little relevance. 
To the contrary, the claim here is that (1) materiality shapes (in productive and 
constraining ways) the space of possible and likely behaviours, (2) materiality is to 
some degree independent of human actions and intentions, and (3) by shaping 
possibilities, materiality is inherently political and therefore useful for 
understanding the dynamics of world politics. 
While the emphasis in this chapter has been on what materiality 
contributes to technology, it should nevertheless be reiterated that the 
development of technologies is also shaped by social factors. The difference 
between determinism and social constructivism is one of degree rather than kind: 
the former is simply the zero degree point where the material dynamics force only 
one possibility of development. The latter, by contrast, neglects the ways in which 
material factors channel development and behaviour in certain directions. The 
next chapter will continue this focus on technology, but will examine the 
specificities of representational technologies and what they entail in shifting 
cognitive possibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
“The 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, 
like [railway] switchmen, determined the tracks along which 
action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. ‘From 
what' and 'for what' one wished to be redeemed and, let us 
not forget, 'could be' redeemed, depended upon one's image 
of the world.”1 
 
-Max Weber 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
In the last chapter we set out a theory of technology – as a platform for social 
behaviours and for technological development along a determinate spectrum of 
future paths. This chapter seeks to build upon that foundation and establish a 
framework for understanding a particular type of technology: representational 
technologies. These are the material technologies which are being used to generate 
knowledge claims (in the form of numbers, maps, graphs, videos, and indicators) 
about complex situations.2 These technologies include simulations, formal models, 
agent-based models, data analytics, and other instruments used to produce 
representations of some phenomenon. 
While representational technologies have existed historically in a number of 
ways (e.g. maps), the latest generation of digital representations are significantly 
different.3 On a fundamental physical level, digital representations provide an 
immense expansion of optical possibilities. Whereas previous visual media 
remained bound to the optical laws of refraction and reflection (e.g. photography 
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and film), the computer opens up the now everyday possibility of directly 
constructing images imperceptible pixel by imperceptible pixel.4 This invisibility of 
the individual pixels lends the images the potential aura of reality (see, for instance, 
Apple’s attempt to invoke this reality by branding their high-resolution screens as 
‘Retina displays’). With this expansion of visual qualities, perspective is easily 
manipulated, impossible objects are easily constructible, and the difficult 
techniques of experimental cinema become a simple software effect.5 
In fact, while the term ‘representation’ suggests a direct relation between 
the images on a screen with a phenomenon in the world, it is perhaps more 
accurate to state that computers generate rather than represent images.6 This 
generative aspect entails that they are algorithmic through and through – nothing 
that appears on the screen has avoided this step.7 This generative aspect is also what 
makes possible another unique aspect of digital representations. For some theorists 
the rise of digital imaging portends the separation of images from reality. This 
quality of digital representation stems from the fact that they can construct 
enclosed simulations. Given a few assumptions and rules, these models generate 
self-consistent worlds. In particular, these digital representations are capable of 
modelling dynamic systems (not just static images), visuals (not just numbers), and 
complex interactions (not just simple linear relations). Moreover, these media are 
interactive – they allow users to manipulate them in increasingly intuitive ways, 
lending them an amplified sense of being an extension of the real world (rather 
than a mere virtual world). 
Lastly, digital representations have different properties than other recent 
representational media (particularly oral and written media) – they last longer than 
photographs or film; they have a larger storage capacity for information; and they 
are more easily transported than the bulky media of earlier ages.8 This builds on 
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the shift from a literary-based world to an image-based world which entails that “we 
experience, perceive, and value the world and ourselves differently, no longer in a 
one-dimensional, linear, process-oriented historical way but rather in a two-
dimensional way, as surface, context, scene.”9 It is on the basis of these material 
differences that contemporary representational technologies are coming to play 
increasingly significant roles in cognition and knowledge production. 
 The first section of this chapter will demonstrate how modern science and 
knowledge are intricately interwoven with material infrastructures. Particularly in 
the latter half of the twentieth century, representational technologies have come to 
occupy important roles in providing the basis for human knowledge. The second 
section will look at recent research in cognitive science and philosophy of mind to 
argue that it is not only that knowledge is stored in technology, but also that 
technology plays a role in thinking. From here, the third section will go beyond the 
general proposition that thinking occurs with machines and outline some specific 
mechanisms through which representational technologies augment cognition. The 
latter half of this chapter will then turn towards existing ideas of knowledge 
production in IR and show how the idea of representational technologies modifies 
concepts such as epistemic communities. From here, a new concept will be put 
forth: the idea of cognitive assemblages as the sociotechnical production of 
knowledge for actors involved in world politics. 
In one sense, the focus on knowledge and representations in this thesis is nothing 
new for IR. Constructivism has long emphasised the processes of knowledge 
production, highlighting the ways in which identities, norms, interests, and 
knowledge contribute to the formation of world politics. In Emanuel Adler’s 
exemplary words, knowledge for IR “means not only information that people carry 
in their heads, but also, and primarily, the intersubjective background or context of 
expectations, dispositions, and language that gives meaning to material reality”.10 
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Knowledge here is both mental (inside the head) and social (distributed via 
intersubjective communication). 
The problem with this formulation of what knowledge is (and what 
distinguishes the approach taken here from traditional constructivist approaches) is 
that decades of research in other disciplines have shown this to be a partial view of 
the nature of knowledge. Instead, knowledge has come to be recognised as being 
comprised of a heterogeneous set of materials, of which only a portion are in fact 
identifiably ‘social’ or ‘in our heads’. It is precisely this heterogeneity – and more 
specifically, the materiality of knowledge – that this thesis is attempting to focus 
our attention on. Knowledge is inseparable from measuring instruments, from data 
collection tools, from computer models and physical models, from archives, from 
databases and from all the material means we use to communicate research 
findings. Highlighting the significance of these material means of knowledge 
production, Latour argues that a major factor which separates pre-scientific minds 
from scientific minds is the technologies that became available during this period.11 
There was, in other words, no sudden advance in brainpower which made 
seventeenth century humans more scientific than fifteenth century humans. 
Similarly, as philosophy of science has shown, there is no clear scientific method 
that we simply started to follow.12 Instead, Latour argues the shift was largely in the 
production and circulation of various new technologies which enabled our rather 
limited cognitive abilities to become more regimented and to see at a glance a 
much wider array of facts and theories. The printing press is the most obvious 
example here, but also the production of rationalised geometrical perspectives and 
new means of circulating knowledge – all of this contributed to the processes of 
standardisation, comparison, and categorisation that are essential to the scientific 
project. Similarly, the instruments of knowledge production themselves come to 
embody and embed particular theories, permitting a boot-strapping process of 
further technological and scientific development.13 The thermometer, for instance, 
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“…has been designed to take one quantitative reading (e.g. mercury 
volume) and systematically translate it into another quantitative 
reading (e.g. degrees Celsius). This is a very simple computation, but 
it is a kind of reasoning process. Modern science is built upon a 
panoply of much more complicated instruments that automate 
lengthy series of calculations which we previously would have had to 
wind our own inferential path through.”14 
 
This condensation of inferences into instruments is one of the primary means of 
expanding our limited cognitive capacities. Therefore, the shift between the pre-
scientific to the scientific world was heavily indebted to shifts in the materiality of 
knowledge, not our minds. 
Today sees a similar revolution in the material infrastructure of knowledge 
production. Since the emergence of computers, science has been increasingly 
beholden to their abilities to the extent that modern science is almost entirely 
premised upon computational infrastructures with knowledge existing distributed 
across these systems. The large-scale experimental apparatus such as wind-tunnel 
testing grounds and particle accelerators are all essential to the production of 
knowledge, and the amount of data generated by these systems demands 
computational analysis. These ‘knowledge infrastructures’ are comprised of “robust 
networks of people, artefacts, and institutions that generate, share, and maintain 
specific knowledge about the human and natural worlds.”15 They function as widely 
dispersed systems of observation, calculation and data storage. Contrary, therefore, 
to poststructuralists like Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio, the West is not shifting 
into a post-physical virtual world, since symbols themselves have become 
increasingly dependent on material structures.16 Such is the dependency of science 
on these systems that a number of commentators are beginning to worry about the 
costs of ‘big science’ and whether these computational infrastructures can grow 
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much further with diminishing funding.17 Yet these infrastructures remain essential 
to contemporary knowledge production: 
 
“Get rid of the infrastructure and you are left with claims you can’t 
back up, facts you can’t verify, comprehension you can’t share, and 
data you can’t trust. Without the infrastructure, knowledge can 
decay or even disappear. Build up a knowledge infrastructure, 
maintain it well, and you get stable, reliable, widely shared 
understanding.”18 
 
Knowledge, therefore, is both produced and sustained by these material systems, to 
such a degree that progress in scientific knowledge is now tied to progress in 
computational technology.19 
 With this increased reliance on material (and specifically, computational) 
infrastructures, knowledge production is undergoing a transformation on multiple 
levels. The much heralded rise of ‘big data’ is but one recent symptom of this shift. 
This increasing reliance on computational science has been equated with an overall 
revolution in which the very style of scientific practice and institutionalisation gets 
transformed.20 Others highlight the tendency of this new science to shift from 
reductive analysis of components to emergent synthesis of wholes – one premised 
upon networks and complex systems.21 Perhaps most significantly, the novelty of 
computational science stems from the fact that it “uses methods that push humans 
away from the centre of the epistemological enterprise.”22 The rise of digitised 
information and increasingly ubiquitous data collection has meant that science is 
becoming too vast, too filled with unrelated data, and too complex for traditional 
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methods and for individual comprehension. There is a shift occurring here in what 
‘science’ and ‘knowledge’ mean.23 As one commentator puts it, 
 
“With the new database-based science, there is often no moment 
when the complex becomes simple enough for us to understand it. 
The model does not reduce to an equation that lets us then throw 
away the model. You have to run the simulation to see what 
emerges.”24 
 
In order to make these systems compatible with human limitations, their 
operations must be output into particular human-sized representations (often, 
though not always, visual) – a problem which is increasingly being recognised by 
studies of data visualisation.25 Lastly, with this shift in the methods of knowledge 
production comes a shift in decision-making as well. Whereas historically, decisions 
have been made on the basis of experience and judgment, with the rise of complex 
societies we have had to shift to a new mode of understanding and acting that is 
premised upon data, algorithms, and interfaces.26 
 Modern science is therefore increasingly reliant on materialising knowledge. 
Yet this idea of ‘materialising knowledge’ has at least two senses that need to be 
distinguished. The first we have already mentioned: the relatively common sense 
notion that technologies embody knowledge in their very construction. A 
telescope, for instance, embodies certain principles of refraction, along with certain 
engineering principles. A nuclear weapon embodies knowledge of atomic structure 
and uranium enrichment. In this sense, materializing knowledge means quite 
literally turning knowledge into a concrete artefact. The second – and for our 
purposes, more important – sense is of embedding and extending cognitive systems 
into material infrastructures. In this sense, technology (particularly computing 
                                                 
23 Weinberger, “To Know, But Not Understand.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 Tufte, The Visual Display of Quantitative Information. 
26 Sarewitz, Pielke, Jr., and Byerly, Jr., “Introduction: Death, Taxes, and Environmental Policy,” 3; 
Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Kim, Strength in Numbers: How Does Data-Driven Decisionmaking Affect Firm 
Performance?; Ayres, Super Crunchers: Why Thinking-By-Numbers Is the New Way To Be Smart. 
technology) does cognitive activities such as perception, memory and processing, 
and then presents the outcome of these processes in a form amenable to human 
cognition. It is one of the unique components of the modern world that such 
representation-producing technologies widely exist, inaugurating a new way to 
speak of the material construction of world politics. 
It is this latter sense of materialising knowledge which has been the focus of recent 
research in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. While the notion of 
embedding cognition into material processes (the brain, most obviously) is no 
longer controversial, this research has argued for extending cognition beyond the 
boundaries of the human body. Rather than cognition being limited within the 
physical boundaries of an organism, the literature on distributed cognitive systems 
argues that technology can and does extend cognition beyond these arbitrary 
borders. What this entails is that certain information processing functions can be 
carried out by objects external to our physical bodies.27 In a famous example, the 
philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers imagine the case of a man with 
amnesia who uses a notebook as the primary storage medium for his memories.28 If 
examined closely, we realise that the notebook itself plays all the functional roles 
we would typically attribute to internal memory – meaning that once we ignore our 
inner/outer assumption we should be willing to acknowledge that this external 
object is itself a part of a distributed cognitive system. 
This argument relies on what Clark calls the Parity Principle. It is a weak 
form of functionalism which states that if an external object consistently carries out 
a causal-functional role for a cognitive system, then it should be considered a part 
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of that cognitive system. As Clark argues, what the Parity Principle does is suspend 
the arbitrary a priori separation between the inner and the outer. If some external 
object – a notebook, a computer, a smartphone – plays a role in a cognitive 
sequence, then the simplest explanation is that it is part of an extended system. 
The picture of human cognition emerging from the research in this field is one of 
humans who are experts at offloading information processing into their 
environment. “The real power of human cognition lies in our ability to flexibly 
construct functional systems that accomplish our goals by bringing bits of structure 
into coordination.”29 The result is an image of the human that is more managerial 
than anything else. We excel at mobilizing decentralised processes, while 
maintaining minimal internal cognitive capacities. 
Yet in order to draw the boundaries of such extended systems, a distinction 
must be drawn between external elements that are merely causally important and 
external elements that play a truly cognitive role.30 This, in turn, requires a 
definition of cognition. Such a definition of cognition and cognitive roles must not 
be so fine-grained as to limit it to the idiosyncratic nature of human cognition; yet 
neither must a definition be so general as to negate any possible explanatory 
advances.31 In the words of the cognitive scientist Edwin Hutchins, the 
requirements for a conception of extended cognition are such that, 
 
“the sort of computation that cognition is [has] to be as applicable to 
events that involves the interaction of humans with artefacts and 
with other humans as it is to events that are entirely internal to 
individual persons.”32 
 
With the criteria in mind, cognition will here be taken to mean thought 
understood as a matter of information-processing and which thus takes a cognitive 
system as “a complex system that receives, stores, retrieves, transforms, and 
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transmits information.”33 For our purposes, the primary debates in cognitive 
science over connectionist versus dynamic systems versus computationalist 
approaches are immaterial. Whatever way cognition is processed within the brain is 
secondary to an abstract definition of cognition that allows for its embodiment in 
multiple physical instantiations. The strength of this definition is that it points to a 
minimal notion of cognition involving computation, representation, and the 
circulation of representations within an individuated system. It does not a priori 
bias the study of cognition towards a particular material realisation (e.g. the neural 
circuitry of the human brain), thus it falls silent on where cognition resides. The 
demarcation of the causes of cognition from the constitutive elements of cognition 
(i.e. what is external to cognition from what is internal to cognition), is not 
something that can be determined in advance but can only be determined by virtue 
of empirical research and explanatory success.34 
 While later chapters will substantiate this with empirical detail, already 
there are theoretical reasons to reject the critics of distributed cognition and argue 
that an extended system is a valid entity irreducible to the summation of the 
individual plus its environment of technology.35 Most obviously, the entire 
sociotechnical system is oriented towards a specific functional goal (e.g. producing 
true representations of the climate, inferring the state of a global market, and 
orienting action within a crisis situation) and this function cannot be located 
simply within any individual component. It only exists and is carried out by the 
entire system. Similarly, 
 
“the computational power of the system composed of person and 
technology is not determined primarily by the information-
processing capacity that is internal to the technological device, but 
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by the role the technology plays in the composition of a cognitive 
functional system.”36 
 
In other words, in order to fully understand the roles and uses of technology, or 
human cognitive systems, one must take into account the functional system within 
which they operate. As representations are circulated through this system, changing 
their medium in the process and affecting responses, it is relatively simple to 
understand this system as something bound and distinct from an external 
environment. Similarly, the distribution of cognition takes on new properties 
above and beyond individual cognition – including parallel cognitive activities, and 
the emergent significance of bandwidths for communication.37 Thus distributed 
cognitive systems are valid entities by virtue of the fact that they produce emergent 
properties irreducible to their component parts. We cannot simply analyse the 
human mind in interaction with an environment, but must instead take the 
perspective of the system itself. 
There is one further dimension of the extended mind that also needs to be 
examined – a dimension which moves the debate beyond the Parity Principle’s 
conservative functionalism. Whereas the Parity Principle invokes the extension of 
already existing functional roles to external objects, there is also the possibility for 
extension to create emergent and novel functional possibilities.38 In fact, it is this 
capacity which makes studying extended cognitive systems particularly significant 
since it entails that they incorporate possibilities that are irreducible to either 
human cognition or the technological extension.39 In this dimension there are 
therefore three possibilities. The first is the purely ‘instrumental’ level where a 
technology simply replaces a function that a human is already capable of. The 
second level is ‘extensive’ – it takes an existing human capacity and extends it 
beyond what a human is normally capable of. In principle, the capacities of 
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extensive technologies can be accomplished by humans (though often with great 
difficulty), and so it is a fluid boundary between instrumental and extensive 
technologies.40 The final category is ‘transformative’ technologies, which are those 
which produce entirely new capacities for humans – capacities which humans are 
not innately capable of even in principle. We can think here, for instance, of the 
many scientific instruments which allow the ability to ‘perceive’ unobservable 
entities like positrons, alpha particles and electron spin.41 
Given that cognitive science and the philosophy of mind persuasively argue that 
cognition can extend outside the physical body of an individual, the question to be 
settled in this section is how are representational technologies employed to 
accomplish this cognitive augmentation? The literature on this question is large 
and growing, albeit scattered across multiple disciplines and with numerous 
diverging case studies. Moreover, the products of representational technologies can 
take a diverse array of forms (e.g. visual, numerical, and linguistic). The aim here 
will be to provide a wide angle view on how such technologies affect and augment 
cognition. It is on the basis of these augmentations that the case studies will make 
possible new behaviours. 
 To begin with, one can broadly distinguish between different types of 
representational technologies. Essential to each is that they allow for manipulation 
and offer affordances for reasoning. Users can use them, change them, experiment 
with them, and play with them, in an effort to make a phenomenon intelligible. 
With this characteristic in mind, the most basic level of representational 
technologies can be considered images. While some have argued that images alone 
are incapable of manipulation and therefore are incapable of augmenting cognitive 
abilities,42 there are cases which permit of manipulation and therefore afford the 
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possibility to reason with. A navigational chart, for instance, “is a carefully crafted 
computational device” that is used to simplify the calculation of distances and 
directions via the drawing of lines on it.43 In other words, such charts are designed 
for manipulation, despite being a static image. 
 The focus of this thesis, however, will be on computational instruments 
which incorporate a much more expansive range of possible manipulations. The 
scope of technologies included here is broad: some are more formal and abstract, 
others are more data-driven and empirical; some are more real-time analysis, others 
are more long-term and predictive; and so on. It is the automation and 
computational power which distinguishes these contemporary technologies from 
earlier representational technologies. 
In this thesis, three different means of producing representations will be 
analysed: simulations, pricing models, and real-time data processors. Simulations 
act as idealised laboratories, suitable for examining the dynamics of processes that 
are difficult or impossible to experiment with in reality. They embody particular 
scientific theories and computationally encode inferences that can be repeated 
multiple times in order to uncover the likely outcomes of the real processes.44 
Climate change simulations are the example that will be covered here. The climate 
is far too complex of a system to intervene in an experimental way, and must 
instead be tested on computer simulations.  
Pricing models are close but analytically distinct from simulations. At their 
basis they also encode particular theories, but they are not used to test theories nor 
are they usually run multiple times. Instead they take certain inputs and run them 
through algorithms in order to produce a particular output. The case study that 
covers these means of producing representations will be derivatives pricing models, 
which use complex mathematics to combine empirical variables and non-empirical 
probability distributions in order to produce rational prices for various derivatives. 
The last type of representational production covered in this thesis will be 
real-time data processing and visualization. This process takes in information 
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received simultaneously from multiple sources and synthesises and analyses this 
information, producing some form of representation as an output. The algorithms 
involved here do not embody theories, as in simulations and models, but instead 
function to combine massive amounts of disparate data. Crisis mapping is the 
primary example that will be analysed in this thesis, looking at how this 
amalgamation of real-time data provides new perspectives and capacities for action 
in humanitarian situations. 
 The traditional approach to representational technologies, largely emerging 
out of philosophy of science, has been to examine them in terms of their 
representational qualities.45 This approach is itself divided into two research 
programs – one is focused on scientific models in fields like physics, economics, 
and biology, and examines the relationship between a model and the theory which 
it embodies (an approach itself divided between a syntactical and semantic view).46 
A second program is to focus on the relationship between a model and the world 
(whether it is aiming to either fully represent the data or to provide a caricature of 
it).47 
A third approach widens the scope beyond these representational aspects 
and examines models as technologies that do things.48 Representational 
technologies, by virtue of being relatively autonomous from both theory and data, 
are capable of having their own instrumentality that is irreducible to a 
representational function.49 This latter approach spans research on how 
representational technologies act as exploratory instruments,50 how models shape 
the world towards their own image,51 and how models construct social realities.52 It 
is this approach to representational technologies, which sees such cognitive 
augmentations as instruments rather than just representations, that is the focus 
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here. These technologies make possible a variety of cognitive actions that are 
otherwise prohibitively costly or simply impossible. In their computational form, 
they oversee a shift from expert judgment to engineered algorithms; they facilitate 
learning processes by virtue of their manipulative abilities; and they can be used for 
stigmergic coordination between decentralised individuals, amongst other tasks. In 
making new cognitive extensions and new political actions possible, these 
technologies function in a similar way as intersubjective ideas do for constructivists 
– they are “the medium and propellant of social action; they define the limits of 
what is cognitively possible and impossible for individuals.”53 
In large part, these technologies gain their power via embodying two general 
sets of rules for manipulation: the rules imposed by the material of the model, and 
the rules imposed by the subject matter of the model.54 In the former, the material 
can be physical (e.g. models that attempt to build scale replicas of the phenomenon 
in question) or ideational (e.g. models built in algebraic language or a particular 
computer language). In both cases, one is bound by the rules of how one can 
manipulate such material. The second broad set of rules comes from the subject 
matter itself – the theoretical concepts and their interrelations that the model 
builders have implemented into the technology. 
A consequence of the two sets of rules imposed by modelling is that one 
can have a precise pathway for following a chain of consequences. On the basis of 
this, what gives contemporary computational models their peculiar power is their 
capacity not only to organise but also outsource cognition. While organising 
cognition is a virtue in itself, it is when these rules and chains of consequences are 
outsourced into a computational medium that they take on their uniquely modern 
power. With such a representational technology in hand, one can allow the 
calculative and inferential processes to expand far beyond any human capacity. It is 
here where the mechanisms of extending cognition take hold. 
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At this point, it has been argued that cognition extends outside the physical brain 
and that representational technologies are providing new capacities for reasoning, 
representing, and intervening that go far beyond what has previously been possible. 
The question to be tackled in this section will be how such new modes of 
knowledge production transform traditional concepts of knowledge production in 
IR. In particular, the closely related concepts of ‘epistemic communities’ and ‘co-
production’ all provide insights into knowledge production in world politics – yet 
in the end each neglects the contributions of materialised cognition. As a result, 
this section will aim to develop the idea of ‘cognitive assemblages’ as an extension 
of communities of knowledge into material infrastructures. 
The literature surrounding the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ is the most well-
known intervention into how knowledge and politics interact in IR. In the 
standard definition, epistemic communities are considered to be “a network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and 
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-
area.”55 In contrast to a simple group of scientists working on a technical problem, 
an epistemic community also shares a particular value orientation and seeks to 
further their goals by providing expertise to policymakers. Epistemic communities 
are therefore significant for the study of policy coordination because they “may 
convey new patterns of reasoning to decision makers and encourage them to 
pursue new paths of policymaking.”56 As a consequence, the concept helps explain 
how state interests change over time; how actors’ estimates of cost, benefits and 
probability change; and how ideas about how to attain an outcome change. 
Developed and popularised in the 1990s, research on this concept has since 
come to adopt a few key areas of interest. In the first part, it has tended to focus 
heavily on professional scientists and science. The approach taken here is to 
                                                 
55 Haas, “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” 3. 
56 Ibid., 21. 
instead follow recent work on the concept and take knowledge production to 
include more than simply a group of scientists. Instead the term invokes any group 
that seeks to construct and transmit knowledge, and to influence politics via their 
expertise in knowledge (though not necessarily policy).57 Moreover, one of the main 
findings in recent research on the science-politics relation is how often the divide 
between the two becomes an instrument wielded by political groups to either 
strengthen their position or weaken an opponent’s.58 While the authority of certain 
knowledge claims will be an important element in some of the case studies 
presented here, the strategy will be to reject any strict divide between science and 
non-science. The focus will instead be on knowledge claims, which can vary in the 
strength of their epistemic support (akin to Latour’s notion of how reference 
circulates).59 The value of these moves is that they recognise the necessity of 
constructing knowledge in all areas of international politics – the process of 
producing knowledge is not limited solely to highly technical areas, but is instead 
ubiquitous. 
The second major focus within the epistemic community literature has been 
on how knowledge production is aimed at influencing states. In particular, 
standard analyses of the role of scientific knowledge in politics have focused on the 
policy process, often separating it into a tripartite (albeit overlapping) division: 
agenda setting, legislation, and implementation.60 However, once one recognises 
the widespread significance of knowledge production (and not just that by 
scientists) then the scope for where knowledge is relevant becomes increasingly 
widespread as well. Privatised governance is but one example of this, yet this thesis 
will also examine how knowledge production affects actors in financial markets 
and actors in humanitarian crises.61 The state-centric focus of the epistemic 
community literature is too constricting. In addition, this focus on policy-relevance 
                                                 
57 Cross, “Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later”; Adler, “Communities of Practice in 
International Relations”; Barry, “The Translation Zone: Between Actor-Network Theory and 
International Relations,” 423. 
58 Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policy Makers, 14. 
59 Latour, “Circulating Reference: Sampling the Soil in the Amazon Forest.” 
60 Mitchell, International Politics and the Environment, 80; Keller, Science in Environmental Policy: 
The Politics of Objective Advice. 
61 Cross, “Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later,” 141. 
tends to assume the external formation of an epistemic community, which only 
enters into the policy process after it has formed. The directionality of the 
influence goes from consensus to policy coordination. Similarly, the formation of 
consensus on a piece of knowledge is presumed to occur outside of and before the 
political process.62 “Rarely do people adopt convergent ideas and then decide to 
band together in communities or form new institutions; rather, they come to share 
ideas as a result of social interactions that help constitute the community in the 
first place.”63 The messiness of knowledge production, and its always tentative 
certainty, is typically left aside in these analyses.  
By contrast, an alternative concept that has arisen to take into account this 
interaction between science and politics is the idea of ‘co-production’. In this 
framework, rather than a deficit model of communication (with information being 
transferred linearly from scientists to policymakers),64 what is seen to occur in 
practice is more akin to a dialogue model whereby policymakers are increasingly 
voicing their needs to scientists and vice versa. This recognition of the messiness of 
the science-policy distinction in practice has led science and technology scholars to 
speak of ‘boundary work’ and ‘boundary organisations’.65 In this view, the divide 
between science and politics is not an a priori given and is instead the boundary is 
something that must be constructed in the process of interaction. Boundary 
organisations are those organisations which straddle the two worlds of politics and 
science. They create products which can be used by both sides (e.g. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment reports), they 
involve members of both worlds, and they are responsible (in different ways) to 
each world.66 The concept of boundary organisations therefore recognises that 
science and policy are often highly intermixed, and that interaction between the 
two is the rule not the exception. 
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The epistemic community literature has been useful for acknowledging the 
significance of knowledge in shaping world politics, and as this short review has 
shown, has been expanded in a number of different directions.67 What perhaps 
calls for a new term though is the introduction of specifically material aspects of 
knowledge production. Once one goes beyond social relations and starts looking at 
how technological infrastructures are being incorporated into knowledge 
production, the term ‘community’ begins to lose its grasp. As a result, we here 
prefer to use the term ‘cognitive assemblages’ in order to emphasise the always 
material nature of knowledge production. 
Cognitive assemblages share many of the features of these earlier concepts: they 
highlight the intermingling of knowledge and politics in contemporary societies; 
they recognise the often competing demands of both worlds; and they recognise 
that the products of these systems are designed to bridge the two worlds. Where 
they go further is in highlighting the material infrastructure of boundary 
organisations, and emphasising the technological dynamics.68 With regard to 
representational technologies, we can draw a distinction between such technologies 
(the physical components) and cognitive assemblages (the sociotechnical whole).69 
With relation to the approaches covered in the previous section, what is 
particularly novel about cognitive assemblages is the delegation of thought to 
machines. Epistemic community and boundary organisation approaches maintain 
cognition as a solely human process and one shaped by social factors such as power 
and authority. With the cognition of problems delegated to machines though, the 
factors affecting the outcome begin to include properly material aspects of 
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technology as well. Incorporating technology is significant therefore because it 
brings with it the dynamics analysed in the previous chapter – as a platform that 
shapes social formations and temporal development. Thus technological dynamics 
become an important explanatory factor in when, where and how political issues 
arise and are approached. Knowledge becomes collective and distributed rather 
than individual or solely social: 
 
“These descriptions of the temporally extended and collective work 
of producing objective displays contrasted with the established view 
of observation and representation as individual, and largely 
instantaneous, perceptual acts. Instead of being a confrontation 
between a world and a prepared mind, the research act began to 
resemble a form of factory production in which material inputs were 
transformed into readable data to be disseminated widely in a 
community.”70 
 
Secondly, the concept of cognitive assemblages highlights the way in which 
epistemic communities and boundary organisations can be a derivative effect of 
technological infrastructures.71 For epistemic communities, ideas are situated in 
and organised by a collective. It is the members of this collective who then spread 
the ideas around. By contrast, the idea of cognitive assemblages highlights that 
ideas can also be situated in and organised by representational technologies. For 
instance, regardless of a community existing beforehand or not, option pricing 
models have become hegemonic tools to intervene in derivatives markets. To 
interact with these markets means to accept the framing of the market provided by 
these instruments. Similarly, the climate modelling infrastructure produces 
communities that incorporate atmospheric scientists, software engineers, physicists, 
data designers, chemists, technicians, and others. These communities are brought 
together by virtue of the needs of the technological system itself, and the scientific 
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representations produced by the models can and do form the basis for shared 
beliefs in epistemic communities. Much like newspapers for the constitution of 
national imagined communities, scientific visualisations can constitute particular 
epistemic communities.72 
Third, cognitive assemblages focus on the decentring of rational thought. 
Government rationality exists neither in a unified mind (the statist view), nor in 
competing bureaucracies (the foreign policy analysis view). Rather, government 
rationality is an extended material infrastructure, complete with the unique 
advantages and hindrances that such a situation brings. This also means looking at 
alternative places where the understanding of a situation may go wrong – namely, 
in the political or otherwise biased nature of the models themselves. For instance, 
one of the main observational gaps for climate modelling is currently in Africa, 
leading to greater uncertainty over short- to mid-term predictions for this region. 
The political consequences of this model shortcoming could be significant given 
that it is among the most vulnerable areas in the world to climate change. 
Finally, as was emphasised earlier, externalised cognition has different 
properties and capacities from internal cognition. Certain forms of nonhuman 
cognition become available for use (e.g. thinking nonlinearities and second- and 
third-order effects), but also bring along new problems of parameter-setting, tuning, 
computational friction, and data arms races. In addition, technological cognition, 
as opposed to internal cognition, has the properties that it can be more durable, 
easier to communicate, have greater capacities, and be simpler to consciously 
manipulate.73 
In all these ways, therefore, the concept of cognitive assemblages shifts the 
focus of attention and changes the potential explanatory factors involved in 
understanding world politics. The cognitive assemblage becomes a necessary 
mediating point between the problem and those charged to solve it. The problem 
(e.g. the changes in the climate system) must pass through a technological mediator 
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(e.g. GCMs) in order for them to become thinkable by a policymaker. The result is 
that the technology introduces a particular series of representations of the problem 
into the cognitive assemblage and these go on to have consequences in a variety of 
ways. 
In looking back at this chapter and the previous one, they can be usefully framed as 
a division between the hardware (chapter 2) and the software (chapter 3) of 
representational technologies. The overall conclusion of these chapters is that 
technological autonomy combined with cognitive assemblages entails that 
perception and cognition of the world shifts as technology shifts. These 
transformations are accomplished through the introduction and diffusion of 
various cognitive-enhancing technologies into the fabric of world politics. The 
state, and indeed any actor in world politics, must be recognised as a complex 
network of various mechanisms that incorporate and expand perceptual, cognitive, 
and action functions (the latter typically being the sole idea of power).74 
With respect to the initial problem posed in chapter 1 of cognitive mapping 
– the gap between phenomenological experience and global structures – it should 
be clear by now that it is technology which enables human cognition to 
asymptotically bridge this gap. In this final section, we will examine what this 
entails and why it is necessary for the contemporary era. 
 The fact that the modern world is increasingly complex has been declared 
by many scholars before. This complexity can be divided into a number of different 
aspects. First, and most intuitively, today’s crises are often truly global in scale – 
they span and spread throughout global networks. These interconnections, 
moreover, involve feedback loops, nonlinear dynamics, and unintended second- 
and third- order effects. The second aspect of complexity is that these global 
problems spread with an unprecedented amount of speed. The increasingly tight 
interconnections mean there are ever more channels through which crises can 
diffuse. A third aspect of complexity results from the simple finite limits of human 
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cognition. The increase in specialization has been a consequence of these limits, as 
individuals are forced to focus on ever smaller areas in order to maintain pace with 
the front lines of human knowledge. Yet this specialization has meant that an 
understanding of large systems has come under increasing stress. It is technology 
which is increasingly being used (implicitly and explicitly) to overcome the 
cognitive limitations of individual humans and map the complexity of today’s 
world. 
This metaphor of cognitive maps suggests a few different qualities. First, 
maps occupy a middle ground between the purported neutrality of scientific 
perspective and the practical exigencies of a particular situation. They cannot 
eschew representation entirely, nor can they ignore the demands of human action. 
Maps require specific limitations and abstractions precisely in order to fulfil their 
functions. “Without visual limits there can be no, or almost no, mental imagery; 
without a certain blindness, no tenable appearance.”75 It is specifically the 
complexity of the contemporary conjunction which leaves action immobilised; thus 
mapping calls precisely for a condensation of this complexity in order to make 
action effective. An effective map needs to condense (with this word’s dual sense of 
making-smaller and bringing-together) the global structures. Maps also inscribe and 
embody accumulated bodies of knowledge – they are a technology in themselves, in 
this sense.76 Finally, maps entail the production of an abstract perspective as well. 
Such perspectives do not correspond to any actual point of view, but instead aim to 
provide a universal viewpoint on a situation which allows for a lived experience to 
be situated within it.77 On the other hand, the risk of the map metaphor is that it 
too closely suggests a spatialisation of relationships. The essence of maps, however, 
is less a matter of spatialising relationships than it is of making abstractions 
sensible to individuals. In the words of one map theorist, they create “categories, 
boundaries and territories.”78 
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 Importantly, cognitive maps do not merely represent a pre-existing reality. 
Instead they also materially construct the global. As examples from later chapters 
will show, it is on the basis of these maps that further developments of the global 
become possible. We can see weather, but we cannot see the global climate. We 
can see stock exchange floors, but we cannot see a global financial market. We can 
see destroyed buildings, but we cannot see a humanitarian crisis. In these cases, 
abstraction and conceptual representation become the sole means of perceiving the 
phenomenon. The ‘global’ as a conceptual representation that permits of rational 
action does not exist outside of the material representations of it. To be sure, 
cognitive maps index some real aspects of the world in the same way that any 
knowledge does. Yet the science of the global focuses on an object that is invisible 
without the proper conceptual and material tools to make it perceptible. There is a 
parallel here with the natural sciences and their extension to unobservable entities: 
“The notion of a detectable unobservable can be extended outside the natural 
sciences with one minor modification: the recognition that detection equipment 
need not be physical equipment, but can also be conceptual equipment.”79 It is 
precisely cognitive maps and the material cognitive systems they presuppose which 
provide the equipment to make visible an otherwise unobservable ‘global’. 
Today, many global actors are already using variations of this technology. 
The US military is now modelling first-, second-, and third-order effects of airpower 
attacks on vital infrastructure.80 The US Federal Reserve uses massive econometric 
models involving over a thousand variables, one hundred equations, and 
observations from around the country in order to forecast the future of the 
economy.81 Automated algorithms filter through the proliferating surveillance 
cameras around the world, using specialised software to detect ‘threats’ and report 
them to a human observer.82 These can all be understood to produce cognitive 
maps, or what Buckminster Fuller called ‘geoscopic vision’– the use of technology, 
data collection, algorithms, data visualization, material infrastructures, social 
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organizations, and user adaptability to produce (at the limits) a real-time 
visualization of global dynamics.83 
As can be discerned from these examples as well, they are all oriented 
towards political action and intervention in particular situations. It is, 
paradoxically, the condition of concrete political action that it be premised upon 
abstraction. As Jameson says, “abstraction from the ‘blooming, buzzing confusion’ 
of immediacy was always a radical intervention in the here and now and the 
promise of resistance to its blind fatalities.”84 It is these technologies which are 
making possible new interventions and new actions in the world – and it is 
predominantly elite organisations which control such technology. The construction 
of material infrastructures of power is lending ever more capacity to macro-actors 
to shape the world according to their own interests. 
The remainder of this thesis will attempt to use the theoretical framework 
set out here in order to examine three case studies and show how such 
technologies are altering the behavioural and cognitive landscape of actors in world 
politics. With the world increasingly enmeshed in ubiquitous computing and 
digitised data collection, the issues surrounding these technologies are likely to 
only become more significant. While there are some general dynamics that will be 
examined in the concluding chapter, each case study is a relatively independent 
study on its own. The variety of technologies and users makes it difficult to draw 
many general conclusions without doing harm to the empirical data, yet each of 
them points to important dynamics. 
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“Unlike the wind which we feel on our face or a raindrop 
that wets our hair, climate is a constructed idea that takes 
these sensory encounters and builds them into something 
more abstract. Neither can climate be measured directly by 
our instruments. We can measure the temperature of a 
specific place at a given time, but no one can directly 
measure the climate of Paris or the temperature of the 
planet.”1 
 
-Mike Hulme 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Amongst the complex problems facing the world today, it is climate change which 
most clearly condenses within itself the issues and messiness that such complex 
problems tend to produce. The knowledge generated to understand the earth 
system has mobilised the largest collective scientific project ever, while the response 
to the challenges of climate change has attempted to bring about a radical shift in 
the very way of life for humanity. It is inspiring wide-ranging transformations in the 
fabric of world politics – from shifts to green economies,2 to new institutional 
arrangements,3 to shifts in the behaviours of individuals in their everyday lives. At 
every level of social reality, changes are being made on the basis of climate science. 
And at the epistemic basis of all of this is computer modelling of the Earth system. 
Since climate change is not empirically observable in the same way weather is, it is 
“a danger described only by computer programs.”4 Relative to weather, the time 
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frames are much longer, the human-scale changes much subtler, the spatial horizon 
much larger, and the nonlinear effects much less predictable. The result is that 
climate change has had to be constructed as an object of cognition first – it 
required the material production of representations – and the representational 
technology which has been most responsible for this is general circulation models 
(GCMs). The primary aim of this chapter is to show how these technologies have 
been incorporated into larger cognitive assemblages that are now changing the 
behaviours of actors in world politics. 
A significant driver of this change in behaviour is the evolving ways in 
which we see nature. As recently as 1941, climate was still considered to simply be 
an average of local weather patterns. One of the earliest assessments of human’s 
impact on the climate defined it as being relative to a specific place: “The climate 
of a place is merely a build-up of all the weather from day-to-day.”5 It was not until 
the mid-1980s that climate routinely began to be conceived of in global terms.6 The 
recognition that global climate change was both theoretically possible and 
empirically occurring has been the culmination of centuries of research. Yet it has 
only been the past few decades – with the rise of GCMs – that it has become 
possible to make predictions, to attribute responsibilities, and to establish 
adaptation procedures. A simulated baseline is necessary for understanding how 
the climate would have developed without the influence of humanity, and 
therefore for being able to pinpoint the causal factors. Insofar as the political 
question of climate change revolves around whether the changes are produced by 
human actions or by natural cycles, it is only GCMs which have been capable of 
transforming it into a potentially solvable political issue. 
 This chapter will explore the emergence and integration of climate 
modelling into the fabric of world politics. It will be argued that in the face of the 
complex system that is the climate, only representational technologies that extend 
cognition are capable of representing it and reacting to changes in the system. 
Moreover, these technologies are now making possible new political actions – in 
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particular, new ways of adapting to climate change. The first section will outline 
the ways in which nature poses a complex system and a complex problem for 
political actors. The next two sections will proceed through a short history of 
climate science and climate modelling (which became indistinguishable in the 
1970s), viewing their development as being shaped by technological frictions. On 
the basis of this history, it will be shown how the knowledge of climate change – in 
all of its significant aspects – is instantiated in the technological infrastructures that 
form the global climate observation and modelling network. In terms of politics, 
this system developed relatively independently with climate scientists, computer 
programmers, software engineers, and other technical professionals. In the past two 
decades, though, this system has come to be integrated with governments around 
the world. The fourth section will summarise the sorts of perceptual and cognitive 
possibilities that these representational technologies have constructed. The fifth 
section will turn towards the cognitive assemblages which have been making use of 
these new perceptual and cognitive possibilities. In particular, the focus will be on 
climate modelling centres that are tightly interwoven with government demands to 
think the future of a changing climate. Complex systems demand such extensions 
of cognitive capacities, and governments have been increasingly developing these 
technological extensions in order to inform their policies. On the basis of these 
cognitive assemblages, new political actions are being created and employed – with 
localised adaptation measures being one of the clearest examples. The final section 
will return to the question of how representational technologies construct the 
actors of world politics and highlight some of the unique qualities involved in 
climate change. 
In what precisely does the complexity of the climate consist of? On a 
straightforward level, this complexity consists of the multi-levelled nature of the 
system: modelling the climate involves 14 levels of magnitude – from the level of 
aerosol particles to the level of global circulation patterns.7 A decade ago, only the 
top two levels were capable of being modelled (about a 300km resolution) – with 
the expectation that in five years and the advent of teraflop computers, another 
level could be incorporated (equivalent to a resolution of 50km).8 By 2007, “the 
smallest we can make these chunks in the atmosphere is around 100 miles [160km] 
in the horizontal and a few hundred yards in the vertical, and a bit smaller in the 
ocean. The problem here is that many important processes are much smaller than 
these scales.”9 Since individual molecules cannot be modelled, these variables must 
be aggregated into larger chunks of data – they must be set as parameters. Quite 
simply, the computing power necessary to incorporate additional levels of 
magnitude is massive. 
 It is not simply the sheer scale of the system which has to be tackled though. 
In addition to this, the climate system meets the criteria for the standard 
conception of a complex and chaotic system: involving nonlinearities, tipping 
points, and sensitivity to initial conditions. As the climate is a chaotic system, small 
initial discrepancies will produce solutions that diverge from each other over even a 
few days.10 Research into such systems has demolished the popular idea of a 
‘balance of nature’. There may be equilibrium points, but these are themselves 
subject to fluctuations and disruption. These emerging conceptions of a complex 
system have important implications for the response to climate change. Policies 
that seem intuitive in an equilibrium system (e.g. stop forest fires at all costs) can in 
fact be counterproductive when seen from the perspective of a non-equilibrium 
system.11 Finally, the complex nature of climate can be seen in the uncertainty 
surrounding predictions. Because of their sensitivity to initial conditions, 
simulations of the climate raise important epistemological issues about the accuracy 
of predictions. 
 The response has been to produce climate models that are themselves an 
additional source of massive complexity. These models can include simple toy 
                                                 
7 Kerr, “Forecasting Still Cloudy,” 1040. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Emanuel, What We Know About Climate Change, 40. 
10 Wells, The Atmosphere and Ocean: A Physical Introduction, 295. 
11 Forsyth, Critical Political Ecology: The Politics of Environmental Science, 65. 
models that are capable of being run on a standard desktop computer. Yet others 
are only possible on the latest supercomputers – and even then they strain the 
resources available.12 One overview of climate science notes that, 
 
 “Computer modelling of global climate is perhaps the most 
complex endeavour ever undertaken by mankind. A typical climate 
model consists of millions of lines of computer instructions designed 
to simulate an enormous range of physical phenomena, including 
the flow of the atmosphere and oceans; condensation and 
precipitation of water inside clouds; the transfer of solar and 
terrestrial radiation through the atmosphere, including its partial 
absorption and reflection by the surface, by clouds, and by the 
atmosphere itself; the convective transport of heat, water, and 
atmospheric constituents by turbulent convection currents; and vast 
numbers of other processes.”13 
 
There is simply no way to bypass the use of these complex models. As the historian 
of technology Paul Edwards has outlined, models are necessary for climate science 
in at least five senses: to make data sets compatible, to analyse past climate records, 
to predict future climate situations, to distinguish human from natural climatic 
variation, and to simulate the effects of policy decisions.14 While Edwards has done 
much to examine the first four areas, it is the final sense that will be the focus of 
this chapter. How are models used to produce a global vision of the climate, and to 
produce effective policy responses? 
 This leads to the final major source of complexity in the climate change 
world: the transition from the best available science to the world of policymaking. 
“The interconnectedness of ecosystems means that many problems are non-
                                                 
12 Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere: Computer Models, Data, and Knowledge About 
Climate Change,” 34. See p. 37-39 for more descriptions of the varieties of models. 
13 Emanuel, What We Know About Climate Change, 39–40. 
14 Edwards, “Representing the Global Atmosphere: Computer Models, Data, and Knowledge About 
Climate Change,” 62–63. 
reducible: they cannot be resolved by addressing individual parts in isolation.”15 
Moreover, climate change policy incorporates an asymmetry – we are embedded 
within a global climatic system, yet the effects of climate are local and 
heterogeneous. Fully taking climate change into account therefore means travelling 
from the local to the global and back. Often these complexities of effective 
intervention have been resolved by resorting to overly simple policies. As a 
response, complex truths about climate causes and effects have been simplified into 
distorted narratives about phenomena like desertification, soil erosion and 
deforestation. The results of these mistaken ‘facts’ are counter-productive 
interventions into natural systems and unintended (and often unjust) social 
consequences.16 The complexity of policymaking therefore has its own unique 
dynamics in contributing to the messy problems of climate change and the 
“clumsy” solutions required for them.17 
It is because of these complexities that policymakers have to incorporate 
representational technology in order to extend their cognitive capacities. The past 
two decades have seen modelling shift from being a matter of validating scientific 
theories, to being a matter of supporting policy decisions.18 On one level, this 
support would appear to arise from the extension of predictive abilities via 
simulation, making climate models different from financial models (which are used 
for their perceptive capacities) and crisis mapping software (which is used for its 
coordinating capacities). Yet in practice, as we will see, climate models provide a 
wide variety of extensive capacities with prediction playing a relatively minor role. 
Despite the modern-day reliance on technology in order to produce knowledge of 
the Earth’s climate, this has not always been a possibility. Theories about climate 
have traditionally arisen from a variety of sources – from authorities such as elders 
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or religious leaders; from the gathering of large amounts of observational data in 
particular areas; from first principles about the physical basis of the climate; and 
only recently from the use of technology in all its varied forms.19 The latter form is 
the latest source of knowledge, and its history can be traced back to the early 
1900s.20 
 Theories about the climate in fact stem back thousands of years to at least 
Aristotle. This inaugurated a long history of philosophers meditating on the effects 
of climate (and weather, more narrowly). Thinkers as varied as Baron C.-L. de 
Montesquieu and David Hume both subscribed to variations of climate 
determining cultural changes, their ideas themselves being based on readings of 
ancient philosophers.21 Intriguingly, within these discourses there was a common 
acknowledgement of humanity’s capacity to alter climate. For instance, the New 
World colonialists actively saw themselves as shaping the raw nature of America 
into a more moderate (and survivable) climate. Climate in the colonies was 
perceived to be warming because of human action – yet this was also perceived as a 
good thing because of the harsh weather in North America (a judgment of the local 
weather which was to be borne out by modern climatology).22 
The origins of more rigorously scientific climatology can be traced back to 
Italy in the mid-seventeenth century.23 It is here that the first efforts at systemic 
measurement and analysis of climate patterns emerge. Yet most efforts at the time 
were an unstandardised set of disparate observations – both the recording formats 
and the measurement tools were subject to individual fluctuation, making 
comparison and aggregation difficult. It was not until the late nineteenth century 
that most countries would have established national services devoted to recording 
weather observations.24 Yet the advances in the seventeenth century were formative 
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in making climatology into a scientific discipline. Figure 3 presents a quick 
overview of the main developments made after this emergence of more quantitative 
and empirical methods. 
 
 
A Short History of Climate Theory 
 
1670 
Edme Mariotte from France produces a theory of the global 
wind system based on observations collected from friends.25 
 
1822 
Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier theorises that the atmosphere 
retains heat, and that the temperature of space depends on 
the thickness and nature of the atmosphere.26 
 
1863 
John Tyndall realises that gases were not transparent 
conductors of heat rays; some energy is blocked by some 
gases. He then calculated this capacity (the radiative 
potential) for various gases including CO2.
27 Tyndall 
mentions intuitions that such mechanisms could be 
responsible for “all the mutations of climate which the 
researches of geologists reveal.”28 
 
1872/3 
Two international conferences establish the International 
Meteorological Organization (now the World Meteorological 
Organization) – the first international organisation on 
weather.29 
 
1884 
Though not explicitly understood as such, William Ferrel 
developed the first theoretical model capable of quantifying 
and understanding the global greenhouse effect in terms of 
the atmosphere and the earth’s surface.30 
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It took until 1896 for Svante Arrhenius to first calculate the possible 
contribution of CO2 to the changes in the climate. In a published article, 
Arrhenius calculated the contribution of CO2 to the earth’s surface temperature, 
and suggested that it could be responsible for the ice ages.31 At the time, he 
believed the most likely source of excess CO2 was from volcanic eruptions. In 1899, 
Nils Eckholm argued that burning coal would eventually double the CO2 in the air 
and lead to the earth warming – the first modern suggestion that human actions 
could have a significant influence on the atmosphere.32 Building on this work, over 
a period of months, Arrhenius painstakingly calculated a rough estimate that 
human-produced CO2 could raise the earth’s temperature.33 Drawing upon the 
work done on radiative potential before him, and from empirical observations, 
Arrhenius produced what was likely the first rudimentary climate change model. 
Based upon relatively simple calculations, Arrhenius was able to produce 
predictions about the effects that decreases and increases in CO2 would have on 
the climate. On the basis of this evidence, in 1904 Arrhenius publically raised the 
first warning that anthropogenic climate change is a possibility (though he saw it as 
a benefit to counter a secular decline in temperature).34 Soon after this period 
though, various experimental results and theoretical proposals made the CO2 
theory of climate change appear unlikely. It fell into disrepute and even some of its 
main proponents rescinded their support. Decades would pass before the theory 
was rejuvenated and became a prime focus of research again. 
In the meantime, in 1938 the amateur climatologist Guy Stewart Callendar 
revealed the most comprehensive evidence to date for the actual warming of the 
earth. Beyond just the theoretical models which showed that climate could change, 
Callendar’s thorough dataset demonstrated for the first time that the climate was 
changing.35 At the time though, this was a heretical position and it remained so 
until the second half of the twentieth century. It took a series of social and natural 
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consequences from warming in the 1950s for increased attention – in both the 
scientific and popular media – to be paid to the possibility of rising temperatures. 
Climate change was becoming something increasingly palpable, imposing itself 
onto the public’s consciousness. 
With the increased attention and the development of computing technology, 
climate science began to merge into climate modelling. The aim of this section is 
twofold. First, it will demonstrate that knowledge of the climate system and the 
technology of computer modelling are inseparable. Climate science is climate 
modelling, and vice versa. The significance of this is that any discussion of 
scientific knowledge about the climate and climate change is one-sided if it neglects 
the material infrastructure which both constrains and makes possible our 
understanding of this complex system. In order for knowledge to be dispersed 
globally, to become stabilised as a scientific fact, and to take on the 
authoritativeness of scientific expertise, it requires these material infrastructures. 
They provide the solidified chains of inference that support any given claim about 
climate change,36 and they maintain the standards which make possible the 
reproduction and dissemination of knowledge.37 In other words, many of the 
properties attributed to scientific knowledge (solidity, accuracy, predictive power) 
stem from their material embodiment. Conversely, attempts to dislodge and refute 
claims about climate change have to grapple with the materialities of ice core 
samples, ships’ logs, satellite readings, supercomputers, and simulated maps. The 
material infrastructure is, to put it simply, at the heart of climate science.38 
 The second aim of this section is to formulate the progression of climate 
science technology in terms of its materiality. While other scholars have examined 
progress in climate modelling in terms of social ideals (pragmatism versus 
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accuracy,39 most notably), this section will follow the theory of technological 
development set out in Chapter 2 and argue that the material nature of technology 
funnels developments along particular pathways. In particular, the materiality of 
technology generates certain frictions between competing functions and 
components of any particular object. These frictions (e.g. between the desire for 
computational speed and the desire for quantity of data) channel technological 
progress down certain paths. With climate modelling technology, a number of 
general frictions can be discerned throughout its history: data frictions, 
computational frictions, and model frictions. In the first place, “data always have a 
material aspect. Data are things. They are not just numbers but also numerals, with 
dimensionality, weight, and texture. Data friction refers to the costs in time, 
energy, and attention required simply to collect, check, store, move, receive, and 
access data.”40 Computational friction, on the other hand, “includes not only the 
physical and economic limits on processor speed and memory capacity, but also the 
human work involved in programming, operating, debugging, and repairing 
computers.”41 Finally, there is the model friction, which involves the trade-offs 
between creating the model in different ways: for instance, the accuracy of inputs 
versus the accuracy of outputs, the choice of parameters, and the tuning of 
variables. Schematically, model friction can be seen to supervene on data and 
computational frictions (since it must be embodied by them), yet it is a friction that 
results from the functionality of the technology and not from the pure physicality 
of its components. The development of a technology therefore involves overcoming 
these frictions and making the object function as a coherent whole. 
 The models employed by climate scientists are a simulation type of 
representational technology. At its most abstract level, a simulation “imitates one 
process by another”.42 In the case of climate science, this imitation is typically 
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accomplished via a set of differential equations relating changing variables to each 
other and including some rules for how the system will evolve through time.43 With 
today’s climate models this includes momentum equations, temperature equations, 
water vapour equations, equations of state, and hydrostatic equations – usually 
programmed with 30,000 to 60,000 lines of code.44 These equations can be split up 
into two overall model components: a dynamical core, and the model physics.45 
The dynamical core is formed by the basic primitive equations derived from physics 
– these are responsible for modelling the large-scale processes of fluid motion in 
the atmosphere and ocean. The model physics, on the other hand, simulate all the 
other processes going on – in particular, transfers of heat and moisture, and 
interactions between oceans, land, and the atmosphere. These equations are then 
represented in an abstract grid of the atmosphere and the ocean. Since the earth is 
spherical, square grids proved to be problematic, particularly at the poles where the 
time steps between grid points began to diverge from those at the equator.46 As a 
result, there have been a variety of different grids used: not only the familiar square 
grids, but also triangular, hexagonal, polyhedral, and icosahedral grids, each with 
their own drawbacks and benefits.47 Contemporary models can have tens of 
millions of grid points. The model is then run forward over time steps (today, these 
can be down to the order of minutes).48 For each time step, the equations are 
applied to every grid point, moving the model forward. This process is then 
repeated until the model has simulated days (in terms of weather forecasting) or 
decades (in terms of climate forecasting). The output of this is numerical in its 
most basic form, yet visualisations have arisen to present the data output in more 
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cognitively amenable forms (for instance, graphs and maps). They form the basic 
products of these representational technologies. 
Computer models of the climate arose with the technological development 
initiated by WWII, the devastation having spurring on the production of a vast 
array of new tools. Combined with the context of increased public attention and 
the sheer complexity of the climatic system, it was perhaps inevitable that the new 
computing technology would be applied to climatology. Earlier attempts had been 
made at modelling, though without the efficiency of computers these all failed to 
achieve their goals of weather prediction. The first numerical (as opposed to 
graphical) weather prediction system was created in the early 1900s by Vilhelm 
Bjerknes, who produced a series of seven equations that represented the 
relationships between heat, air movement and moisture.49 These were ‘primary 
equations’ – fundamental and derived from essential principles of physics. The 
hope was that on the basis of these, Bjerknes would be able to produce the 
essential characteristics of the climate and make weather predictions on that basis. 
In 1922, Lewis Fry Richardson simplified these equations and made them 
into a model that could be solved by hand.50 On the basis of this, he imagined a 
massive system of calculation that would be capable of producing accurate real-time 
predictions. Yet his model was unwieldy and inefficient – even with the labour of 
an entire factory working to produce calculations, the model would have been 
incapable of generating predictions in time. As late as 1955, the calculation time 
provided by computers was only just keeping pace with real-time: a 24-hour forecast 
took 24 hours to produce.51 
In parallel with these shifts in technology, the 1940s saw universities (such 
as the University of Chicago and Cambridge University) begin to teach their 
students to think of the climate as a physicist would. Early models were developed, 
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though rather than being digitally simulated, they were actual physical models of 
the atmosphere. The simplifications involved in these models made accurate 
predictions impossible, but they were important in demonstrating that natural 
systems need not be balanced or stable and that they can be subject to rapid 
changes.52 (The cultural belief in equilibrium was one of the main reasons that 
thinking about climate change was so difficult to accept at the time.) These were 
the first hints to climate scientists that the climate was a dynamic, complex and 
nonlinear system. Not only could the climate change drastically (as the ice ages had 
revealed), but it could do so much more rapidly than anyone had previously 
thought possible. 
Immediately post-WWII, the mathematician John von Neumann began to call 
for the use of computers in numerical weather prediction. Gaining support from 
the Office of Naval Research, von Neumann’s project had developed a rudimentary 
computer model by 1949 that was capable of computing air flows across three-
dimensional structures.53 In 1950, the Meteorology Project used the ENIAC to run 
its first computer-based weather forecast.54 Between 1953 and 1959, Gilbert Plass 
used the new digital computers and latest spectrographic data on the absorption 
bands of various gases to construct small models of radiative transfer – the primary 
mechanism behind global warming.55 
By the mid-1950s, these models remained at the level of regional climates. Yet 
researchers knew that to truly understand the climate, a global climate model was 
necessary.56 It took until 1956 for what is now considered to be the first 
functioning GCM to be constructed by Norman Phillips – a model which 
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produced a realistic looking jet stream as well as a simulated weather disturbance.57 
Yet this model faced fundamental computational frictions which forced the model 
to presume a cylindrical rather than a spherical shape to the earth. 
Researchers, however, had begun to realise the fundamental 
interconnectedness and complexity of the climate system. In the first place, as the 
understanding of the climate system grew, the nonlinearities involved began to set 
hard limits to existing GCMs. Regardless of the accuracy of initial conditions and 
equations, without implementing nonlinearities into the models the predictions 
diverged significantly from observations after short time periods. Guided by Akio 
Arakawa’s work, a method for implementing nonlinear equations into GCMs was 
developed – not only advancing the technology, but also giving concrete shape to 
the new nonlinear understanding of the climate system.58 Furthermore, while the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had focused on mono-causal explanations 
of climate change, new findings were demonstrating how a variety of causes could 
produce rapid and significant change in climate patterns.59 This emerging vision of 
nature was bolstered in 1959 when Harry Wexler and Charles David Keeling 
produced the first evidence that CO2 concentrations were increasing even in a 
single year. When mapped out in a chart, this data produced the now well-known 
Keeling curve (see Figure 4).60 
Significant technical advances were also made during this time. The 
technical problems associated with primitive equations were largely overcome and 
became the standard approach. The 1950s had seen modellers use quasi-
geostrophic models that employed simplifying assumptions used to reduce three 
equations of atmospheric motion down to one.61 Computational frictions required 
these models to assume that the Coriolis force generated by the earth’s rotation 
cancelled out the pressure-gradient force.62 The new models based on primitive 
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equations proved to provide much more accurate results though, and with their 
technical hurdles overcome they became the dominant approach. In addition to 
this shift to primitive equation models, another major advance was the heating 
variable being determined by motion rather than by latitude – a much more 
accurate approach that allowed for heat to become a cause of motion as well.63 
Baroclinic models also replaced barotropic models, meaning the density of the 
atmosphere was now dependent on temperature in addition to pressure. This led 
to new possibilities for modelling storm patterns.64 
 
 
 
 
The 1960s and 1970s saw the final demise of the historical tradition of 
climatology and its focus on local trends. The classic model of climatology – 
collecting data and sometimes statistically analysing it – was being replaced by a 
more theoretical approach. Theories of how the climate operated were being built 
from the ground up with a foundation in the fundamental principles of physics 
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and chemistry. The traditional model of climatology was rapidly replaced by this 
new world of climate science and computer modellers.65 
With this new approach to climatology, the limits of technology began to 
shape the future developments of these models. Broadly speaking, two different 
paths were open for computer modelling. On the one hand, there were those that 
tried to represent the environment as accurately as possible. Given the limitations 
of the technology though, this was a costly method – both in terms of money and 
time. On the other hand, there were those who took a more modest approach. 
These simpler models had the virtue that they could be solved quickly, thereby 
allowing intuitions about the relations between different elements of the 
environment to be tested quite easily. These models were nowhere near the level of 
accuracy for predictions, but they did begin to systematise inferences about the 
environmental in a computerised format.66 However, tensions were frequent 
between computational and data frictions on the one hand, and scientific norms of 
creating an accurate picture on the other hand. Progress in knowledge production 
was becoming dependent on progress in technological infrastructures. 
For both approaches, the path for future GCM development was to 
overcome existing frictions in order to incorporate an increasing amount of factors. 
In 1967, a simple one-dimensional model was published that incorporated 
radiation and convection effects, and in 1969 this was extended to include some 
oceanic aspects as well.67 The 1970s later saw soil, rainwater and vegetation become 
the objects of early modelling efforts.68 Models at this point began to indicate that 
the Earth’s climate was in a fragile range of stable temperatures. Much colder and 
the climate would plunge into an ice age; much warmer and the Earth would speed 
off into a warming loop.69 The pathway to more complex and accurate models was 
led by Syukuro Manabe and Joseph Smagorinsky teaming up to produce the most 
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sophisticated GCM seen yet. They operated on a first principles basis: all the 
equations should be derived from the physics of fluids and energy. By 1965, they 
had eventually constructed a three-dimensional model that had nine different 
atmospheric altitudes, and that realistically produced global water vapour flows.70 
The shift to GCMs with multiple levels in the atmosphere created a 
significant new computational friction as modelling the vertical redistribution of 
moisture was a computationally heavy process.71 Manabe and Smagorinsky’s model 
was also forced to neglect the differences between land and oceans, instead 
presuming a homogeneous damp surface. Working within these material 
constraints, others at the time took an opposite approach – attempting to model 
realistic territories while minimizing the complexities of the atmosphere (for 
instance, taking it to contain two rather than nine levels).72 At each point, the 
choices of how to develop models were themselves channelled down particular 
paths set out by the material limits of computation at the time. In each case, 
computational and model frictions limited what was possible at the time and 
encouraged modellers to develop their technology in particular ways. Yet at this 
time, major uncertainties still existed about the climate: “climate theorists did not 
agree on the relative roles of such factors as solar variability, sunspots, and cloud 
feedbacks in climate change.”73 
In addition, all these models were beginning to bounce up against 
significant data frictions. In the first place, most observations were analogue, while 
the computations performed on them were digital. This meant not only increased 
the difficulties in manipulating the data, but it also introduced noise in the data 
through the process of transforming analogue into digital data.74 Even more 
fundamentally, data observations were spotty around the world – thorough and 
consistent in some areas, while absent or disparate in many others. One of the 
primary data frictions in modelling arose from trying to convert existing 
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observational networks into the abstract grids of climate change models. Since the 
former are incommensurate with the latter, acts of smoothing and interpolation 
are required to make observational data useable.75 The partial resolution to this 
tension began with the rise of satellite reconnaissance which was no longer limited 
to the stable (and random) placement of ground-based observations. Satellites to 
monitor the weather were initially launched in 1960, with the number of satellites 
greatly expanding over the ensuing decades. Already by 1969, the Nimbus 3 
satellite’s “infrared detectors could measure the temperature of the atmosphere 
comprehensively at various levels, night and day, over oceans, deserts, and 
tundra.”76 
Yet satellite data creates its own problems, making it a good exemplar of the 
difficulties in data production for climate science. In the first place, obtaining 
accurate readings from raw data involves taking into account “instrument design, 
calibration, orbital drift over time, atmospheric structure, and chemical 
composition.”77 Once the raw data is collected, analysis faces an ‘inverse-problem’ – 
each observational point in fact aggregates different atmospheric layers and 
different frequencies together, and the problem is to disaggregate these sums in 
order to get accurate estimates for each layer and frequency.78 Data from satellite 
observations must then be transformed into the gridded format used by computer 
modelling. This entails both a spatial and temporal grid, and is produced through a 
variety of methods including by hand, and through “automated procedures 
involving function fitting, methods of successive corrections, and statistical 
interpolation schemes.”79 As some areas of the world still had only a few 
observations available, techniques were required to project information into these 
gaps. In particular, numerical weather prediction was used to take information 
from densely observed areas and extend the projected weather patterns into the 
sparsely observed areas. The result was a much more accurate estimate of the data 
in the gaps. Finally, datasets for atmospheric observations can contain hundreds of 
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terabytes worth of information, making storage, retrieval and analysis exceedingly 
difficult.80 Despite these difficulties, satellites are the only truly global method of 
gathering homogeneous temperature data and resolved a number of problems with 
traditional observation methods. 
Lastly, this period of time saw a significant shift in the end products of 
these representational technologies. While the new simulations were designed to 
provide insight on how the global climate functioned, their output was rows and 
rows of numbers that were themselves in need of analysis, interpretation and 
synthesis.81 Cecil Leith advanced upon this by being the first to create proper 
visualisations of the models’ outputs, accomplished by working with a Hollywood 
company to produce actual movies of the simulations. This was a significant 
innovation since it was the first time modellers could see their model’s outputs, 
rather than being forced to imagine it.82 
By the 1970s, the stage was set for the next major advance in GCMs: the shift from 
modelling just the atmosphere to now including ocean dynamics in so-called 
coupled atmosphere and ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs). The focus 
previously had predominantly been on the atmosphere as the most important 
factor of energy circulation. Yet the oceans, as a major transmission belt of energy, 
as well as a giant sink for CO2, were also crucial to understanding how the climate 
functioned. In particular, AOGCMs are key for understanding how quickly 
heating of the top ocean layers will get mixed into deeper ocean layers, and thus 
how quickly climate change will occur and significantly upset the thermal 
circulation in the oceans.83 Two differences made modelling oceans more difficult 
than modelling the atmosphere though: the relative lack of observed data points, 
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and the increased difficulty in using averages to represent large ocean areas.84 In the 
first case, the lack of stable observation stations within the oceans made collecting 
data a significant challenge. Datasets were reliant on ships travelling around the 
world and collecting systematic observations. Fortunately, the 1970s also saw the 
emergence of a more complete dataset for ocean circulation, which allowed 
modellers to move beyond the material limitations of the previous data.85 The US 
Geochemical Ocean Sections Study has been designed to track radioactive fallout 
from nuclear weapons testing as it circulated through the oceans. In doing so, 
though, scientists gained access for the first time to a massive wealth of 
observational data about the oceans. Datasets such as this provided the basis for 
the first realistic coupled OGCM: Syukuro Manabe and Kirk Bryan’s 1975 model 
(itself based on an earlier initial attempt in 1968).86 
The second challenge in modelling oceans was that the major transmission 
belts of the ocean consisted of both microscopic whorls, and vast country-size 
whorls. These whorls, it turned out, were more important to energy transfer than 
the more familiar currents. As a result, more of the complexity of oceans also had 
to be modelled – something which was far beyond the capacities of the computers 
at the time. Initial attempts to develop ocean models coupled with atmospheric 
models therefore used simple ‘swamp’ models of the ocean that incorporated its 
essential dynamics, but only its surface layer evaporation mechanisms. As the 
technological platform expanded the possibilities of modelling, more sophisticated 
mixed-layer models began to include a heat capacity for the ocean that varied 
according to the depth of the ocean layer. Eventually models began to incorporate 
heat transfer by ocean currents as well.87 As before, progress in producing 
knowledge of the climate system was constrained and channelled as much by the 
technological platforms available as by the imperatives of science. 
The inclusion of ocean models into coupled GCMs also raised the crucial 
question of how to actually couple them together. Since OGCMs and AGCMs 
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began as independent models, there needed to be some means to connect them 
and this gave rise to novel frictions. In particular, coupled GCMs require some 
mechanism for simulating the exchange of energy, heat, wind and water between 
the different areas.88 It soon became a major focus of the decade to overcome the 
problems involved in coupling these models together, leading Arakawa to call it 
one of the “great challenges” of the time.89 These difficulties would continue to 
play themselves out in the 1990s debates over flux adjustment (a topic that will be 
returned to in the next section). 
In terms of computational friction, one of the most significant advances was 
the use of spectral methods to replace finite difference GCMs. Advances in 
computing power and in algorithmic efficiency eventually made these new methods 
possible, thereby expanding the material possibilities of these technological 
platforms.90 Finite difference methods had been used to approximate solutions to 
difficult partial differential equations – a key component of complex systems 
modelling.91 As Edwards explains, the new spectral methods "express the horizontal 
variation of dynamic model fields in terms of horizontal spherical harmonics. The 
technique simplifies the solution of many of the nonlinear partial differential 
equations used in general circulation modelling."92 Essentially, these methods were 
designed to overcome the problems with using grid points to model a spherical 
earth by exploiting the mathematics of wave space. Motion in the atmosphere 
could be calculated in wave space using spectral methods, and then translated back 
into the abstract physical space of the computer model, thereby bypassing the main 
computational frictions involved with grids.93 
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By the 1975-1985 period the general focus in GCM development had 
turned towards greater resolutions, better parameterisations, and bringing together 
atmospheric and ocean models.94 The main technical developments in this period 
were focused on improving (but not radically altering) spectral transforms, 
hydrological cycles, coupling of AGCMs and OGCM, radiative transfer, moist 
convection, continental surfaces, and boundary layer turbulence.95 The 1980s also 
saw GCMs gain increasing prominence for their experimental capacities, altering 
the behavioural possibilities of those who had access to them.96 Given that the 
climate was a complex and open system, there were no real possibilities for 
traditional scientific experiments on it. Instead, experimentation had to take place 
entirely via the mechanised reasoning processes of computer simulations. This 
meant that “by the 1980s, computer models of atmosphere and ocean general 
circulation had become the primary tool in studies of climate.”97 In other words, 
the development of these representational technologies had begun to make 
possible such experimental actions, along with the associated cognitive insights 
they provided on the climate. 
By the late 1980s and 1990s, the international community had begun to seriously 
focus on climate change as a political problem.98 In the technological sphere, what 
became known as the flux adjustment problem emerged from the attempt to 
couple atmospheric GCMs with ocean GCMs. The two separate models were in 
tension with each other, producing numerous complications in the attempt to 
stitch them together. Flux adjustment was an attempt to overtly modify the surface 
fluxes of heat and moisture in order to make the independent AGCM and OGCM 
components compatible with each other and with the observed climate dynamics. 
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The point to note here is that the possibilities available to modellers were set out 
by the technological limits of the time: either one introduced adjustments that 
were known to violate physical laws (the pragmatist solution), or one rejected the 
idea of coupling models until better technology was available (the purist solution). 
Whereas most modellers thought that flux adjustment was valid as temporary fix, it 
was also known to introduce new errors, insofar as the appropriate adjustment is 
calculated on the basis of a climate in equilibrium – which does not reflect the 
actual system. The result of this correction was an underestimating of existing 
tendencies.99 Nevertheless, the flux adjustment episode highlights clearly how the 
development of modelling technology was shaped by computational, data, and 
model frictions. The social contestation between pragmatists and purists took place 
within the framework set out by material possibilities. 
In general, the 1990s saw the gradual, but not revolutionary, development 
of more sophisticated GCMs. New factors were constantly being introduced – in 
particular, the effects of greenhouse gases other than CO2, as well as new ways of 
modelling clouds and wind.100 ‘Earth system models’ – models which incorporate 
elements such as the biology on land and ocean surfaces, as well as greater roles for 
chemistry – became commonplace. Carbon cycles became implemented as focus 
turned towards how carbon sinks would both affect and be affected by climate 
change.101 There was an expansion of vertical levels; an expansion of latitudinal and 
longitudinal resolution; and the introduction of more realistic surface topography. 
Major hardware developments in supercomputing underpinned this model 
development – including the development of vector processing and parallel 
computing.102 The former made possible the simultaneous application of the same 
equation to multiple grid points, whereas the latter allowed multiple instructions 
to be carried out at the same time rather than sequentially. This allowed the partial 
mitigation of some of the computational friction involved in calculating millions of 
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grid points. The hardware requirements (multi-petaflop supercomputers) of these 
new high-resolution earth system models have created new model tensions though, 
with algorithms having to be re-written in order to take advantage of parallel 
processing.103 
New simulation methods were introduced as well: multiple simulations 
began to be run in order to explore the likely possible outcomes of the simulations. 
Given that the climate system is a chaotic one, the sensitivity to initial conditions 
entails that any errors in the initial state can cause major errors later on. 
Repeatedly simulating the same model with slightly modified initial conditions 
attempts to overcome this problem by producing an estimate of how robust the 
results are.104 By the mid-1990s these methodological and conceptual advances were 
demonstrating significant payoffs as three different GCMs could – for the first time 
– accurately reproduce the entire climate of the twentieth century.105 In addition, 
by the time of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, models could accurately 
simulate the regional variations in heating.106 
Today, GCMs continue to incorporate an ever expanding series of elements 
into their models, including the unique effects of urban spaces. Resolution has 
continued to increase – as of 2009, a Japanese modelling centre had been 
experimenting with GCMs using resolutions as low as 3.5-10km.107 At the level of 
hardware, today’s most advanced models are employing multi-petaflop parallel 
processors, and even looking to use probabilistic chips to employ stochastic 
processes.108 A 2009 state of the discipline report notes that, 
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“There are atmospheric GCMs currently in use at 50km resolution 
that can run 1,000 times faster than real time. With the existing and 
projected technology, models with 25km resolution are within reach 
in next 3 years or so. However, global nonhydrostatic cloud system 
resolving models of the atmosphere using 2-5km grids (with 
comparable resolution in the ocean) are not likely to be attained 
within the next 5 years. As models reach 2-5km-scale resolutions, 
they will generate aggregate output data on the order of hundreds of 
exabytes, stored at widely distributed modelling centres.”109 
 
In terms of data, one of the more significant advances has been the 
emergence of an autonomous observation network featuring gliders, buoys, and 
subs.110 This observational network is spanning an unprecedented range of areas 
and multiplying greatly the frequency of observations. It is becoming a key part of 
the input system for climate modelling. Yet this has led to an emerging need for 
data centres as newer models are expected to produce hundreds of exabytes of 
data.111 The data friction involved in handling this immense amount of 
information has created a desire for a global modelling centre. Such a centre would 
include creating a network of national weather forecasting centres in order to 
incorporate the best regional data available.112 
The contemporary landscape of climate science is therefore one populated 
by globe-spanning infrastructures of observation networks, computing centres, and 
data visualisations. It is these infrastructures which have fed representations of 
nature into the world of politics. Moreover, progress in climate science has become 
inextricably intertwined with progress in these material infrastructures (particularly 
supercomputing). At each stage of progress, regardless of social interpretations or 
differing norms of science, model builders have had to face up to the frictions 
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involved in trying to incorporate all the different functions and goals of models 
into one representational technology. 
This infrastructure of climate modelling has come to be incorporated into 
cognitive assemblages, expanding the capacities of decision-makers. As with any 
other technology, the effects of climate modelling operate through the expansion 
of possibilities. Technologies may make entirely new options possible, they may 
make existing possibilities pass the crucial threshold of usability, or they may simply 
extend existing possibilities further. The primary effects of climate modelling have 
been to expand specifically cognitive abilities. Human cognition is no longer 
bound by tedious hand-written calculations, nor is it limited to mathematical 
equations that have closed form solutions. Cognition can now think nonlinearity 
in all of its complexity, and human thought can simulate different earths rather 
than remain bound by the limited opportunities for experimenting with the actual 
climate. The feedback loops of the climate system can now be thought, and 
probabilities given to the effects of sensitivity to initial conditions. Complexity, in a 
substantial way, is now capable of being thought via these cognitive assemblages. It 
is technological extensions of cognition which have produced the shift in scientific 
practice and the subsequent shift in how we conceptualise the natural world.113 A 
variety of capacities have been transformed and augmented as well. 
Among the capacities that these cognitive assemblages have made possible, 
it is often assumed the most significant is their predictive capacities: “Science in 
policy making is asked to be predictive and to answer questions under conditions 
of high uncertainty.”114 Yet in fact there is little evidence that this is its most useful 
function. For complex systems, prediction is often a futile gesture: “uncertainty 
about the probabilities of outcomes is pervasive, multiplicative, and often 
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nonlinear in complex systems.”115 The limits of cognitive capacities arise again here. 
While climate forecasts are intended to supplement our cognitive abilities, 
limitations remain – particularly in users’ understandings of uncertainty and in 
interpreting probabilistic claims.116 There is also an important disjuncture between 
the temporal horizons of predictions and policymaking. Whereas there are 
fundamental epistemological concerns about the validity of fine-grained predictions 
outside of a relatively short time period, many adaptation policies seek to plan 
decades in advance.117 Traditional methods of decision-making therefore fail to 
meet the demands of a complex system. To understand how these models are 
changing practices requires moving beyond a focus on representational concerns 
and instead looking at the pragmatic dynamics of what the models allow actors to 
do. 
As a result, a large part of what climate models do is not to provide answers 
per se (the prediction paradigm), but instead to highlight otherwise unseen 
problems in a complex system. Rather than prediction, for instance, the IPCC 
prefers to speak of ‘projection’.118 Unlike prediction and its implicit sense of 
certainty (even if this certainty is expressed probabilistically), projection relies on 
projecting out from specific given assumptions. Models can also be used for actions 
other than prediction – they are employed as "tools for organising inquiry, 
identifying interdependencies, and developing a better overall understanding of 
complex issues."119 Within the adaptation framework, for instance, alternatives to 
prediction-centred policy focus on building resilience to whatever may come.120 
Models, in this variant, are used to discover robust strategies – strategies that work 
sufficiently well over a variety of possible outcomes, rather than maximising one 
single outcome.121 The existence of uncertainty in complex systems means that such 
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a unique outcome is impossible to discern. Yet the discovery of robust strategies is 
only made possible by ensemble runs and the general simulation of the climate 
system. We can summarise by stating that models make possible the capacity to 
simulate, which in turn makes possible the capacity to consider the value of various 
strategies to deal with complex systems. It is only through repeated simulations of 
the future that strategies can be adequately assessed for their robustness to the 
variations involved in a complex system. 
On the basis of these new perceptual and cognitive capacities made possible by the 
representational technologies, new behavioural options have opened up for 
policymakers. This section will argue that, in particular, the material development 
of GCMs has made possible new adaptation policies that were previously 
impractical. Adaptation primarily requires local information that until recently was 
unavailable.122 With technological development though, the information has arisen 
to instantiate already existing political desires. A focus on political interests in 
therefore insufficient for understanding this shift, unless one also takes into 
account the transformations of the technological platform which have made it 
possible in the first place. 
In the past decade policymakers have been moving their attention away from global 
mitigation and more towards regional adaptation. On one level, the desire for the 
latter type of scientifically-informed and politically-relevant knowledge has been in 
existence for at least thirty years. In the political sphere, the 1978 US National 
Climate Program Act set itself the goal of discovering short-term effects on 
economic and social issues – though the program largely ignored global warming.123 
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The influential 1979 Charney report (“the first policy-oriented assessment”124 on 
climate change) for the US National Research Council also noted the significance 
of regional variations in possible climate change and expressed a desire for more to 
be known about it.125 Similarly, in the scientific sphere, the desire for accurate 
regional forecasts was the initial impetus for the development of numerical weather 
prediction in 1922.126 In some important senses, the knowledge for regional 
forecasts has been available for decades as well: early attempts in the 1980s had the 
models and data for a variety of the issues at hand, but the models had been 
developed independently and were impossible to integrate into any synthetic global 
vision.127 Why then, given the political desire, the scientific desire, and the basic 
scientific knowledge, did regional forecasts for adaptation only arise within the past 
decade? The answer, it will be argued here, is that it took the emergence of 
cognitive assemblages – with their technological embodiment in computer models 
– in order to integrate all the components together into an effective cognitive 
adjunct for government policy. 
Until the past decade, the vast majority of global climate modelling was 
aimed at determining the macro effects of doubling CO2 – deemed to be the 
standard measure for deciding how significant climate change was going to be. This 
measure was co-constructed by both the scientific modelling community and the 
political imperative of producing a ‘manageable’ problem.128 The central policy 
issue at this point was of demonstrating whether or not human-caused climate 
change was real and important. This focus had existed since the 1980s when 
climate modelling became a policy tool, and had produced the general outlines and 
measures for determining how severe climate change was going to be.129 In this 
instance, the focus on CO2 emission levels is the archetypal example. This metric 
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provided a simple and easily comprehensible standard against which to measure 
how much effect humans were having on the climate, and how severe the effects of 
climate change were likely to be. It allowed for the construction of a simple story 
built around the mitigation of carbon emissions, and it allowed for easy 
comparison of models. The aim of this program was, to put it simply, to prove that 
human-made climate change was real and that the best solution was mitigation on 
a global level via focus on a global cause (CO2 emissions). The IPCC and the 
United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are archetypes of this 
approach: global scientific consensus marshalled for global action. 
Yet in the past two decades – and particularly the last decade – this focus 
has begun to shift: first in the modelling world, and subsequently in the policy 
world. The emphasis is now increasingly focused on producing regional climate 
modelling downscaled from a GCM. The shift began in the modelling world, as 
modellers began to downscale GCMs to provide finer detail about possible regional 
dynamics. Up to the 1990s, the impact studies on the effects of climate change 
have been run at immensely crude levels. As one review notes, 
 
“There is a very serious mismatch of scale between the scenarios of 
climate change (for example, developed from GCMs with 500-km 
resolution) and the scale of operation of many climate impact 
models. For example, typical crop-climate models calculate crop yield 
on a m2 basis and are designed to accept climate input from a single 
meteorological station representing a very local area. Similarly, 
climate information at the catchment scale, which maybe as small as 
a few kilometres, is needed to assess the effect of climate change on 
many hydrological basins.”130 
  
The disjunction between scales severely hampered earlier attempts to draw 
out regional forecasts for policymaking purposes. GCMs would agree on the 
general changes made to the Earth’s climate, but regional predictions would 
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produce conflicting accounts – for instance, drought in one model, and excessive 
rain in another model.131 These problems drove modellers to develop downscaling 
techniques to bypass the technological limits on GCM resolution.132 This 
downscaling was attained through three primary means: the empirical approach 
avoids the computational frictions by limiting the role of modelling and instead 
uses historical examples of regional warming as a guide: for instance, paleoclimatic 
data and warm years in recent decades. The semi-empirical approach uses 
correlations and known relations between elements to translate low-resolution 
GCM outputs into higher-resolution regional estimates. Lastly, the modelling 
approach attempts to run high-resolution models but only for limited issues and 
areas. In this case, high-resolution models are often nested into coarse resolution 
GCMs, with the latter providing the input data for the former.133 
As the anthropogenic sources of climate change have become solidified as a 
piece of scientific knowledge, the pressure now is to use these downscaling 
methods and the latest high-resolution GCMs to produce models that can 
illuminate regional dynamics. More specifically, while global models are sufficient 
for mitigation decisions and demonstrating the existence of climate change, 
complex downscaled global models are needed for adaptation decisions that are 
necessarily local. The political stakes of this shift in the modelling community are 
well-recognised.134 A recent 2009 statement of intent by the World Modelling 
Summit for Climate Prediction is particularly clear: “The climate science 
community now faces a major new challenge of providing society with reliable 
regional climate predictions.”135 As with earlier periods of modelling technology, 
there remain fundamental trade-offs between the resolution of a model and the 
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complexity of the components it includes. The higher resolution of this new 
regional modelling means that computational, data, and model frictions are all 
raising their head yet again.136 
 
 
 
With the representational technology and the political desires for regional 
modelling in place, policymakers have begun to shift their attention towards 
regional adaptation measures. This is not to say that adaptation policies have not 
existed in the past; but they have remained crude and based on general principles 
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for resiliency. They have not been capable of being based on targeted adaptation 
measures simply because such information was outside the realm of human 
cognition. For decision-makers who want to understand how to respond and 
locally adapt to climate change, forecasts about the changing regional climate are 
absolutely necessary. How will precipitation patterns change? How should water 
resources be managed? How will infrastructure hold up? How much will sea levels 
rise and how high do barriers have to be? How will vegetation respond to the 
increased local temperatures? How will local ecologies be transformed? All of these 
questions require high-resolution regional modelling in order to provide an 
overview of the most likely outcomes. 
In order to obtain these technological requirements, governments have 
progressively incorporated climate modelling centres into their circuits of 
knowledge production and decision. There has been a creation of two-way 
interactions between climate models and policymakers, fully integrating the two 
together into a single cognitive assemblage. Rather than scientists simply working 
on their own projects and eventually bringing issues to the political sphere, politics 
is now actively reciprocating the flow of information and dictating to modelling 
centres what information they require. As a result of this, governments are now 
seeking to integrate climate modelling not only as a tool to prove climate change, 
but also as a cognitive prosthesis for making decisions about adaptation.138 An early 
adopter of this strategy was the International Research Institute for Climate 
Prediction, created in 1996 with the specific aim of providing seasonal climate 
predictions for government (though focused more on the El Nino Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO) instead of global climate change). This institution was among 
the first to introduce the idea of a true integration of modelling, science, and 
policy-relevance via “the notion of an end-to-end system running from climate 
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researchers to consumers of climate information, and back again.”139 Today, this 
creation of cognitive assemblages has expanded around the world. For instance, in 
their national plan for responding to climate change, the South African 
government has placed information as a central input to any effective response: 
 
“In order to make informed proactive decisions in respect of 
interventions aimed at reducing predicted climate change risks, 
reliable medium- and long-term impact predictions must be available 
to, among others, establish the scale of the projected change and 
associated impact and establish the potential costs of the impact and 
the potential benefits of a response intervention. Furthermore, as 
much of the on-the-ground responses will be planned and 
implemented by local authorities, it is imperative that these 
predictions are down-scaled to levels where they are of use in 
informing these plans.”140 
 
A similar recognition of the importance of regional modelling for any 
effective governmental response can be found in Brazil. Their National Plan on 
Climate Change notes that, 
 
“Some studies have been carried out in the country seeking to 
understand the regional dynamics of climate and the environment, 
social and economic impacts, both at a national and local level, 
which can occur due to changes in climate in the coming century. 
Attempts will be made to increase the production of scientific 
knowledge about all aspects related to the problem, in order to 
achieve an adaptation that minimises the costs incurred by the 
country in relation to the new climatic conditions.”141 
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Turning this programmatic statement into concrete action requires “using the 
supercomputers of the National Space Research Institute (Instituto Nacional de 
Pesquisas Espaciais – INPE), which will contribute to carrying out studies on 
Vulnerability and Adaptation.”142 In all of these cases there is a recognised need for 
regional and local information that has been downscaled from GCM predictions. 
Moreover, there is an explicit demand from governments for policy-relevant 
forecasts for regional adaptation measures. In both the policymaker world and the 
climate modelling world there is a simultaneous turn towards making climate 
models into effective tools of policymaking. It is, in other words, the emergence of 
a cognitive assemblage incorporating government institutions and representational 
technology. 
 In the end, the shift in policy focus towards regional adaptation and away 
from global mitigation can be seen as the product of a number of different 
developments: the political desire to better prepare for climate change; the political 
stalemates of mitigation measures; the scientific desire to accurately understand the 
Earth system; and their integration in materially-embodied cognitive assemblages. 
Given that the first two have been constants for some time, it is the latter which 
helps explain why this shift in focus is arising at this particular time. The 
emergence of cognitive assemblages has in turn been the product of a number of 
different trends: the development of supercomputing (e.g. parallel processing, 
multi-petaflop processors, and probabilistic chips); the development of climate 
models (e.g. Earth systems modelling, higher resolution, and better 
parameterisations); and the development of observational networks (e.g. satellites, 
greater dispersal of observation stations, globally centralised data centres). These 
lines of development have contingently come together to make possible the 
emergence of these assemblages, which have in turn come to embody the desires of 
governments and scientists to make forecasts about local and regional climate 
changes. Climate modelling centres have therefore come to effectively provide the 
cognitive means for government bodies to conceptualise and work through the 
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medium- to long-term consequences of a changing complex system. They provide 
the necessary mediating point through which planning and action must pass. 
It is in the United Kingdom (UK) where this emergent cognitive assemblage of 
government and modelling centres has arguably reached its current peak. As with 
Brazil and South Africa, the Met Office Hadley Centre is turning towards 
regionalising global dynamics.143 Formed in 1990 as a means to centralise 
climatology work being done by various UK government bodies, the Hadley Centre 
has from the beginning been explicitly oriented towards providing policy-relevant 
information. Yet the same shift seen in other modelling centres is now under way 
here too: whereas “previously regional information was used to answer: ‘Is there an 
issue?’ now it's more: ‘How do we respond?’”144 The Hadley Centre also provides an 
ideal illustration for understanding the relation between technical climate models 
and policymaking because it has consistently avoided the extremes of what Simon 
Shackley calls ‘climate seers’ and ‘climate model constructors’. The former group 
aims to use models in order to make predictions and explore the effects of changes 
on the climate system. The latter group looks to develop the most accurate and 
realistic model of the climate possible; prediction and usefulness being secondary 
concerns.145 This distinction, far from being a mere psychological predilection of 
individual climate modellers, is a social factor that plays into the development of 
climate models. National systems of modelling which take a climate seer approach 
will tend towards more pragmatic models. With the recent call for more regional 
models, the division between the two sides is being somewhat effaced and the 
Hadley Centre is emblematic of this. The need for pragmatic models of regional 
systems requires the accuracy and realism of the more complex models. 
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 The Hadley Centre is therefore unique in that it occupies a middle ground 
between seers and constructors. At the same time, it is “the main national source of 
scientific input on climate change issues not only to the wider scientific 
community, but also to all departments of government, to industry, and to 
NGOs.”146 Hadley also uniquely takes much of its strategic priorities from 
government (via policies and funding which is primarily through the Department 
of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) and the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)). The Defra funding program which makes up 
nearly 80% of Hadley’s total 2011 funding is explicitly oriented towards producing 
policy outputs.147 “Modelling to address policy-relevant questions thus becomes a 
priority for research.”148 In all these regards, therefore, the Hadley Centre provides 
a prime exemplar for how policymakers and climate modelling are interacting to 
produce an extended cognitive system. 
The Hadley Centre uses a variety of model in order to achieve its scientific 
and policy-oriented goals, with each model providing insights on different aspects 
of the climate. These range from complex state-of-the-art earth system models 
(HadCM3LC and HadGEM2-ES, which as of this writing is one of the most 
advanced models in the world149); models of intermediate complexity; simple 
models used to provide baselines and test major climate drivers; and integrated 
assessment models that attempt to incorporate social, political, and economic 
aspects into the modelling sphere. (See Figure 6 for a quick overview of the Hadley 
Centre’s main models.) 
 Having demonstrated the tight interconnections between the government 
and climate modelling, it is unsurprising to see the Met Office respond directly to 
the demands of adaptation outlined here, and to the cognitive possibilities opened 
up by developments in technology. The latest strategy document of the Met Office 
reiterates the changes in the climate modelling community that were outlined 
earlier: 
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 “Even without climate change, society is increasingly vulnerable to 
hazardous weather and natural climate variability. This means that 
information is required not at a global scale, but at a regional and 
local scale and increasingly for lead-times of months to decades 
rather than for the end of the century. At the same time, there is a 
growing awareness that the most serious impacts of climate change 
will be felt through changes in rainfall patterns, extremes of climate 
variability, and the intensity and frequency of hazardous weather 
events. This new agenda is revolutionising climate science and 
prediction, and the urgency of the problem is requiring an 
increasingly operational delivery of climate services.”150 
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As a result of these demands, the Hadley Centre is focusing its research over 
the next five years on a few key areas: better predictive capacities for hazardous 
weather; increased predictive abilities for the water cycle and precipitation patterns; 
producing monthly to decadal climate predictions; and to integrate human 
activities and reactions into the models. These areas of focused research are all 
aimed at providing the operational means for decision-makers to perceive the likely 
areas where climate change will have the most negative effects (a point made 
repeatedly throughout the strategy document). Firstly, the prediction of extreme 
weather events is of obvious interest to any government, with flooding and snowfall 
being particularly significant for the UK. Secondly, precipitation patterns are also 
crucial for the UK government, as their placement between the Atlantic Ocean on 
one side (with its associated jet streams and ocean currents) and the European 
continent on the other gives rise to particularly unpredictable weather.152 As 
droughts affect southern parts of the UK, while floods affect other parts, planning 
for how to react to these medium-term changes is crucial for the UK government. 
Thirdly, the shift to monthly and decadal predictions is also a significant indicator 
of government interests. Rather than the standard century long predictions used 
for the IPCC assessment reports, monthly and decadal predictions are more 
actionable for policymakers. Lastly, and quite obviously, the human-climate 
interaction is of interest primarily to governments having to make estimates of the 
likely future. A climate purist is interested first and foremost in creating an 
accurate scientific model of the climate system; in this pure vision, human 
interactions are an extraneous factor. 
 Materially, these four strategic goals require not only the further 
development of climate models, but also investment in specific hardware and 
specific technical skills. The Met Office notes that currently far too much time is 
devoted by modellers to fixing computing problems, and therefore there is a need 
to incorporate more computer scientists and software engineers to accomplish 
these necessary tasks. This is particularly significant insofar as upcoming 
supercomputers involve multi-cores and massive parallel processing which will 
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require rewriting every model’s code in order to take advantage of the new 
computing architecture.153 Additionally, the distinction between operational 
climate projections as opposed to research-based climate projections requires 
specific supercomputing abilities in order to make the strategic goals possible. 
Whereas research-based modelling involves running simulations that takes months 
of time to accomplish, operational-based modelling requires much quicker 
turnarounds in order to make the projections useful for more immediate 
decisions.154 
 The products of these investments in the technological infrastructure are 
intended to be direct inputs into policymaking. In the words of one UK-based 
modeller, “Building models of these problems serves a dual purpose – it provides 
predictions, but also, in describing the model, you describe the problem in a way 
that can really help policy-makers.”155 The emphasis on “operational delivery of 
climate services” highlights that the intended audience of the modelling centre’s 
products are to be political users. Already, the Hadley Centre models have been 
used to help businesses stress test their infrastructure in the wake of extreme 
weather events.156 Hadley’s Providing Regional Climates for Impact Studies 
(PRECIS) program is aimed at producing a model which requires minimal 
computational capacity and is designed to be made easily available to developing 
countries to simulate their own regional projections. This is another step in the 
overall strategy of making regional productions more accurate, more widely 
dispersed, and more easily usable for decision-makers at every level. 
The Hadley Centre therefore exemplifies a cognitive assemblage, whereby 
the development of representational technologies and the development of policies 
become intertwined. The Hadley Centre takes its research priorities from 
government requests (e.g. regional and local modelling, the inclusion of the water 
cycle, and the forecasting of extreme events) and is focused on producing policy-
relevant information. This marks a significant shift from the 1990s where it was 
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thought that GCMs would only affect policy indirectly via means such as raising an 
issue.157 Now climate modelling is seen to contribute specifics to how decision-
makers understand their actions. Government rationality is distributed across 
social and material components. Intriguingly, in the emergence of these cognitive 
assemblages, the distinction between weather forecasting and climate projections is 
increasingly disappearing as the technology makes the accuracy and resolution of 
climate projections more closely approximate that of numerical weather prediction. 
There is a breakdown of the traditional division between scientists in favour of 
accurate representations and those in favour of pragmatic representations. Or more 
specifically, the division is being displaced to a new debate over how to use the 
more accurate representations. 
In summary, this chapter has attempted to demonstrate how technologically 
produced representations can augment cognition and contribute to shaping the 
possibility space of political action. In particular, this has been traced out by 
following the emergence of cognitive assemblages resulting from a number of 
different dynamics in climate science and politics. First, there is the technological 
development of regional models downscaled from GCMs, and the ensuing 
effacement of the climate projection/weather forecast distinction. This 
development was guided by material frictions along the way, with social 
contestation over the best path forward being set within these limits. Second, there 
was the political recognition of the inevitability of climate change and the need for 
adaptation measures. Since these measures require local information, regional 
downscaled models are the only current means to provide estimates about the 
likely outcomes of climate change and thus the necessary policy responses by 
governments. These two movements have coalesced together in climate modelling 
centres that are guided by policy needs, with the Hadley Centre exemplifying this 
trend. New state powers of perception and cognition are arising as a consequence. 
The power to act meaningfully in response to climate change is premised upon the 
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capacity to ‘see nature’ – a capacity which is only possible by virtue of the heavy 
technological mediation this chapter has set out. GCMs, as representational 
technologies, have augmented the perceptual capacities of states and international 
organisations as a result. 
Yet despite the significant cognitive advances afforded by these 
technological extensions, there are still limits – some fundamental, some more 
temporary. There is not a complete evacuation of humanity’s roles in making 
decisions about the climate. To begin with, there are always multiple models 
available, and thus the selection of which model to employ is partly a political 
choice.158 This choice is somewhat mitigated by the emergence of ensemble 
forecasting though, which downplays the contribution of any particular model and 
its possible biases. On the output side, “the practical problem is that numerous and 
even contradictory policy positions can be supported by legitimate interpretations 
of the scientific record.”159 Moreover, values inevitably enter into the discussion of 
how to respond to climate change: 
 
“The way in which climate change is framed – as an environmental, 
security, economic or social justice problem – fundamentally affects 
the way that climate is governed, the types of policy interventions 
that are sought, and the actors to be involved.”160 
 
Further complications arise in the economics of climate change: not only what will 
be affected, but how much and what will it cost. Key here is (1) the discount rate 
assumed for future events, and (2) the damage function of temperature rises.161 
These calculations rely less on empirical or theoretically grounded analyses though, 
and more on ethical principles about the value of future humans, the stance 
towards the precautionary principle, and the relation to uncertainty. 
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On an even more fundamental level, prediction with climate models is 
limited by a fundamental characteristic of complex systems: the climate system is 
inherently random – while there are predictable aspects, there is also necessary 
randomness that sets limits on the accuracy of any possible prediction.162 The 
fundamental limit of weather prediction, for instance, is estimated to be two 
weeks.163 And even within that limit, human expertise is still required to interpret 
computed outputs and recognise the signs of extreme weather.164 Therefore, there 
will always remain a space for human decision in the response to climate change. 
This leads to some of the explicit and implicit political aspects of GCMs. As 
with any representational technology, these GCMs shape behavioural and cognitive 
possibilities – which necessarily entails political consequences. For instance, in 
presenting a numerical and abstract vision of nature, interactions between different 
sciences are represented synthetically, and the local and individual variations in any 
component are often effaced by this abstraction. Soil chemistry, hydrology, and 
plant physiology are all abstracted from their original scientific disciplines in order 
to be represented and included with climate models.165 Similarly, GCMs tend to 
“favour certain disciplines and approaches over others, for instance, by giving more 
weight to the present than the past, to near-term meteorological timescales over 
geological ones, and to physical processes (which may be more tractable at global 
levels of representation) than to biological parameters.”166 Within this 
representational technology there is simultaneously a blackboxing of the cognitive 
processing that goes on behind simulations. Regional variations, statistical outliers, 
and contentious assumptions can and do disappear behind the opaqueness of the 
final product. For instance, the simplicity of an earlier sea model made pollution 
appear to be a more universal concern than it actually was. Regional variations in 
pollution were glided over by scientists in an effort to bring about political 
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agreement on the Mediterranean Action Plan.167 The material infrastructure of 
cognitive assemblages and the knowledge they produce can encode a variety of 
other political assumptions. The most common of these are debates about the 
relationship between models and data, as well as debates over whether GCMs are 
tuned to give the results modellers want to find.168 But more significant is that even 
if the validity of the science is not questioned, GCMs can still encode political 
assumptions – for instance, giving weight to problems that affect developing 
countries less than developed countries. (See, for instance, the WRI-CSE 
controversy).169 In this regard, the choice of model outputs is partially political as 
well: what variable, for instance, does one choose to represent soil depletion or 
deforestation? In every case, “predictions must be generated primarily with the 
needs of the user in mind. [For instance,] television weather predictions focus 
primarily on temperature, precipitation, and wind, rather than temperature 
gradients, behaviour of aerosols, and barometric pressure.”170 The global nature of 
the outputs means they have tended to predict risk independently of local 
circumstances and reactions.171 “Such ‘global’ statements may suppress a number of 
important differences and insights at the local level that can either contribute to 
understanding the nature of risks, or indicate the local meaning attached to 
environmental changes often referred to as problems.”172 Lastly, the basic 
acknowledgement that climate change is dangerous says nothing about what in 
particular is dangerous (e.g. increased flooding, more extreme weather, soil 
depletion, ocean acidification, changing migratory patterns, etc.) and to whom in 
particular it is dangerous (e.g. developing countries, rural areas, the global poor, the 
insurance industry, etc.). All of these aspects must be selected (or ignored) as part 
of the output of the model. 
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Further political processes of inclusion and exclusion arise in that “the use 
of technologically sophisticated methods such as computer simulations [are not 
always available to] viewpoints from less scientifically and technically resource-rich 
states and regions of the world.”173 Projects like the DFID funded Climate Science 
Research Partnership (CSRP) program at the Hadley Centre are specifically 
focusing on providing regional projections for Africa, where early warning systems 
are crucial for preparing aid and relief before a crisis strikes.174 This diffusion of 
regional modelling to local areas also extends the computer-mediated vision of 
nature that GCMs embody. It is part of the infrastructural project of creating a 
network with standardised and shared representations.175 This diffusion of 
modelling capacities is conjoined with the move towards regionalised projections 
and the subsequent transformation in the locus of decision-making they make 
possible. This changes the object of governance – from the global space of 
emissions controls to the local space of adaptation measures. It makes possible a 
change in who is governing – from a small community of climate modellers and 
politicians to a much wider group of local stakeholders. Higher resolution regional 
models, for example, can allow for more specificity about precipitation patterns: a 
key aspect for managing local water resources. Whereas the academic focus and 
public attention has largely been on the state and inter-state levels,176 the most 
effective actions for adaptation are at the local and regional levels. The spread of 
regional modelling towards these affected localities promises to make the 
computer-mediated vision of the world even more pervasive in the future.177 
Yet despite all the political implications of these representational 
technologies, GCMs remains the sole means available for making nature qua 
complex system intelligible as a whole. In particular, models act to condense a 
dispersed spatiotemporal problem into an immediate and intuitive representation. 
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One of the well-known difficulties with solving the problems of climate change is 
that the responsible parties, the victims of climate change, the effects of current 
behaviours, and the likely effects, are all dispersed over decades and thousands of 
miles. In situations such as these, those responsible can have both incentives to 
ignore problems and the means to obscure their role.178 What GCMs effectively do 
is to take this entire complex network and make the connections intelligible, 
thereby bringing concreteness to what is otherwise an abstract and often invisible 
problem. This complexity is made visible and intelligible through charts, maps, and 
simulated time-lapse videos. In this regard, “the computer functions not merely as 
an improved typewriter, […] but rather as a general interface between systems of 
equations and sensory perception.”179 GCMs and their cognitive assemblages come 
to form a necessary technical mediator between nature and politics. The ability to 
see the evolution of the global climate “at a glance” allows new means of 
comparison and helps to highlight problems in advance.180 
What this chapter has attempted to demonstrate is that political decisions 
increasingly require technological extensions of cognitive capacities. Complex 
systems far surpass our intrinsic abilities to understand them, and therefore 
demand that humanity develop technology to supplement our finite capacities. The 
next chapter will examine another such system – global financial markets – in 
order to show one way in which non-state actors are making use of representational 
technologies in order to create new possible actions. 
                                                 
178 Mitchell, International Politics and the Environment, 104. 
179 Kittler, Optical Media, 228. 
180 Pasini, From Observations to Simulations: A Conceptual Introduction to Weather and Climate 
Modelling, 145. 
 
 
 
 
“What one thinks of as ‘market data’ are often prices 
 filtered through another model or calculation.”1 
 
-Emanuel Derman 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Once a relatively obscure field of financial economics, derivatives have burst into 
popular consciousness over the past decade, culminating in the financial implosion 
of 2008.2 From the shadows of the over-the-counter (OTC) financial world, stories 
about the proliferation, ubiquity and dangers of derivatives suddenly became front 
page news. It was commonly cited that prior to the collapse the notional value of 
outstanding derivatives was $683 trillion.3 While this number is an exaggeration of 
derivatives’ real significance (notional value includes the value of the underlying), it 
does point to the sheer pervasiveness of derivatives. Similarly, a 2005 report found 
that 92% of the top 500 companies were using derivatives.4 Even many individuals 
who ostensibly never invested in derivatives were nevertheless participating in them 
through pensions, municipal bonds, mutual funds and other investment bodies for 
personal finance. Derivatives were everywhere and they were playing an important 
role throughout the global financial system. 
Yet forty years earlier, derivatives trading was a minuscule market. This 
rapid growth of derivatives (the quickest in history5) and their markets is a bit of a 
mystery (see Figure 7 and Figure 8). The expansion of the world’s financial markets 
                                                 
1 Derman, My Life as a Quant: Reflections on Physics and Finance, 165. 
2 Derivatives are so called because their value derives from some sort of underlying asset (e.g. 
commodities, stocks, bonds, interest-rates, and credit). They are financial contracts (also called 
instruments or products). They can be roughly broken up into four different types of derivatives: 
futures, forwards, swaps, and options. 
3 OTC Derivatives Market Activity in the First Half of 2008. 
4 Bernstein, Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern Wall Street, xx. 
5 LiPuma and Lee, Financial Derivatives and the Globalization of Risk, 94. 
has been given a number of explanations, ranging from American and UK-led, 
IMF-led, and neoliberal-led processes of financial liberalization; institution-based, 
ideas-based, and state-based sources of change; along with liberal analyses and 
Marxist analyses.6 While making important contributions, these explanations tend 
to overlook a key component of this financial expansion: the role of technology in 
constructing global financial markets. It is the aim of this chapter to demonstrate 
what precisely that role is – not as an opposed explanation to the previous theories, 
but as a crucial supplementary cause. In this vein, one aim of the chapter will be to 
show how representational technology began to be used to grasp the complexity of 
financial markets, which in turn enabled the construction of new markets in new 
financial instruments. In part, this technology facilitated the growth of derivatives 
markets by altering modern perceptions of the ‘global financial market’. 
The chapter here concentrates specifically on the creation and spread of 
derivative pricing models and derivative markets (both OTC and exchange-based), 
with a particular focus on options.7 Despite their current popular affiliation with 
the 2008 financial crisis, derivatives were in fact initially developed in order to 
minimise risk – that is to say, to manage complexity. Financial instruments are 
produced (‘engineered’) as mathematical means to try and distribute risk in the 
most optimal manner. They provide a way to fine-tune the risk that a particular 
investor is willing to take on. As financial engineer Emanuel Derman writes, “the 
asymmetry between upside gain and downside loss is the defining characteristic of 
derivatives.”8 Despite the complexity of the nuances involved in derivatives, at their 
most basic they consist of three fundamental products: options, futures, and swaps. 
 
                                                 
6 Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s; Gindin 
and Panitch, The Making of Global Capitalism; Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins 
of the Rise of Finance; Chwieroth, Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization; 
Harvey, A Brief History Of Neoliberalism. 
7 A parallel story could be told for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) – one of the major 
contributors to the 2008 financial crisis – as the models which made them possible share a similar 
history to the derivative pricing models analysed here. 
8 Derman, My Life as a Quant: Reflections on Physics and Finance, 6. 
  
Options, like their name suggests, are the option to purchase or sell an asset 
at a specified price (the ‘strike price’). A call option allows the option buyer to 
purchase an asset, while a put option allows the option buyer to sell an asset. A 
further distinction can be made between European and American options, neither 
of which references a geographical specification but instead refers to when an 
option can be exercised. European options can only be exercised at one specified 
date (the ‘maturity date’); whereas American options can be exercised at any point 
up to the maturity date. Options, at least in one use, are a means to hedge against 
the risk of an asset value fluctuating too wildly. A seller of a good (e.g. farmers 
selling wheat) may buy a put option in order to guarantee a minimum price at 
which they can sell a good, thereby minimizing the risk in asset volatility. Similarly, 
a buyer of a good (e.g. airlines buying jet fuel) may buy a call option in order to set 
a ceiling to the price they pay for an asset in the future. 
 
                                                 
9 This graph is a modified version of that found in Mixon, “Option Markets and Implied Volatility: Past 
Versus Present,” 172. Note that this is a logarithmic scale, which visually minimises the actual leap in 
options trading. The solid vertical line marks the year 1973, when the Black-Scholes-Merton formula 
was published and when the first centralized exchange devoted to options (the Chicago Board Options 
Exchange) opened up. 
  
Options also have a speculative use by virtue of the leverage they can 
provide. For instance, the buyer of an option, crucially, is not buying the 
underlying asset itself, but only the right to possibly own (or sell) it in the future. 
Typically, only collateral has to be paid up front, which is a small percentage of the 
actual asset value under consideration. Leverage can therefore be created by using a 
relatively small amount of capital to purchase options on the movements of a 
relatively large amount of assets. Furthermore, derivatives are off-balance sheet 
entities, meaning they are not subject to the capital requirements that on-balance 
sheet entities are regulated by. Banks and other investment bodies do not need to 
set aside capital in order to trade in derivatives markets, thereby leaving more 
capital for use in the markets. Options, as a result, are extremely popular as a tool 
of speculation. 
Futures are similar to options, though they do not allow for the choice of 
buying or selling the underlying at the expiration date.11 Instead, they are 
agreements to buy or sell an underlying at a predetermined price and at a 
                                                 
10 Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Note that these numbers are not inflation-adjusted. 
These numbers are also drawn from their second-half reports – so 2008, for instance, includes the 
effects of the financial crisis. BIS began thorough record-keeping in 1998, which marks the start of this 
chart. Prior to then, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) kept records of market 
value and activity, but only on currency and interest-rate derivatives and only from 1987. 
11 Forwards are another type of derivative, though they are largely equal to standardized, exchange-
traded versions of futures. 
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predetermined time. They are less flexible than options, though as a result, there is 
no premium paid for having a choice. 
Swaps are a more recent invention and consist fundamentally in the 
exchanging of income streams between parties. Oftentimes these are used to 
manage the volatility of currency exchanges or interest rates. For instance, one 
party may want a stable (fixed) interest rate, while another party is willing to accept 
the volatility of interest rates in the belief that they will provide greater returns. The 
excess gains that may come from the variable rate are exchanged for the security of 
knowing the future interest rate in advance and being able to plan around it. 
These three instruments provide the basis for all the ensuing derivatives 
that will be referred to in this chapter. The more complex derivatives (e.g. exotic 
options and structured products) are typically comprised of variations and 
combinations of options, futures and swaps. The focus point for this chapter – 
where technology, practitioners, complexity and representation all meet – will be in 
the realm of options traders. It is here that the complexity of the market, its 
perception as a global entity, and actions focused on these representations of global 
finance, all arise. 
The story here will focus on a few key moments in their history. After a 
brief historical overview of financial quantification, we will look at the origins of 
pricing models with Fischer Black, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton. We will 
then examine the shift in the use of pricing models that occurred as a result of the 
1987 stock market crash, showing how volatility came to be the prism through 
which much market activity was perceived by options traders. Third, we will look at 
the proliferation of models as a result of debates over the nature of ‘volatility’ and 
the overcoming of various material frictions. Fourth, we will focus on how these 
models came to frame options markets in terms of volatility as a simplifying 
heuristic. Fifth, we will then argue that these models have made possible a variety 
of new behaviours in the markets, which have contributed to making possible the 
rise of global finance. 
 
Global financial markets are complex both in the technical sense of a complex 
system and in the intuitive sense we give to the term. In the more mundane 
everyday sense, markets are comprised of thousands of traders carrying out billions 
of transactions every day. With the incorporation of algorithmic trading recently, 
these volumes are surging ahead. The average daily volume of the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) increased 300% over the period of 2005–9, while the 
number of daily trades increased 800% over the same time.12 This surge in 
volume has been matched by a surge in the variety of financial products available 
as well. The traditional equities and bonds have been joined by increasingly exotic 
derivatives and increasingly abstract products (as we will see, even derivatives of 
the volatility of volatility are now being traded). 
In response to this expansion of products, volumes, and market 
participants, a variety of tactics have been developed to simplify this complexity. A 
mass of information is produced in an attempt to try and make intelligible the 
dynamics of the market: corporate financial reports, scores of analysts’ reports, and 
organisation’s own proprietary analyses, to name just a few. In addition, 
organisations set up trading desks devoted to specific securities and specific 
regions, and traders make use of various heuristics all the time in an attempt to 
make sense of the mass of information (e.g. profit/earnings ratios, credit default 
swap costs, and bond spreads). 
Global financial markets are also complex in the technical sense: subject to 
critical phase transitions, sensitivity to initial conditions, self-organising, and 
capable of generating emergent phenomena. Prices in markets tend to follow a 
random walk pattern, but under certain conditions produce significant critical 
events (i.e. crashes) that can be modelled as a phase transition in the market.13 
Various patterns in financial markets (e.g. the existence of power laws) all suggest 
their nature as a properly complex system.14 
                                                 
12 Beunza et al., Impersonal Efficiency and the Dangers of a Fully Automated Securities Exchange, 5. 
13 Sornette, Why Stock Markets Crash: Critical Events in Complex Financial Systems, chap. 3. 
14 Gabaix, “Power Laws in Economics and Finance.” 
It is as a result of these sorts of complexities that financial actors have 
turned towards various representational technologies in order to make it possible 
to intervene in the market. In particular, this chapter will examine option pricing 
models as tools which condense an immense amount of information about these 
complex systems into an actionable representation that allows traders to trade. 
Despite the recent popularity of these products, financial derivatives have been 
around for millennia. Since this chapter is concerned broadly with the effects of 
financial quantification, it is worth briefly examining the history of such 
quantification. In particular, we will demonstrate the basic steps that were required 
for the worldview presupposed by modern derivatives to emerge. 
The link between finance and mathematics has a long history, harking back 
to at least ancient Sumerian and Babylonian laws on interest rates in the third 
century BC.15 This was a very rudimentary sense of financial quantification though, 
as while interest was calculated on various loans and debts, this relied only on basic 
arithmetic and was predominantly subject to the whims of moral and legal 
arguments rather than any sort of quantitative reason.16 When interest was paid, it 
was typically paid through the same substance that had been lent out. Repayment 
was given ‘in kind’17 for most of history, or eventually through money (though 
money understood as a means of exchange and not as self-generating capital). Early 
finance also neglected any numerical distinguishing of maturities on loans beyond 
a basic ambiguous distinction between short-term and long-term.18 
 
                                                 
15 Lo and Hasanhodzic, The Evolution of Technical Analysis, 5; Homer and Sylla, A History of Interest 
Rates, Fourth Edition, Kindle Location 372–378. 
16 Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the 
Emergence of Scientific Thought, 80–87. 
17 The term ‘in kind’ has remained with us in the present era, and suggests the historical separation of 
different kinds of substances, values and magnitudes. This is a remnant of medieval mathematics, where 
‘numbers’ were based upon incommensurable units of substances, leading to incommensurable series of 
numbers. There was no conception of a general number. (Hadden, On the Shoulders of Merchants: 
Exchange and the Mathematical Conception of Nature in Early Modern Europe, 68–71.) 
18 Homer and Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, Fourth Edition, Kindle Location 276–285. 
Similarly, while options and futures had existed even during Aristotle’s time, until 
recently there was no market for such items and no procedure for pricing them. A 
number was affixed to these entities, but based on qualitative reason rather than 
quantitative calculation. As Joel Kaye argues, the basic problem was this: 
 
“Since [the lender’s] profit is in the future he has no way of making a 
rational decision as to whether or how much he will benefit from 
the [lending], and both equality and rationality are essential to 
proper, non-usurious economic transactions.”19 
 
What was necessary for financial quantification to arise was the ability to 
quantify and price a projected future. Finance being intrinsically temporal, this was 
a necessary condition. In the late medieval origins of quantification it is the work 
of the thirteenth century Franciscan monk Peter John Olivi where the idea of 
quantifying the future explicitly occurs for the first time.20 The crucial step of this 
shift was Olivi’s argument for the reality of probability in issues of pricing.21 
Importantly, Olivi based this argument on his claim to be rationally transcribing 
existing economic practices. Since merchants already estimated a discounted real 
value to the probability of future profits, in practice merchants were therefore 
implicitly giving reality to probability and future value. Despite the largely 
qualitative justification of pricing interest rates on loans, merchants were 
nevertheless suggesting in their actions the potential to quantify future value and 
probability. It was a form of quantification without metrology, or an application of 
numbers without measurement or calculation. Instead of the real abstraction of 
                                                 
19 Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the 
Emergence of Scientific Thought, 120. 
20 Olivi’s work was spread primarily through the sermons of St. Bernadino of Siena, who often took 
directly from Olivi’s writings without referencing them.  (Ibid., 118.) 
21 Ibid., 121. Note that Olivi’s argument pre-dates the origins of probability theory in the seventeenth 
century. It was crucial that probability be established as a real and measurable phenomenon first, before 
it could ever become the focus of sustained mathematical attention by the likes of Blaise Pascal and 
Pierre de Fermat. 
commodity exchange,22 what was taking place was the real abstraction of 
discounting future profits – an abstraction as crucial to capitalism as exchange. On 
the basis of this practice, Olivi would go on to argue that the moral necessity of 
equality between capital lent out and capital returned was based not simply on an 
arithmetical calculation as had previously been thought. Rather, the equality of 
future value with present value was a geometrical concern, with a degree of latitude 
given to randomness and the intrinsically probabilistic nature of the future.23 With 
Olivi then, the idea of rationally justifying and quantifying future value and 
probability comes to be explicitly posed for the first time. This was the conceptual 
shift required for perceiving time and possibility as commensurable with 
quantification, and the entire history of financial quantification since owes its 
origins to this revolution in thought. 
From this point, the history of stock pricing (and prediction) has been an 
eclectic mix of individual expertise, heuristics, and analysis of company 
information. The modern strategies for those actively involved in the market (i.e. 
not including passive ‘buy and hold’ strategies) have been broadly divided between 
technical analysts (‘chartists’) and fundamentals analysts. The latter involves the 
slow and patient analysis of a company’s operations in order to determine its likely 
future. As Wall Street historian Peter Bernstein writes, fundamentals analysts 
“pour over accounting data, interview managements, scrutinise industry trends, 
consult economists, probe into political forces, and worry over interest rates.”24 The 
belief here is that there is a real value to a company that can be discerned with 
close scrutiny. Investors using this strategy seek to find mispriced securities on the 
basis of what they estimate the real value to be. 
On the other hand, there are the technical analysts (or chartists). They seek 
to examine the history of stock market prices in order to uncover patterns in the 
seemingly random fluctuation of the market. Distinctive patterns like the ‘head 
and shoulders’ are presumed to occur because of market psychology, and the belief 
                                                 
22 Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology. 
23 Kaye, Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century: Money, Market Exchange, and the 
Emergence of Scientific Thought, 124. 
24 Bernstein, Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern Wall Street, 134. 
is that they can give astute traders a relatively accurate forecast of the immediate 
future (see Figure 9).25 The practice, while denounced by some as no better than 
astrology, has existed in some form since the Babylonian era and today continues 
to find many practitioners – particularly in the commodities and currency 
markets.26 Modern-day technical analysts use computers, pattern-seeking 
algorithms, and a wide array of indicators and measures to determine the existence 
of trends and turning points, all in order to derive the near-term future of stock 
prices.27 
As is clear from this discussion, both methods rely heavily on the 
experience and expertise of individuals, and the use of heuristics to simplify the 
massive amount of information involved in either analysis. (The most well-known 
is the price-to-earnings ratio, or P/E, which is believed to offer a rough estimate of 
whether a stock or index is over- or under-priced.) 
 
 
 
By contrast, a third group that has come to dominate the past fifty years of 
financial thinking rejects the idea that price movements can be predicted in 
                                                 
25 The reliance on market psychology has resonances with behavioural economics today – if economic 
actors are cognitively biased, there may be good psychological reasons for the existence of market 
patterns. 
26 Lo and Hasanhodzic, The Evolution of Technical Analysis, viii. 
27 Ibid., 156–157. 
advance – basing this conclusion upon the random walk hypothesis.28 Unlike 
technical analysts or fundamentals analysts, the random walk hypothesis argues 
that stock pricing is entirely random and produces no stable patterns. The 
consequence of this argument is that consistently beating the market becomes 
impossible since any predictable price movement is already incorporated into the 
price. 
The random walk hypothesis points to both the fundamental difficulty and 
the subsequent solution to pricing options. Take, for example, a call option with a 
strike price of £40 on a stock currently worth £45 and with an expiration date in 
six months. This option gives you the opportunity to buy that stock at £40 in six 
months. To buy this option now will cost a minimum of £5 (the difference 
between the current stock price and the option strike price). But there is also a 
premium to be paid as well, which is dependent on the amount of time the stock 
price has to grow and how volatile it is. The longer the time period until 
expiration, and the more volatile the stock price, the higher the premium for the 
option will be. The problem is, given the six month period before the option can 
be exercised, how to precisely price the possible variation in the stock price? 
This is the essence of the problem that the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) 
equation solved. Prior to their 1973 publishing of the Black-Scholes (and later, 
Merton) equation, the problem was resolved using rough rules of thumb on the 
basis of past experience. It was generally acknowledged that the longer until the 
expiration date and the higher the current interest rates, the more the option 
would cost for buyers.29 There was little theoretical backing for this, and no precise 
equation for determining the prices, with the result being that options pricing was 
often affected by personal relations as well as by profit considerations. “Each 
person set his own fair price.”30 
                                                 
28 For an extensive overview and critique of the random walk and related ideas, see: Fox, The Myth of 
the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and Delusion on Wall Street. 
29 Bernstein, Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern Wall Street, 206; MacKenzie and Millo, 
“Constructing a Market, Performing Theory: The Historical Sociology of a Financial Derivatives 
Exchange,” 123. 
30 Derman, My Life as a Quant: Reflections on Physics and Finance, 144. 
It was in this context that Black, Scholes and Merton made their 
revolutionary contribution. Since the immediate precursors for the BSM equation 
have been well covered in other works, the story will be taken up at its crucial 
juncture: the BSM equation itself.31 
In contrast to previous pricing practices, the BSM equation provided a clear and 
standardised means to price options. It does so by, counter-intuitively, abstracting 
from the particularities of the underlying asset and instead relying on inputting 
only a few variables: the risk-free interest rate, the volatility of the asset, the current 
asset price, and the time until expiration (see the Appendix for the precise 
equation). The risk-free interest rate is simple enough to calculate and the 
underlying’s price and the time until expiration are immediately given quantities. 
As we will see, however, it is the unobservable volatility variable which has plagued 
option pricing models. The BSM model nevertheless stands as the foundations for 
all subsequent models. It is, as Donald MacKenzie notes, akin to a Kuhnian 
paradigm within the financial world – while it has been surpassed in the details by 
more advanced models, the basic approach that it takes to pricing options is 
fundamental for the models we will examine shortly.32 Therefore, it is essential to 
grasp its conceptual implications before moving on. 
Black and Scholes argument relied on the conjunction of two previous 
advances. The first was initially formulated by a French mathematician, Louis 
Bachelier, in his 1900 PhD thesis.33 Bachelier’s work argued that changes in stock 
growth could be modelled with arithmetic Brownian motion – effectively, that at 
each time period, stock prices would follow the EMH’s random walk and grow (or 
contract) randomly according to a normal Gaussian probability distribution. 
                                                 
31 For this earlier history, see: Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market: A History of Risk, Reward, and 
Delusion on Wall Street; Bernstein, Capital Ideas: The Improbable Origins of Modern Wall Street; 
MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets. 
32 MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets, 139. 
33 Bachelier, “Theory of Speculation”. While Bachelier is an important figure in the history of option 
pricing, there are even earlier predecessors such as Jules Regnault’s 1863 attempt at applying probability 
calculus to price movements, and Henri Lefevre’s 1874 use of geometric modelling for price 
movements. (Preda, Framing Finance: The Boundaries of Markets and Modern Capitalism, 97–105.) 
However, the use of the normal distribution made it theoretically possible that a 
stock price could become negative, which is an empirical impossibility. So in 1960 
Case Sprenkle revised the work to model stock prices according to geometric 
Brownian motion, which follows a log-normal probability distribution instead (see 
Figure 10).34 This modelling of stock growth volatility made it possible to estimate 
the probable future values of a given stock – crucial for understanding what the 
value of an option based on that value should be. 
 
 
 
The second advance upon which Black and Scholes relied was the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM). In essence, CAPM provides a quantification of how 
risk should be valued – it gave a precise definition to the sense that more risky 
assets should have higher returns in order for investors to be interested in them. 
Risk, moreover, was a relative concept and not an absolute measure. Since some 
risk can be diversified away, this risk has no premium. What cannot be diversified 
away, however, is the riskiness of the entire market itself.35 Thus the riskiness of a 
particular stock was dependent on how correlated it was with the entire market. 
Stocks that are uncorrelated with the market can have their risk diversified away; 
                                                 
34 Sprenkle, “Warrant Prices as Indicators of Expectations and Preferences.” 
35 MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets, 129. 
stocks that are heavily correlated cannot and thus require higher returns by 
investors (the level of correlation came to be symbolised by the Greek letter ‘beta’). 
CAPM also allowed for an arbitrage argument to be made about risk – stocks with 
the same beta must have the same expected return otherwise they could be 
arbitraged to make a risk-free profit (an act which would itself eventually eliminate 
the discrepancy). 
The essence of the Black-Scholes argument relied on these consequences of 
CAPM. They argued first that the price of an option can be equated through 
comparison with an equivalent entity – a ‘replicating portfolio’ consisting of 
various stocks, bonds, cash (and/or more liquid options). The European vanilla 
options that Black-Scholes originally examine can be dynamically hedged through 
time by buying or selling the appropriate ratio of stocks.36 The resulting portfolio 
has zero beta, meaning all of its risk can be diversified away according to CAPM. In 
this case, the returns on the entire hedged portfolio are known in advance – since 
it is perfectly hedged, it is riskless, and must therefore provide the risk free rate of 
interest.37,38 Therefore, the option, plus its replicating portfolio, must provide a risk-
free rate of interest (see Figure 11). This is the basic conceptual argument that leads 
to the BSM equation. Setting this known rate of return against the changes in the 
value of the hedged position ultimately provides Black and Scholes with a partial 
differential equation (PDE)39 that models how the price of the option varies over 
time and with changes in the stock price (see the Appendix). Once this general 
equation is established, setting the boundary conditions40 allows for the PDE to be 
                                                 
36 This ratio is known as ‘delta’ and is symbolized by ∂V/∂S. It is the sensitivity of the option’s price to 
changes in the underlying’s price. 
37 Black and Scholes, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,” 641–643. 
38 The risk-free rate of interest is often taken to be either the rate of interest on US Treasury bonds, or 
the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The importance of this rate for pricing options reveals a 
major reason why rate changes are followed with such attention in the financial world. For a fascinating 
sociological study on how the LIBOR is set, see: MacKenzie, Material Markets: How Economic Agents 
Are Constructed, 78–83. 
39 It is a ‘partial’ differential equation because it models the rate of change for three variables, which 
must be solved while holding one variable the same over time. 
40 The ‘boundary conditions’ are the limits on the function. For instance, if the strike price of a call 
option is higher than the stock price at the date of maturity, then the option is worth zero. Otherwise, 
at maturity the option is worth the strike price minus the stock price. 
solved as the option pricing formula for calls or puts – that is to say, what has now 
become the famous Black-Scholes formula.41 
 
 
 
What is particularly notable about the final equation is what it does not 
include. It does not take into account the expected return on the stock, individual 
investor preferences for risk, information on the individual stock itself, or 
information about supply and demand for the option or for the stock.42 None of 
these elements play a role in determining the price of an option. Instead, it is the 
short-term interest rate (a known value), the stock price (a known value), the 
exercise price (a known value), the time to maturity (a known value), and the 
volatility of the stock’s growth (an assumed value), that provide the components for 
pricing. 
Black and Scholes innovation was to provide a standardised pricing formula 
for options, based upon a relatively simple argument that employed CAPM’s 
conclusions about diversification. Simply put, since the hedged portfolio is riskless, 
it must provide the risk-free rate of interest. Yet while Black and Scholes showed 
what the price must be, it took Robert Merton to show how to achieve a perfectly 
hedged position – it is his contributions which have made the equation known by 
the Black-Scholes-Merton name.43 
Merton’s advances were twofold: first, to provide a more general argument 
than Black and Scholes had provided (one not based upon CAPM assumptions). 
Second, and related, Merton transitioned from a discrete-time equation to a 
                                                 
41 Black and Scholes, “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,” 644. 
42 In practice, however, options are determined partially by supply and demand.  (Haug, “Option Pricing 
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continuous-time equation. This latter shift involved a move from standard calculus 
to stochastic calculus, arguably inaugurating the true mathematisation of modern 
finance. Using the continuous-time model, Merton was able to develop truly 
dynamic hedging – where hedging occurs at every instant – and this made it 
possible that “you could get rid of the risk, but not just the systematic risk, all the 
risk.”44 Thus, Black and Scholes were right that the hedged portfolio returned the 
riskless rate of interest – but in Merton’s work this was because of continuous 
hedging and not because of CAPM. As we will see later, one of the most important 
consequences of Merton’s derivation of the BSM equation was to introduce the 
idea of continuous dynamic hedging into finance. 
The BSM equation was and is a paradigmatic success, and arguably the most 
important contribution of quantitative finance. As Donald MacKenzie has 
demonstrated, BSM had performative effects on option pricing and eventually 
brought market prices in line with theoretical prices.45 At this stage, BSM operated 
as a representational technology that produced knowledge of option prices – 
though a representational technology that also shaped the empirical referent in 
conformity with the representation. Yet October 1987 inaugurated the emergence 
of a phenomenon that dramatically changed the way in which the assumptions of 
the model were conceived.46 This month saw the biggest one-day stock market drop 
ever, with the Dow Jones Industrial Average crashing 22.6% on 19 October. Since 
then, options prices began to systematically diverge from the theoretical prices 
constructed by BSM. This was the emergence of the ‘volatility smile’ (or skew) 
which became evident when traders realised that the market prices were 
consistently deviating from the model’s proposed prices. What was according to 
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BSM an apparently risk-free arbitrage opportunity that should be quickly 
eliminated, instead persisted. Rather than BSM being an idealised attractor around 
which market prices could fluctuate, BSM had now become a model that 
systematically mispriced options. 
 
 
The essence of the shift was from the assumed constant volatility parameter 
in the BSM model to the non-constant volatility of the market. In Figure 12, the 
distinctive shape which gives the volatility smile its name is clearly visible. The 
diagram shows the variation of the volatility implied by the market prices for 
options (on the vertical axis) with the strike price of the option (the horizontal 
axis). As strike prices get further away from the current stock price (‘at-the-money’, 
or ATM), the implied volatility rises. In the standard BSM model, this line should 
be straight across – volatility should not vary with strike price. What was occurring 
in the markets was that options which the model deemed to be highly unlikely to 
be exercised (options with strike prices far from the current stock price, i.e. far ‘out-
of-the-money’, or OTM) because of the unlikelihood of the stock price reaching 
this point, were in fact being valued in the market at a significantly higher price 
than expected. Fundamentally, the market price was taking into account the 
possibility of statistically “impossible” situations like the October 1987 crash. If 
such extreme events occurred more than the model assumed, then the likelihood 
of exercising such far-OTM options was higher than assumed, and therefore their 
value was higher than estimated. 
Taken together, the volatility smile and the term structure of volatility 
comprise the ‘volatility surface’: a three-dimensional surface that plots how 
volatility varies with both the maturity of the option and with the strike price of the 
option (see Figure 13). Each particular market has its own unique and dynamic 
volatility surface. The particular shape of the surface in any given asset class 
depends on the historical volatility of the asset – indexes, for instance, tend to drop 
greater percentages than they gain, and so the smile is skewed towards that end. By 
contrast, individual stocks and foreign exchange are more symmetric and therefore 
the smile is more balanced.47 
 
 
 
With these complications in the volatility surface, traders have moved away 
from the intended use of BSM to price derivatives, and have instead taken to using 
the representational technology in a radically different way. Rather than derive a 
theoretical price, traders gradually began to use the equations to derive the ‘implied 
volatility’. That is to say, given the market price, what level of volatility will solve 
the BSM equation? The reasons for this shift were twofold: first, since the volatility 
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variable was unobservable, traders used the market prices for liquid options to 
generate the appropriate volatility for the option pricing model. They could then 
input this derived constant back into the equation and extrapolate from liquid 
prices in order to price more illiquid options. The second reason for the shift was 
the conceptual simplification that volatility brought about. As a theoretically 
produced entity, volatility managed to act as a common denominator behind the 
multiplicity of derivatives, strikes, maturities, and sectors. Quoting derivatives in 
terms of volatility rather than price allows traders to quickly determine whether a 
derivative is mispriced and how it may be used to hedge their own position. 
Volatility quickly became the language of traders. As MacKenzie relates, 
 
“Gradually, what was being bought and sold in an options market 
was re-conceptualised: it was the Black-Scholes-Merton model’s free 
parameter, volatility. If stock volatility increased, options became 
more valuable; if it decreased, they became cheaper.”48 
 
While money has been conceptualised by Marx as a general equivalent that 
manages to bring together otherwise heterogeneous commodities, with implied 
volatility we find an even more abstract general equivalent. Price, for derivatives 
traders, was still too relative to time (i.e. maturity) and possibility (i.e. strike price). 
What was needed was an abstract equivalent that could make comparisons between 
price, time, and possibility. Implied volatility came to serve this purpose. 
The significance of this is the re-purposing of the BSM technology that it 
brought about. BSM was no longer a simple tool to construct a price, but instead a 
representational technology to filter out the massive amount of information 
contained within the market in order to infer the market’s collective expectation of 
future volatility. This was, properly speaking, a complete inversion of the original 
BSM model. BSM was meant to price options, not to imply volatilities from market 
prices. What we see here is an important instance of a technology creating new and 
unintended capacities through its very existence. This inversion shows definitively 
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why BSM was not merely an extension of existing capacities – it was the 
unintentional creation of entirely new capacities that augmented previous 
practices. 
Thus in practice, when trading on the basis of implied volatility, traders 
would analyse the market’s pricing of implied volatility against the theoretical price 
presented by BSM (or some other functionally similar model). Comparisons can 
then be made across similar derivatives49 – for instance, if one has a lower volatility 
than the other then there may be an arbitrage opportunity. 
However, in implying volatility there are a number of complications 
involved. In the first place, oftentimes the pricing equations cannot be analytically 
inverted and must instead be numerically calculated.50,51 In other words, the 
equations are not as simple to solve for a variable as something like ‘A+B=C, 
therefore B=C-A’, making numerical calculation a computation-heavy method. In 
addition, there are multiple ways to derive the level of implied volatility: using 
either a weighted approach over the different strikes and maturities, or a 
minimised-square pricing error approach, or simply selecting a single option that 
will represent the implied volatility to be used.52 
The volatility surface adds further challenges to the practice of implying 
volatility. Most significantly, implied volatility is no longer set against a theoretical 
volatility, but rather against statistical (historical) volatility. If implied volatility is 
greater than the recent historical volatility, the option is often considered to be 
overvalued. Option pricing software, such as OptionVue, can immediately present 
this material together on one screen (see Figure 14). Yet it is not as simple as 
matching up a given volatility against historical or expected volatility. In addition to 
the earlier difficulties with implying volatility, the use of historical volatility adds 
another impediment. In order to compare it with implied volatility, historical 
                                                 
49 The process of determining which derivatives are similar enough to be subject to arbitrage (e.g. the 
companies may be from the same industry) is itself a product of a specialized socio-technical 
arrangement.  See: Beunza and Stark, “How to Recognize Opportunities: Heterarchical Search in a 
Trading Room”; MacKenzie, Beunza, and Hardie, “The Material Sociology of Arbitrage.” 
50 Mayhew, “Implied Volatility,” 8. 
51 This is achieved by “by iterating the BSM analytical formula in a root-finding routine.” (Ayache, Elie. 
Personal communication, 4 May 2011.) 
52 Mayhew, “Implied Volatility,” 9–10. 
volatility requires selecting a sample size that is representative – which raises 
questions of how far back in time, which maturities and strikes are included, etc. 
Complications like this are resolved in large part through a function of experience 
and context, further demonstrating that representational technologies are always 
situated in a specific cognitive assemblage. 
Even the market prices one employs are not as simple as they may seem: 
 
“What one thinks of as ‘market data’ are often prices filtered 
through another model or calculation. Yields are extracted from 
collections of bond prices. Volatility is calculated from historical 
returns. Each year, as markets mature, products become more liquid 
and traders calibrate their quotes to greater numbers of related 
securities, sometimes so many that their prices must be obtained via 
electronic price feeds. All of this involves software.”53 
 
 
 
In the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), this model-dependency 
of derivatives prices has even been embodied in the exchange’s autoquote system. 
This system functions as a universal provision of quotes for all the listed options, 
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which are then distributed to the CBOE’s trading floor and around the world.54 As 
with all options, these market prices are generated on the basis of a particular 
model, in this case the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model (which will be examined briefly 
later). Further complicating the picture, while CBOE provides a public autoquote 
system, individual traders can and do employ proprietary quoting systems to gain 
an edge over the competition.55 The end result of this is that, quite literally, market 
prices do not exist without option pricing models. 
In addition to these difficulties, the use of BSM to imply volatility surfaces 
also entails a practical contradiction insofar as BSM assumes a constant volatility 
while the market presents non-constant volatilities. Implied volatility could still be 
quoted and used as an abstract measure, via BSM. However, using BSM to price 
options on the basis of more liquid securities is impossible if the model cannot 
even reproduce the existing market prices.56 Even prior to the volatility surface, 
BSM was incapable of pricing products like American put options.57 Clearly 
something new was necessary. 
The next section will examine how this transformation of volatility 
generated a proliferation of competing representational technologies, but with the 
technicalities of implying volatility covered it is worth stepping back and explicitly 
resituating the argument in the context of the overall thesis. The idea implicit 
within the act of implying volatility is that the prices of options contain within 
them a wealth of information that is only accessible via the use of specialised 
technology. To be sure, the idea that prices are the aggregate of all information on 
a particular product is a commonplace in economics (see the earlier discussion of 
EMH). Yet what is occurring in derivatives valuation is an unbinding of that 
aggregate and the selection of only a portion of that information. The technologies 
of derivative valuation are in this sense a means to extract and make perceptible an 
aspect otherwise hidden within price dynamics – an aspect which suggests the 
future expectations of volatility and risk, as well as an aspect that can then be used 
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to leverage larger trades through hedging. In this regard, derivatives valuation 
technology is not merely an extension of existing human capacities, but instead a 
proper augmentation of them. It makes something visible which is otherwise 
invisible to the isolated human mind. It transforms volatility from an imperceptible 
medium into a perceptible representation. As will be shown in the next section, the 
role of volatility was only going to become more essential. 
As a result of BSM’s failings, the technological developments in quantitative 
finance have been generating models that have more complex representations of 
underlying price changes. The general problem is well understood – BSM volatility 
no longer matches up to market volatility – yet there are different interpretations of 
how this problem should be resolved. This has led to a proliferation of different 
approaches, and a proliferation of new models.58 The construction of these new 
representational technologies has been essential to the everyday trading of the 
dealers and market makers that perform global finance. Without it, actors are 
incapable of determining a rational price and incapable of determining the proper 
hedging position. In other words, without financial models, risk (e.g. credit risk, 
delta risk, market risk, etc.) increases and the dynamics of the market shift. 
As a means of coping with the spread of the volatility smile, many firms 
now have different trading desks (dealing with different asset classes) and the 
overall risk management team, all creating models to grapple with volatility.59 The 
massive proliferation is in part an attempt to create proprietary models that give an 
edge over the competition. Yet despite the proliferation, the basic premises of 
derivatives pricing contained within the BSM framework have been maintained as 
they spread not only through geographical space, but also through theoretical space 
in terms of different underliers. 
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Like the representational technologies examined in other chapters, the 
development of pricing technologies has been channelled by the material nature of 
the technologies. The pure abstractions of mathematical finance have had to face 
up to the material constraints and possibilities of the real world – often finding 
itself expressed as a tension between the speed necessary to trade in the market, 
and the sophistication of the volatility variable, all while remaining bound within 
the conceptual framework established by BSM. In the early days of financial 
modelling, computers were massively limited by memory constraints and 
computing power. The result was anaemic user interfaces that functioned within 
the restrictions imposed by the state of computer technology, but at a major loss of 
efficiency. Derman relates his experience of first working in finance: 
 
“Each time a salesperson needed to value an option for a potential 
trade with a client, he or she had to type in, on one line after 
another, the bond’s current price, maturity, and coupon as well as 
the option’s expiration and strike; then the salesperson had to enter 
the current short-term interest rate and the bond’s assumed future 
yield volatility. One more tap on the return key and the program 
computer the model’s theoretical price and told you how to hedge it 
with the underlying Treasury bond. If you wanted to compute the 
option value for a variety of volatilities, expirations or strikes, you 
had to repeat the same sequence, entering items and hitting keys all 
over again.”60 
 
In an industry premised upon speed and efficiency (particularly to grasp 
fleeting arbitrage opportunities), such tedious routines were a major hindrance to 
the adoption of models. The result was that one of the first areas to be developed 
in quantitative finance was proprietary trading systems that simplified the interface. 
Today, the production of software (either as components, or entire trading systems) 
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is a major industry within the financial world, and essential to the smooth 
operations of global finance.61 
Yet computational frictions still exist today, to the point where sometimes 
even the inventors of complex models may avoid them and rely instead on simpler 
models.62 The complexity of some models simply outstrips their usefulness in 
practice. Such a rationale is only intelligible within a framework where models are 
not aiming at realistic dynamics (and more complex models), but instead where 
models are used to do things. In being used to accomplish new practical capacities, 
models must face up to the concrete realities involved in their implementation. 
The attempts to resolve these frictions have come to focus upon a few basic areas of 
research and innovation. First, there are those which make volatility itself a 
stochastic (i.e. ‘volatile’) variable. Second, there are those which make volatility 
subject to ‘jumps’ in the asset price. There are also combinations of these, along 
with more advanced models which will be briefly covered. 
From their beginnings, option pricing models faced up to computational and data 
frictions, and much of their development has been guided by attempts to overcome 
these frictions while maintaining the usability of the technology. The publication 
of the BSM model occurred only a month after the opening of the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange (CBOE) – the first exchange devoted to trading options on 
leading stocks. The BSM model quickly spread within traders involved in the 
CBOE and soon became the industry standard.63 The famous investor Edward 
Thorp had even programmed his own options pricing formula into a handheld 
calculator prior to the opening of the CBOE – a formula that he admitted was 
largely similar to Black-Scholes equation.64 Within six months of the equation 
being published, Texas Instruments had created and begun marketing a handheld 
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calculator pre-programmed with the BSM equations.65 As Merton recalls, “Such a 
complete and rapid adoption of finance theory into finance practice was 
unprecedented.”66 The desire to spread the material embodiments of BSM was 
clearly a force in the early stages of the CBOE. 
Yet in the beginning the equations remained too difficult and 
computationally intensive – computers at the time were too cumbersome to bring 
on the trading floor and even calculators with algorithms pre-programmed took too 
long to be useful.67 Sheets of prices (introduced by Black in 1975) became the 
initial way in which the equation entered into trading pits – effectively constructing 
a distributed cognitive system in action.68 The advancement of computer 
technology overtook these initial constraints, to the point where by the 1980s 
financial models were being taken up in practice as soon as they could be created.69 
This rapid uptake of new models demonstrates clearly how central they were to the 
practices of financial firms. The 1980s also saw the point where computing 
technology finally allowed nearly real-time prices and hedging ratios, allowing the 
technology to become a seamless component in trading routines.70 
In the context of these computing developments, an important advance in 
constant volatility models was made by John Cox, Stephen Ross and Mark 
Rubinstein.71 It was particularly an improvement on BSM by virtue of being more 
easily implemented on a computer, and for allowing the possibility of numerically 
solving the equations with relative ease.72 It was applicable to stocks which paid 
dividends and to American options as well, rather than just the European calls and 
puts that BSM had quantified. Eschewing the advanced mathematics used by Black 
and Scholes, and Merton, the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein model also presented the basic 
valuation approach in a manner easily understandable by traders without a 
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mathematical background.73 J. Michael Harrison and David Kreps went on to turn 
BSM into a more general theorem74 – they developed a pricing equation for any 
option or other derivative on an underlying. They also introduced ‘martingale 
theory’ which helped further bridge the mathematics realm with the finance realm, 
setting the stage for implementing financial models deeper into computer 
software.75,76 
Yet despite the technological advances made, the constant volatility 
assumptions limited the flexibility of their use in certain situations. Under 
particular circumstances, these models would systematically produce incorrect 
prices and incorrect implied volatilities. As a result, modellers turned towards 
relaxing the constant volatility assumption. 
The first generation of post-volatility smile models loosened the restrictions on 
volatility by attempting to directly model the volatile nature of volatility. With 
stochastic volatility (SV) models, volatility itself was largely unbound from its 
assumption of constancy. Volatility instead followed a random-walk pattern: the 
volatility of volatility. In particular models other factors enter into determining the 
path as well, such as stock price variations (itself stochastic), and the tendency of 
volatility to revert to a mean. Yet the essence of these models is the parameter 
designated for the volatility of volatility itself. The reversion to a mean factor is 
notable, however, in that it entails these models have implications for the dynamics 
of the volatility surface, and how it is likely to evolve given current prices. 
Crucial to using these models it the necessity of calibrating the parameters 
of the model to the prices of the market. The problem of calibration is a 
ubiquitous one in option pricing – ranging from setting the parameters for one 
variable (e.g. volatility in BSM) to setting tens of parameters (e.g. interest-rate 
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models).77,78 As with climate change models, financial models do not admit of clear 
answers to what parameters should be set at. Model calibration in finance is often 
done against relatively liquid securities – their prices are used to orient the model 
(this is ideally done against stocks, bonds and options, thereby providing the most 
thorough calibration). It is a matter of making sure the model(s) reproduce the 
existing market prices for the more liquid securities. These liquid products have 
clear markets, and they can then be used to calculate prices for more illiquid 
securities. Since the market determines the base level from which other options are 
priced, this entails a constant re-calibration of the models as well.79 A problem with 
calibration, though, is that while it produces a converging (i.e. non-arbitrage) price 
for the liquid securities (this is the essence of calibration), it necessarily produces 
diverging prices for the more illiquid options. The different parameters of different 
models produce different outcomes of the pricing process.80 Each model has a 
different means of calculating a price, and while the models can be calibrated to all 
produce the same price for liquid securities, once calibrated they will all be 
extrapolated to produce different prices for illiquid securities because of their 
different calculations. In addition, as with climate change models, calibration error 
can occur here and mistakes can be made in estimating the proper parameters.81 In 
part, this is why practitioners will sometimes use several models simultaneously to 
price derivatives – this helps to narrow down the range of acceptable values and 
highlight any blatant calibration errors. In using different models, though, some 
are too difficult to calibrate, making them again impractical for everyday use. They 
simply contain too many parameters to fit to the existing data. The problems with 
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calibration are compounded by the fact that calibration has different uses when 
used by different users. For market makers, an accurate calibration is important 
since their profit derives from the spread in bid and ask offers. For proprietary 
traders, on the other hand, their profit derives from discovering mispriced 
securities – something which is impossible to do if the model is calibrated to simply 
return existing market prices.82 While calibration is therefore a ubiquitous data 
friction for this representational technology, with stochastic volatility models this 
calibration process tends to be particularly computationally complex and difficult 
to fit to market prices.83 This hindrance is one of the primary reasons more simple 
(though less realistic) models have arisen. 
The Heston SV model has nevertheless garnered popularity in practice 
through its ability to overcome computational frictions. While other stochastic 
models have more accurate representations of the diffusion process, it is the 
Heston model which first established a ‘quasi-closed-form’ solution to its 
equation.84 By contrast to equations that require numerical solutions, a closed 
form analytic solution is a very straightforward procedure that requires little 
computational power. “An analytical solution is one in which you plug factors 
into a function and get a result.”85 Equations that need numerical solutions do 
not admit of such a straightforward method of solution and instead require a sort 
of brute-force approach to solving them. As a result, they are much more 
computationally-intensive and much slower to process. Solutions to these 
equations involve a variety of methods, such as binomial and trinomial trees, 
finite difference or Monte Carlo methods. Despite their differences, each 
involves working through a variety of solutions, and using trial-and-error to 
approach an approximate solution. In the high-speed world of financial trading 
these computationally-intensive solutions make some models impractical, since 
they provide a valuation far too slowly to be actionable. The alternative solution 
is to use closed-form solutions only, but this can produce mispricings of options 
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too.86 As a result, there’s a delicate balance between the two mathematical 
choices. With the Heston model producing a quasi-closed-form solution, the result 
was that while other models were “computationally expensive” to achieve a 
solution, the Heston model provided the crucial speed necessary for becoming an 
operative model.87 
While SV models are theoretically elegant in their more accurate 
representations of volatility, their material embodiment has produced a number of 
frictions. First, they remained computationally intensive, though as we saw the 
Heston model partly resolved this and has become a popular choice as a result. 
Second, their calibration to present market prices proved to be difficult and time-
consuming.88 They also relied on a number of factors affecting the volatility of 
volatility, most of which were difficult to estimate accurately.89 Some models even 
have parameters that remain the same over time, meaning they cannot be 
calibrated to market prices for options near expiration.90 Perhaps most worryingly 
for traders, stochastic volatility tends to make hedging positions increasingly 
difficult to accomplish, thus introducing new sources of risk and exposure to large 
market changes.91 
In an attempt to move beyond these material frictions, the next generation of 
models set itself a more modest goal. Rather than re-think the entire diffusion 
process (the volatility of volatility), local volatility models attempted to derive the 
market’s volatility from the market prices, in a sort of ad hoc manner. A number of 
models were developed along these lines, with Emanuel Derman and Iraj Kani 
formulating the most concise and clear version.92 All these models share the 
presumption that given the market prices of options, a unique diffusion process 
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can be derived that accurately fits the given price distribution. In other words, it is 
possible – for each maturity date and strike price – to extract and extrapolate the 
market’s expectation of short-term (local) volatility. This local volatility is the 
market’s expectation of volatility over a short time-step, rather than over the entire 
life of an option.93 Summing these local volatilities together, the visual result is 
represented as a binomial tree diagram (see Figure 15) with underlying price and 
option maturity as the axes, and the level of volatility being measured by the shape 
of the grid. It can be seen in Figure 15 that the implied volatility tree shifts its 
volatility over time, whereas the constant volatility tree (by definition) maintains 
the same volatility for every point. The advance made by local volatility models was 
that they could be used to generate a rational implied volatility for any node in the 
tree, provided there were three given nodes. Through a process of triangulation, 
the entire tree could be reverse engineered from the market’s prices and then used 
to price more illiquid derivatives.94 
Similar to the way in which the original BSM made possible the rational 
pricing of options, the new local volatility models also made possible a rational 
determination of volatility. “From this tree you [could] calculate both the 
distribution and the volatility of the index at future times and market levels, as 
implied by options prices.”95 These local volatility models made possible the 
capacity to extrapolate from given volatilities in order to generate prices and 
volatilities for more illiquid securities – and ensuring that they were consistent with 
each other. In particular, they were crucial for calculating rational prices for barrier 
options, and static hedges for exotic options.96 Such derivatives were incapable of 
being modelled by BSM and could only be priced and hedged through local 
volatility models.97 Effectively, these models corrected the hedging strategies and 
pricing mechanisms that were systematically wrong in the BSM model. 
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By taking volatility to fluctuate with the level of the underlying’s price, they 
take volatility to be both stochastic and deterministic. The fluctuations in volatility 
are taken to be a simple function of the underlying’s stochastic price volatility. 
There are no additional sources of volatility beyond this, meaning that while local 
volatility ends up being stochastic, it is fully determined by the underlying’s 
stochastic process – marking off an essential conceptual difference between local 
and stochastic volatility models. 
Local volatility models ran into data frictions though. Since they generated 
implied volatility on the basis of a few discrete options, they necessarily left out the 
implied volatility surface between options that were missing from the market (i.e. 
between strike prices and maturity dates). As with climate change models, local 
volatility models had to face up to the problem of using discrete parameters to 
model a continuous phenomenon. The solution was the same as with general 
circulation models – to use mathematical methods to interpolate the missing data. 
Yet this is a computationally intensive process and one that could produce 
disconcerting results.98 The models were also theoretically unsatisfying. The 
attempt to derive local volatility from empirical prices, rather than provide a 
theoretical explanation for the changes in volatility reminded some of the pre-
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Copernican attempts to add variables to account for celestial movement.99 Thus 
while local volatility models served as an intuitive and computationally efficient 
attempt to incorporate the volatility surface, under certain circumstances they 
returned mistaken hedge ratios and implied volatilities.  
Even with stochastic volatility, new models were incapable of modelling the very 
short-term smiles involved in actual market pricing. Prices for near-expiration 
options were significantly higher than the models supposed, and were being valued 
according to a much larger change in underlying price than could be accounted for 
by existing probability distributions.100 What was necessary was to introduce jumps 
– literally, discontinuities in the price diffusion process – where massive shifts in 
prices could occur in very short time periods. 
While historically first, jump-diffusion models constructed specifically for 
the volatility surface were the third generation.101 In constructing these models, one 
of the primary questions to be answered is the size of the jump. Often, models will 
provide a variety of different jump sizes that may occur, each of which has a 
particular probability of occurring.102 In Merton’s original model, this distribution 
of jumps followed a lognormal distribution. In addition to the jump-size 
probability, the models also give a probability for a jump in any given time period. 
Together, these models tend to produce volatility smiles that raise the price of near-
expiration options as the probability of a major jump makes far OTM options 
more likely to be exercised. Jump-diffusion models tend to under-value far-from-
expiration options, as the price is assumed to revert to a mean, and the initial 
effects of any jump end up dissipating.103 
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The problem with jump-diffusion models is that they ultimately break down 
the possibility of replicating them. Each possible jump size requires a different 
hedge, and since the jump size is unpredictable and can take on an infinite number 
of sizes, there is no way to hedge for all the possibilities.104 As with all the post-
volatility smile models, the very essence of BSM – the dynamic replication of an 
option – appears to be severely curtailed in its effectiveness. 
Despite their divergences over how to model volatility, each of these models 
represents options markets in terms of this theoretical variable. While it is often 
forgotten due to the naturalisation of talking about ‘global markets’, there is no 
empirical referent for such a term. No one has ever seen a ‘global financial market’ 
in the flesh – such an entity exists only in and through local situations and 
constructed perspectives. The first such perceptions were created through the 
medium of price charts in the 1830s. These charts abstracted away from the 
particularities of companies and made clearer the patterns of stocks that comprised 
a market.105 Through their composition in chart form, these patterns made 
perceptible something like the ‘market’ as a whole. In the words of one broker at 
the time, the chart provided “the bird’s eye view of the stock market.”106 In other 
words, charts constructed a ‘panorama’ – a (local) overarching view of a (global) 
totality which obscures its own production and mediation.107 The visualization of 
the market took on temporal qualities with the introduction of the stock ticker in 
the 1870s. This technology came to replace the discontinuous publicizing of prices 
that had previously occurred on whiteboards. Before the ticker, prices had also 
been plagued by variation in the quotes – different brokers would present different 
stock prices, and errors were rampant. With the advent of the stock ticker, “instead 
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of multiple, discontinuous, heterogeneous, and unsystematically recorded prices, 
we now have single, continuous, homogeneous, nearly real-time price variations.”108 
The market, as the complex system comprised of a multitude of actors with 
billions of transactions a day therefore has always required a representational 
technology in order to make the market perceptible and capable of being acted 
upon. While not a completed project, the tendency of modern markets has been 
towards screen-based trading and away from floor-based exchanges. 
 
“Most FX trading takes place through the medium of the screen and 
electronic booking systems. Most information also comes through 
the screen – through proprietary services (and especially Bloomberg) 
or through email and bulletin boards to which all the traders on the 
floor can contribute – and through telephone conversations on open 
lines with company dealers in other locations.”109 
 
Similarly with day traders, ethnographic research suggests the vast majority 
of their time is spent on price observation – the acts of trading are themselves a 
relatively small portion.110 As such, much of the modern trading environment is 
constituted in and through computer representations. Such representations ‘frame’ 
the financial environment and set boundaries upon relevant and irrelevant 
information.111 The models and computer software that produce the frame can 
obscure certain aspects, while bringing other aspects to light.112 
Phenomenologically, such representational technologies extend the temporal 
nature of experience beyond immediacy (via the use of historical data and 
economic forecasts), while simultaneously abstracting from individual trades in 
order to produce a global overview. In other words, framing provides the material 
basis upon which traders, brokers and market makers’ decisions are subsequently 
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made. It orients attention towards itself, and coordinates activities amongst its 
users.113 It is not simply a representation of the market – for all intents and 
purposes, it is the market.114 While this framing process is never fully completed 
(i.e. excluding all external factors), it nevertheless can give rise to a sense of ‘the 
market’. At a fundamental level, therefore, the global financial market is first 
materially produced as an object of cognition via the mediation of databases, 
computer-programmed algorithms, and data visualization tools. Such technology 
standardises and normalises the market, producing both a common language and a 
common perception of the market and its relevant factors. It allows “economic 
actors to rationalise their future courses of action and to project the outcomes of 
these actions, a process which establishes boundaries between efficient and 
inefficient actions.”115 
With option pricing models, one of the most unique aspects of this material 
construction of global markets has been the language of volatility that has come to 
dominate in practice. While BSM and other derivative pricing models have lost 
some of their uncritical acceptance, the terms they introduced into the derivatives 
world have remained fundamental. The ability to ‘see’ volatility is now a reality for 
traders. In the same way that the smallest particles of the world can only be 
visualised through specialised instruments, so too is volatility only perceivable 
through the use of specialised financial models. This use of options pricing models 
to perceive an aspect of market prices that is otherwise imperceptible is now a 
standard practice. Options and derivatives are routinely quoted in terms of their 
volatility, and an entire index (the VIX) has arisen in order to trade volatility. 
A significant reason for the dominance of this perception of the market in 
terms of volatility was the conceptual simplification that it brought about. As a 
theoretically produced entity, volatility managed to act as a common denominator 
behind the multiplicity of derivatives, strikes, maturities, and sectors. Quoting 
derivatives in terms of volatility rather than price allows traders to efficiently 
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determine whether a derivative is mispriced and how it may be used to hedge their 
own position. Volatility quickly became the language of traders. 
On the basis of these new ways of seeing the market, new capacities have become 
available to market actors. Contrary to liberalism’s analysis of technology in IR, the 
introduction of technologies does not simply speed up or reduce the costs of 
otherwise unaltered market relations.116 Rather, these representational technologies 
have expanded the capacities of individuals to act in the world and think about the 
world. Foremost among these new capacities is the production of new financial 
products, the innovative capacities to hedge and speculate using derivatives, and 
the construction of a market for the model-based variable ‘volatility’. 
In determining what the technology allowed market participants to do, it is 
crucial to make precise who the market participants in question are. There are 
essentially four types of participants in derivatives markets: speculators, hedgers, 
arbitrageurs, and derivative producers.117 Speculators are those who believe they can 
predict the future and use derivatives to place bets on outcomes. Hedgers are those 
who are looking to limit losses by purchasing derivatives that stabilise future 
outcomes. Arbitrageurs are those who seek out discrepancies in prices between 
similar assets and look to make ‘risk-free’ profit from exploiting these differences. 
Finally, derivative producers profit from actually constructing the derivatives, 
particularly with complex structured products and exotic options. 
Similarly, there a wide variety of bodies involved in derivatives markets: 
investment banks, commercial banks, hedge funds, pension funds, mutual funds, 
municipalities, corporations, and high-worth individuals, among others. For our 
purposes here, we will be looking primarily at the dealers and ‘market makers’ 
within banks: those who create, buy and sell derivatives, and who profit through a 
combination of derivative production and arbitraging. 
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The constant revolution of derivatives modelling has led to a unique state of the 
field today. Whereas BSM originally gained its reputation as an accurate 
representation of reality (and indeed, is still taught as such in most universities), 
today most practitioners accept that there are inevitably multiple models. Models 
of the volatility smile are no longer considered just representational measures, but 
also as practical tools that allow traders to enter into the market: “When options 
traders invert the Black-Scholes formula, they don’t care about the knowledge of 
implied volatility; they care about the delta hedge to execute in the market. […] It is 
the trader’s way into the next market movement.”118 Curiously, this use of models 
as tools into the market has meant the reintroduction of all the experience, 
context, and rules of thumb that were initially banished by the BSM model. 
Correctly judging whether a model is right, whether volatility is high or low, and 
whether two products are similar enough to be an arbitrage opportunity, are all 
functions not just of mathematics but also of social organization, expertise, and 
luck. Today, traders will often employ multiple models, sometimes aligning their 
different valuations into spreadsheets to provide an immediate sense of how 
sensitive pricing is to different inputs and different models.119 Firms will compete 
with each other, looking to generate models that will allow them to profit off of the 
mispriced products of others.120 
Quants also continually develop new customised products for clients, in 
order to secure a profit for the production process and for the uniqueness of their 
product.121 While the earlier years of derivatives trading were dominated by vanilla 
options, by the 1990s exotic options were beginning to emerge and become 
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popular.122 After the collapse of Long Term Capital Management in 1997, volatility 
and variance swaps proliferated.123 Yet the profit advantages of these new products 
only last momentarily, as competitors will dissect new derivatives in order to 
reverse-engineer them. The result is a decrease in profit levels, and the ensuing 
search for ever more complex and structured products.124 
While the 1970s and 1980s saw the mathematical formulas emerge for 
some of the more exotic options, it was not until the 1990s that such products 
became widely used within the financial world – in no small part due to the fact 
that the technological means to produce such derivatives were at the time non-
existent.125 Even some of the most widely used models – such as the binomial 
model created by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein – required lengthy calculations that 
were hindered by the existing state of technology. As the options trader, Satyajit 
Das, has noted, “as the availability of computers increased, the ability to handle 
more complex types of options rapidly increased.”126 
Other factors played a motivating role in the development of the wild 
derivatives found today (e.g. options on the VIX, which are essentially derivatives 
of derivatives). As competition spread in the options markets, the profits to be 
made from simple derivatives decreased, and financial institutions were spurred on 
toward the production of more complex derivatives and structured products (under 
the marketing banner of ‘customised risk’). At the same time, new regulations 
produced an incentive to move liabilities off balance-sheets by using derivatives, 
which then allowed for leveraging and liquidity at an unprecedented level. As 
MacKenzie makes clear, the invention of novel derivatives is like any other 
invention in that it requires a keen sense of meeting users’ requirements. Details 
such as the option sizes, margin requirements, and the risks that can be hedged by 
a new instrument all play a part in designing these instruments.127 Yet these 
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advances were only made possible through the modes of action opened up by the 
development of new technologies and models.  
Technology also played a role in making markets ‘complete’. Most markets 
are incomplete in the sense that there are gaps in the maturity or strike prices 
available.128 The development of abilities to hedge risks, and the proliferation of 
models, has made it cost effective to provide derivatives in areas that were 
previously untenable. The result has been a proliferation of products in a different 
sense: not the creation of entirely new products, but the expansion of existing 
products into covering previously overlooked risks. 
The general dynamic in derivatives markets has therefore been that new 
products call forth models to price them, and new models prefigure products to 
use them.129 Central to this proliferation is a ratcheting dynamic: first-level 
derivatives (i.e. vanillas) are priced on the basis of more liquid underliers (e.g. 
stocks and bonds), which then allows a market to emerge in the first-level 
derivatives. These first-level derivatives can then be used as the more liquid 
derivative to price second-level derivatives (i.e. exotics). Such a dynamic points to 
what Merton calls the ‘financial innovation spiral’: 
 
“The proliferation of new trading markets in standardised securities 
such as futures, options, and swaps makes possible the creation of a 
wide range of new financial products, many custom designed and 
sold OTC by financial intermediaries to meet selected needs of 
investors and corporate issuers. Next, volume in the new markets 
expands further as the intermediaries themselves trade simply to 
hedge their own exposures from the products they sold. Such 
increased volume in turn reduces marginal transactions costs and 
thereby makes possible the further implementation of new products 
and trading strategies and this, in turn, leads to still more volume. 
New markets also evolve as some successful products become 
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standardised and their source of distribution moves from 
intermediaries to markets. Success of these trading markets and 
custom products then encourages investment in creating additional 
markets and products, and so on it goes, spiralling toward the 
theoretically limiting case of complete markets and zero marginal 
transactions costs.”130 
 
In other words, once the models and technology are in place, the economic 
dynamics of the situation take on an autopoietic nature. These dynamics produce 
incentives for further development of derivatives, which produce ever greater needs 
for advances in technology and model production. At its limit, even the speed of 
light becomes a technological issue for financial trading.131 At such extreme points, 
the physics of materiality that comprise the infrastructure become all important. 
As we saw earlier, prior to 1987 the most important first effect of BSM was to 
provide a rational and universal means to quantify the value of options. While 
there were previously a series of rules of thumb used to pragmatically determine the 
boundaries of prices for options, these were still subject to individual whims. BSM 
initiated a sort of ‘attractor’, to borrow a term from complexity science. The price 
generated by the BSM equation did not need to precisely match up to the market 
price, but it provided an idealised point around which market prices were 
presumed to fluctuate. Deviations from this idealised point were considered 
opportunities for arbitrage and were quickly exploited and eliminated for profit. 
                                                 
130 Merton, “Influence of Mathematical Models in Finance on Practice: Past, Present and Future,” 456. 
131 Wissner-Gross and Freer, “Relativistic Statistical Arbitrage”; The importance of the speed of light 
here is the opportunity to use a particular trading strategy (statistical arbitrage) in order to profit off of 
the price differences between two markets. Those with access to the information quicker are able to 
profit over those with access to the information later (even if this ‘later’ is measured in microseconds). 
Thus the physical location between two markets can become of crucial importance. Fundamentally 
though, this is nothing new in finance as such strategies have been employed even during the American 
Civil War. Upon the South’s defeat, one American financier chartered the fastest boat possible in order 
to travel across to Europe and profit off of the news before the information reached anyone else. 
(Freedman, Introduction to Financial Technology, 10.) 
While the role of option pricing models as a representation of an objective 
price did not last long, the capacities it made possible for hedging positions are 
among its most significant consequences. Through their argument132 linking 
together a portfolio made of stocks and bonds, with that of an option, BSM made 
it possible to both price the option (which the CAPM no-arbitrage argument 
deemed must be equivalent to the portfolio), and to hedge the option (i.e. returns 
could be precisely managed by taking their opposite position).133 What is called 
‘static hedging’ can work perfectly when it is possible to buy an inverse replica of 
the derivative sold (e.g. buy a put option when selling a call option, or vice versa). 
The problem is that in practice such perfect matches are rarely possible – in which 
case, it becomes important to find suitable alternatives. Thus, the perhaps most 
distinctive advance made possible by BSM was that of ‘dynamic hedging’.134 ‘Static 
hedging’ entails taking an opposite position once, and then holding both positions 
until expiration. Dynamic hedging, by contrast, is a constant manipulation of one’s 
position by altering the mixture of options, stocks, and riskless bonds in the 
replicating portfolio. The shift from static to dynamic hedging also allowed for 
market-makers to more easily trade derivatives, as their hedge no longer had to 
remain until expiration in order to work. Through BSM and other models, it also 
became possible to conceptualise the various types of risk that an option is exposed 
to, and hedge against each individually. (The sensitivities to these risks are known 
as ‘the Greeks’ since each has a Greek letter associated with it (except for ‘vega’).) 
Most crucially, dynamic hedging made it so that option sellers (primarily dealers) 
could mitigate the risks of their positions – a virtual impossibility beforehand. The 
result was a significant decrease in the amount of risk that a dealer had to take on. 
Since dealers and market makers are the primary sources of liquidity and volume 
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within markets, the sheer growth of the derivatives market is hard to imagine 
without this capacity for them to minimise risk. 
The original impetus for derivatives was for them to be used to hedge and 
minimise risk. But their mathematical valuation simultaneously allowed the 
construction of a speculative market for them (an example of how technology 
opens up new capacities and not merely expanding existing possibilities). The result 
was a massive expansion of the set of possible actions that could be carried out by 
those who create global markets. 
 The capacity to hedge, in particular, is essential to dealers and market 
makers for derivatives. Both are heavily involved in buying and selling derivatives 
and are exposed to numerous risks as a result. Dealers, for instance, predominantly 
sell options to clients, which leaves them holding the opposite end of the deal. 
Since the buyer of an option is limiting their downside risk, it is the dealer who is 
left covering that risk. The result is that they are placed in a precarious position. 
Hedging is therefore a crucial component of dealers’ work since it is what allows 
them to offset their short positions. Dynamic hedging – made possible solely by 
derivatives valuation models – is one of the primary ways in which modern dealers 
hedge their position. In dynamic hedging, as the underlier’s price changes, so too 
must the hedging of the position, and it is the models alone which provide the 
proper ratios of stocks, bonds, and cash to replicate the option payoff. This 
requires not only the model itself, but also “appropriate position-keeping and risk-
management tools”.135 As Mark Davis and Alison Etheridge write, 
 
“In earlier days there was no way to hedge an option contract: 
markets were illiquid, costs too high and information too scanty. 
Effective management of option risks depends on having a ‘deep’ 
(implying large) market and trading on a sufficiently fast 
timescale.”136 
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 More generally, derivatives made it possible for all investors to hedge what 
was once considered unavoidable risks (e.g. currency devaluation, among others). It 
was now possible to hedge against and protect against these possibilities, meaning 
corporations and institutional investors could mitigate their risk in new ways. The 
result was that the management of risk has now become a massive and important 
part of corporations.137 (Albeit, the main risk management systems such as Value-at-
Risk (VAR) are massively simplifying despite their complexity.138 If one 
distinguishes between ‘risk’ as a known unknown, and ‘uncertainty’ as an 
unknown unknown, it is not clear that risk management has come to terms at all 
with the latter.) Regardless, the expansion of hedging that occurred as a result of 
derivatives valuation models is an important way in which complexity and volatility 
are managed. Through their management of complexity, these technological 
objects have allowed for the creation of today’s global financial markets. 
 There is a flipside to this management of complexity however, and it was 
made clear in the 2008 financial crisis. As with all of the representational 
technologies examined in this thesis, they are open to multiple uses and they have 
unintended consequences beyond their creator’s intentions. As a component of a 
larger assemblage, these technologies have their own set of capacities that vary from 
assemblage to assemblage. In the deregulated world of the 1980s onwards, 
derivatives valuation models became a tool of speculation.  
In the first place, as we saw above, derivative valuation models provided a 
new way to estimate profitable trades via implied volatility. This opened up new 
means for professional arbitrageurs to compare heterogeneous assets against each 
other. This also opened the space for a shift in how investment banks profited – 
from mergers and acquisitions, underwriting, initial public offerings, and other 
traditional services, to proprietary trading and arbitrage hunting. 
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Pricing models simultaneously made possible the ability to hold large and 
complex positions across markets, since such moves were beyond cognitive 
capacities beforehand.139 In the words of one options trader, 
 
“I’ll stand in a pit with [options on] 16 stocks that each trade two 
[expiry] months and five strike prices and I’ll take anybody on: turn 
off the lights, I want to trade with no electronics. But when you get 
to multiple expirations, strike prices, higher volatility stocks . . . well, 
volatility changes by 10%, Arco goes from a 15 to a 13.5 [annualised 
percentage implied volatility], I can do that math in my head. [With 
a high volatility stock] 150 to 135 seems like it ought to be similar 
but . . . I’ve got too much money at risk if I’m wrong in my mental 
calculations.”140 
 
The sheer size of the markets massively increased as a result of computing as 
well. This was assisted in part by dynamic delta hedging – traders no longer had to 
hold onto a portfolio until expiry in order to secure their hedge. Instead, now they 
could consistently (and, indeed, were forced to) manipulate their positions in the 
market, thereby opening up new buyers and sellers. It was also assisted by the shift 
away from ‘block trading’, where large transactions are made all at once. The risk 
in this traditional strategy was that the price could shift as a result of that very 
transaction, or that transaction costs (e.g. commissions, bid-ask spreads) of multiple 
trades will rise, eliminating the profit potential from a trade. By contrast, today 
computers make such large trades possible (and profitable) by automatically 
optimizing trading strategies in order to effectively space out the trade over time.141 
Through a combination of varying the volume, timing and sequencing of trades, 
these programs inaugurated the first developments in algorithmic trading.142 These 
technological innovations have all contributed to making possible the explosion in 
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derivatives trading that this chapter began with. Today, on large stock exchanges 
like the NYSE, there can be over a billion transactions occurring in a single day of 
trading. There is no physical way for this to occur without the assistance of 
computers and automated trading programs: 
 
“Such volume would be impossible without the computer. Many 
complex securities could not even be priced without the computer’s 
speed and mathematical capabilities. So-called DOT transactions 
automate small trades on the New York Stock Exchange and 
transmit them instantaneously from the customer’s broker to the 
post where the order is executed.”143  
 
The size, speed, and liquidity of modern markets has therefore been made a 
possibility through the computational and mathematical innovations first 
introduced by derivative pricing models. 
One market in particular is a direct result from the rise of options pricing models: 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index (VIX). First 
proposed in 1993 and launched in 2004, this index relies on the shift to implied 
volatility, and measures the implied volatility that is hidden in the S&P 500’s index 
options.144 By measuring the market’s expected volatility in the next 30 days, the 
VIX effectively represents how risky the market believes that period will be. In 
times of crisis, the VIX shoots up (see Figure 16). As a result, the VIX has now 
become a widely used indicator of ‘fear’ in markets. In other words, a market based 
on products produced by theoretical models, is now being used as a symptom of 
market emotions. This level of second-order abstractions has led to a situation 
where there is no consensus about what the index fully means.145 (A situation 
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complicated further by debates over how to calculate the index and how to weight 
different options.) 
 
 
 
 
 Despite these difficulties, the VIX has been a success as attested to by its 
rapid growth in volume.146 Its success goes beyond its general function as a fear 
index, and speaks to the capacities it makes possible for hedging risks. In particular, 
it is significantly easier to dynamically hedge against future volatility changes if 
there is a market for volatility itself. For instance, vega is the variable for how the 
price of an option changes with respect to changes in the underlier's volatility and 
can be hedged through volatility options. Products based around the volatility 
index make it possible to accomplish such hedging gestures. This is indeed what 
has occurred: with the theoretically-constructed VIX index of implied volatility, a 
range of new VIX-based products (futures and options) have been engineered. The 
significance of this is that it makes possible a range of new options for hedging and 
trading. In the words of one trader, 
 
“The medium of options actually changes the kinds of messages it 
occurs to you to express. This is really the reason why I think options 
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are so interesting and valuable. If the only three words in my 
financial vocabulary were buy, short, or hold, I might not bother 
thinking my way to a thesis that could only be expressed with 
optionality.”147 
 
The volatility index and the volatility products that surround it literally extend the 
conceptual and perceptual possibilities of traders. Again, it should be emphasised 
that trading volatility products is entirely model-dependent – volatility only exists as 
an exchangeable asset by virtue of the models that produce it. 
With an understanding of option pricing models, what they do, and how they have 
developed, we can now summarise their role in the material construction of global 
finance. The construction of the global through these representational technologies 
has occurred in a number of ways. These technologies have, first, made it possible 
to ‘see’ the volatility assumed within market prices – a possibility which has given 
rise to the VIX and the transactions and products that circulate around it. 
Secondly, option pricing models have opened up new possibilities to hedge and 
trade, expanding the language within which positions in the market can be taken 
up. These technologies have generated a wide variety of new products and been at 
the basis of entirely new markets. 
At all levels of the global financial world, models have become embodied in 
the technological objects used routinely every day. They provide the basic material 
infrastructure without which today’s massive derivatives markets simply would not 
exist – transforming the ‘gentlemanly’ capitalism of earlier markets into the 
increasingly computational markets of today.148 Yet the built-up nature of this 
infrastructure imposes certain constraints and possibilities for any future 
development. For instance, high-frequency trading (HFT) is bumping up against 
the limits of exchange’s abilities to log and time-stamp trades – a problem that 
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becomes essential when trying to discern how crashes occurred.149 Instituted 
decades ago, the Network Time Protocol (NTP) is what synchronises computer 
clocks together – yet it is limited to synchronizing with an accuracy of 10 -2 
seconds.150 Relative to the nanoseconds that some HFT occurs in, this is an 
eternity. This infrastructural path dependency is placing limits on how fast trades 
can be completed, and forcing alternative means to escape this constraint. 
Similarly, with the financial models themselves, the various component 
pieces (algorithms, equations, computer code, data visualization, graphics 
processors, data servers, etc.) produce a series of likely possibilities for any future 
development. For instance, the limitations of current processing power lead the 
development of new models to aim for closed form solutions, or to only employ 
manageable probability distributions (avoiding the ‘monstrous’ distributions of 
Benoit Mandelbrot).151 Other possible paths of development are neglected as a 
result of the nature of the representational technology. 
Yet despite this ongoing automation of financial markets (which one UK 
government report envisions as the eventual ‘depopulation of trading floors’), 
social and political factors remain.152 Historical research on options trading is 
illuminating here, highlighting how various social conventions were capable of 
supporting a minimal market for derivatives. The historical data from market 
prices suggests that early options markets employed a variety of basic rules of 
thumb in order to produce a relatively rational system of market prices.153 Implied 
volatility was systematically related to realised volatility, and overt arbitrage 
opportunities were typically minimised thus making options correctly priced 
relative to each other. Evidence from personal accounts and news stories suggests 
the existence of some conscious awareness of the factors involved in pricing 
options, and also suggests a minimal existence of static hedging. What does not 
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exist, though, is accurate pricing – the data suggests systematically overpriced 
options. The most thorough comparative study of pre-BSM markets therefore is 
correct to say that the qualitative factors are highly similar between periods.154 This 
is due to the existence of basic financial rules of thumb concerning arbitrage and 
the likely volatility of stocks. However, the post-BSM era shows a noticeable 
increase in the accuracy of pricing. Likewise in terms of hedging, pre-BSM 
strategies relied on basic (though important) ideas of put-call parity in order to 
hedge their positions when buying or selling options. Importantly, all the evidence 
suggests this remained at a level of static hedging – a hedge established at the 
beginning of a position and then held to expiry. Dynamic hedging, a primary act of 
modern derivatives markets, was only an idea at the time. 
What these historical studies do show though is that particular social 
conventions can sustain a minimal level of option pricing. Principles of arbitrage, 
including put-call parity, and heuristics to take into account factors like volatility 
(i.e. ‘market conditions’ as one 1914 treatise put it) all functioned to give some 
consistency to pricing between options and their variations. These exist in a social 
world, and while the introduction of BSM appeared to initially negate the social 
factors, the emergence of the volatility smile and the proliferation of option pricing 
models has made social factors increasingly significant. 
In addition to this explicit return of social aspects involved in derivatives 
trading there are the often implicit political decisions that have gone into the 
construction of models. Foremost here are the technical decisions embedded in 
technologies such as option pricing models, credit default swap models, Value-at-
Risk (VAR) models, and macroeconomic models. Such technologies were 
constructed initially to create representations of various complex phenomena: 
volatility, correlation, risk, and economies.155 The ease with which their 
constructions could be communicated and replicated lent these numerical 
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representations a sense of objectivity and, hence, a sense of authority.156 This 
authority was then employed to justify wild speculation in financial markets, 
leading to excessive risk-taking, massive leveraging, and the eventual breakdown of 
the global financial system. As always, the issue is not that the technology caused 
this bubble and its subsequent burst; rather the technology altered the behavioural 
landscape and made over-leveraging and excessive risk-taking to be increasingly less 
costly (and in fact, often profitable) actions. The well-known limitations of these 
technologies (e.g. their incapacity to model realistic probability distributions, their 
reliance on past data, and their dismissal of long tail events) were set aside and lost 
in the rush to make profits. Being situated in a larger sociotechnical assemblage 
(that of capitalism), these representational technologies performed an array of 
functions with both useful and disastrous results. While some have taken this as 
evidence of an overreliance on mathematics and technology, as will be argued in 
the final chapter, such an approach neglects the extent to which the contemporary 
world requires such technologies. The politics of representational technologies and 
cognitive assemblages are not something to be banished by fiat, but instead a 
problem to be faced up to. 
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There have been a number of conceptual ways to derive the BSM equation, with 
Paul Wilmott citing the existence of at least 14 different ways. The derivation of 
this equation is taken from Wilmott’s Frequently Asked Questions in Quantitative 
Finance.1 Note that this is the equation that shows how the price of an option 
varies with time and stock price changes. For the price of a particular option at a 
particular time, we need to input the boundary conditions (i.e. the characteristics 
of the particular option, such as expiration date, call or put, and when it can be 
exercised). 
 
  
  
 
 
 
    
   
   
   
  
  
        
 
Where, 
 
V = option price 
t = years until expiry 
  = volatility of the underlying’s returns (i.e. growth) 
S = underlying price 
r = current annualised risk-free rate of interest 
 
  
  
 : the rate of time decay, i.e. the loss of option value as the 
expiration date  approaches 
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  : convexity term, i.e. the rate at which a hedged position 
varies on average from changes in the stock price 
 
  
  
  
  : price drift, i.e. the growth of the stock price at the risk-free 
rate of interest 
 
      : the discounting of the future value to the present time (at the 
risk-free rate of interest) 
 
This equation is formed by setting a riskless portfolio proportioned between 
options and stocks on one side, against the riskless rate of interest on the other 
side. Rearranging the terms produces the above equation. 
Yet this PDE does not yet tell us what the price of an option should be; it 
only shows us how the option price varies with stock price and volatility. In order 
to get a pricing formula, what is necessary is a second step whereby certain 
boundary conditions on the function are set.2 These are dependent on the type of 
option, the strike price of the option and the price of the underlying. Given these, 
particular formulas can be derived that provide a means of computing the price of 
particular options. 
Finally, the particular formulas can have the relevant numbers inputted in 
for the variables, which can then be computed, providing a solution to the 
equation. 
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“With Ushahidi, you have the big picture immediately.”1 
 
-anonymous activist 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
In contrast to climate change and financial markets, humanitarian crises are less 
likely to be noted as particularly complex. Yet the logistical networks and 
coordination that go on behind the scenes of a major humanitarian operation are 
among the most complex acts of cooperation that occur today: 
 
“Imagine the planning involved in an event like the Olympics. Now 
imagine planning the same event but not knowing when or where it 
will take place, how many spectators will attend, or how many 
athletes will compete. The near impossibility of the task gives some 
insight into what humanitarian logisticians are up against.”2 
 
 In the wake of the 2010 Haitian earthquake, the devastating 2004 tsunami 
in the Indian Ocean, and other major humanitarian disasters, increased global 
attention has been paid to the ways in which actors involved in humanitarianism 
can and should evolve to deal with these emergency situations. Media, 
international organizations, and non-governmental organizations have all reflected 
on the implications and path forward for managing crises, with a wealth of reports 
emerging in the wake of this decade’s crises.3  
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 A similar set of complex crisis situations has become significant recently 
with the political events surging across the Arab world. While analytically 
distinguishable from humanitarian crises, these political crises share many 
common aspects and often blur at their boundaries. Political crises typically 
produce humanitarian crises, while humanitarian crises often stretch the capacities 
of political systems. The result, in either case, is a situation characterised by its 
complex and fast-moving nature. Moreover, in both instances there is often a 
dearth of reliable information. If effective political action is premised upon the 
conceptual representations of a situation, then rational action becomes nearly 
impossible in crisis situations. In this regard, the new technologies involved in 
crisis mapping can be seen as a means for political actors to overcome this cognitive 
deficiency. Through this case study it will again be demonstrated how political 
actors are in fact constructed not only socially, but also through material 
technology. The very perceptions of actors is altered by technological extensions, 
and “map-based ‘mashups,’ through the use of frequently updated data from 
multiple sources, allow us to ‘see’ microbehaviour spatio-temporally.”4 
 The next section will make precise the various complexities involved in 
humanitarian crises, demonstrating that it is often a system beyond the cognitive 
capacity of any group of non-augmented minds. The third section will outline the 
early history of crisis mapping, focusing on its pre-history in various attempts to 
map crises after the fact, as well as the shift to predictive modelling attempts in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The fourth section will articulate the 
development of contemporary crisis mapping, from its origins with a Kenyan 
blogger to the rapid and sophisticated international technology it has become 
today. Important here are the various frictions internal to the technology: 
particularly the tensions between the functional demands of the technology and 
the limitations imposed by the materiality of the software. The penultimate section 
argues that crisis mapping software has changed the capacities of actors in 
significant ways, and undertakes to demonstrate these effects through a variety of 
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recent humanitarian crises. It will show how this technology has enabled 
humanitarian actors to see crisis in a new way. 
The traditional history of humanitarian action traces its origins back to Henry 
Dunant and his efforts to eventually create the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC).5 Yet its origins in fact lie further back in the cultural changes 
that arose in the late eighteenth century. Behind this shift was a combination of 
new religious interpretations that placed salvation in individual’s control, 
increasing confidence in the ability of scientific knowledge to change things for the 
better, and technological changes that made the scope of communities 
geographically wider. All of these came together to foster a novel humanitarian 
sense amongst people – expanding empathy beyond the traditional local borders 
and into new imagined communities.6 Since this time, the humanitarian desire has 
come to embody itself in an array of institutions, laws, practices, and technologies. 
The contemporary humanitarian landscape is a diverse mixture of public and 
private, local and global, formal and informal actors. 
A first source of complexity is therefore the fact that the “actors in the 
humanitarian world are often uncoordinated, spontaneous, unsolicited, and 
disparate.”7 The Haitian earthquake, for instance, had over 900 aid organisations 
that were registered with the UN – plus all those who had not registered.8 
Humanitarian operations are typically put together incredibly quickly and it is 
often unclear precisely which actors will be responsible for what. The logistics of 
humanitarian operations involve a number of different levels, ranging from the 
international to the national to the local. A variety of different components also 
need to be coordinated to produce an effective humanitarian assemblage: 
materials, information on the ground, finance, people, and knowledge from past 
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experiences.9 These crisis responses entail coordinating a variety of agencies: 
international institutions, local relief agencies, national governments, individual 
volunteers, privatised logistics corporations, and in situations with poor security, 
even privatised military contractors.10 This linkage to conflicts (as many 
humanitarian situations are) increases the complexity of the situation and the 
necessary sophistication of the response.11 
A second major source of complexity is the uncertainty and lack of 
information in most humanitarian crises. “Information is the foundation upon 
which the humanitarian supply chain is designed, formed, and managed.”12 At the 
most general levels, crises are plagued by uncertainty over the size, the tendencies 
and the nature of a crisis.13 These contemporary crises often embody incalculable 
risks – meaning preventative measures are incapable of sufficiently dealing with 
them.14 In addition, there is uncertainty about what will be available (in terms of 
labour, capital, and existing infrastructure). The needs and supplies of resources 
can frequently fluctuate, and the very infrastructure and environment that the 
relief work is operating in is typically altered by the crisis (the devastation wrought 
by an earthquake, for instance).15 There is not only a requirement to know what 
the local needs are, but also to know what the local supplies are. As procurement is 
one of the most difficult tasks for humanitarian relief, being able to find supplies 
locally saves both in terms of costs and time. Key pieces of information are often 
not well understood. The demand for resources, for instance: what precisely is 
needed for a successful operation in the circumstances? (Experience helps, but is 
insufficient.)16 Conversely, data about supply is needed: from where are resources 
(food, money, blankets, labour) going to come from? Therefore, unlike a standard 
business supply chain, humanitarian supply chains are much more uncertain about 
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the basic parameters of what is required. There are difficulties both in assessing 
who is in need of assistance, and how they can be helped. The latter ranges from 
understanding what is needed to understanding how to get it there (a process 
which can involve unorthodox means such as air-drops and loading elephants).17 
Gathering data is therefore one of the key challenges and those in the field have 
the best access to this information.18 Yet these sources are often uncoordinated, 
making centralising data into a single overarching vision of the crisis more difficult. 
Moreover, this information can and often is politicised by the various actors 
involved.19 Aid agencies may portray situations as worse than they actually are, 
while governments may downplay the crisis in order to avoid international 
attention. The different incentives to manipulate data add to the uncertainty and 
complexity of the situation. 
 The final source of complexity is the dynamism of the situation. 
Humanitarian crises are constantly evolving situations that surpass the capacity of 
static information systems to respond. Instead, a dynamic information 
management network is necessary to equal the dynamism of the situation. In 
addition, these contemporary situations comprise complex networks of social, 
economic, and political relations between a variety of heterogeneous groups. The 
effects of any humanitarian action in such a complex system are necessarily 
multiform and unpredictable to some degree.20 Combined with the urgency of 
responding to a humanitarian crisis, and the inevitably political nature of every 
intervention, the complexity of organizing a response quickly becomes very 
complex.21 
All of these complexities are tied together in the logistical requirements of 
humanitarian operations. In particular, the initial stages of a crisis are the most 
crucial and the most intense for establishing the logistical structure for a 
humanitarian operation. At this point, operations need to be set up and 
established as quickly as possible in order to get relief out to the affected 
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communities. There is also a plethora of issues to be handled at this point, “such as 
obtaining visas, negotiating landing rights, getting customs clearance, [and] 
arranging licenses for vehicles.”22 Collecting information about the situation, about 
the affected population, about the available resources, and the means to bring all 
these aspects together – this forms the crux of the complexity issue for 
humanitarian agencies. The importance of logistics for humanitarian situations was 
recognised in a McKinsey report in 2000, which went on to instigate widespread 
changes in the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC). The logistics of humanitarian relief and disaster response were given their 
own department, in recognition of their importance for effective humanitarian 
action.23 The focus here will not be on the entire logistical network that goes on 
behind the scenes of a humanitarian response. Rather, the focus here will be on 
the immediate coordination of resources and how the technology of crisis mapping 
allows both humanitarian organisations and affected populations to change the 
way they approach a crisis situation. This is the particularly crucial hinge upon 
which much of the success of the aid operation hangs. As one expert notes, “for 
those organising the immediate response, one of the biggest challenges [is] getting 
information (assessment) about the situation on the ground. They [need] to know 
what [is] affected, what [is] needed, what resources [are] available, and, as aid 
[begins] to arrive spontaneously, what [is] coming and when.”24 
With the complexity of modern crisis situations, the primary demand is therefore 
some means to ‘see’ the crisis. Some means, in other words, to quickly gather, 
collect, organise, and analyse data about the real-time fluctuations in the wake of a 
crisis. Historically, the technology of mapping has played a key role in providing 
and organising this information. (There is evidence, in fact, that maps existed 
before language as a means of communication.)25 Yet, as will be shown, it is only 
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recently that crisis mapping has taken on a form conducive to effective assistance in 
the midst of a crisis. For the most part, the historical use of maps has been to aid 
post-hoc assessments. Today’s crisis mapping technologies are the first to function 
as real-time visualisations of the situation, thereby allowing actors to more fully see 
a crisis. 
Initial attempts to map crises were done after the events, to provide the 
public with a geographical representation of what had occurred, and to provide 
organisations with a different perception to analyse. Oftentimes, crisis mapping 
represented riots, with the 1863 draft riots in New York and the 1967 riots in 
Detroit both being mapped for local media.26 Perhaps the most historically famous 
case of crisis mapping though was John Snow’s use of geographical patterns in 
determining the source of cholera in mid-1800s London. Countering the then 
dominant miasma theory (which argued cholera spread through bad air), Snow 
plotted the cases of cholera on a map and found support for the germ theory of 
cholera and correctly pinpointed the source in a nearby water pump. The spatial 
analysis and geographical representation played no small role in justifying Snow’s 
claims, and the local council prohibited usage of the pump as a result. 
Later efforts at crisis mapping began to incorporate some ostensibly 
predictive aspects – using conceptual models to articulate the spatial and temporal 
dynamics of disasters.27 For instance, aid organisations in the 1970s employed 
models to represent ecological dynamics. These were used in an effort to systemise 
the relationships involved in drought situations. How were pastoral practices 
related to international trade regimes related to weather patterns? The models 
provided the agencies with some means of systematically thinking about how 
interventions within the humanitarian situation would affect the rest of the 
system.28 Yet most of these efforts at crisis mapping were for early warning 
systems,29 creating, for instance, geographical models of how a drought would likely 
generate a particular spatial distribution of famine. More recent projects have 
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coded and visualised civil wars in an effort to disaggregate country-level data and 
make clearer the relationships between conflict, resources, and ethnicities.30 More 
recent crisis mapping software is also being used prior to disasters – to catalogue 
the existing infrastructure of schools, water pipes, and hospitals. In developing 
countries, where this information is often scarce, it can be crucial for responding 
effectively to disasters.31 These more recent crisis maps were significantly aided by 
the emergence of remote sensing technology – inaugurated by the launching of the 
first remote sensing satellite in 1999.32 These technologies generated the geo-
referenced data that today’s crisis maps rely upon, and were quickly developed with 
military applications, particularly as part of the counterinsurgency effort in 
Afghanistan.33 
The current stage of crisis mapping technology arose in the last decade. The 
possibility of this crisis mapping relies upon the technological platform provided by 
the recent spread of mobile technology throughout the developing world. The last 
ten years have seen a rapid and pervasive diffusion of technologies – significantly, 
not only at an elite level, but also at the most general levels. As of 2010, there were 
over 4 billion mobile phones in operation, at a level of 78 for every 100 people.34 
Over a billion people now have access to the internet, and both of these numbers 
are continuing to grow rapidly.35 More importantly, they are spreading quickest in 
developing countries – areas that are now leaping over the need for large fixed 
infrastructural systems.36 What this has meant is that technology now permeates 
many everyday social relations to an unprecedented degree. The world we live in 
can no longer (if it ever could) be considered a solely social sphere, disconnected 
from the materiality of the physical world and the implication of technological 
objects in the organization of human relations. 
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As such, there has been a revolution in social interaction and capacities 
with the rise of mobile phone technology. Their distributed infrastructure has been 
used to monitor election results in real-time, to chart medical inventories, track 
mosquito net distribution, provide mobile banking, and other important services.37 
With the simultaneous rise of Geographic Information Systems (GIS), there came a 
push for more user-centric and interactive mapping technology. This 
‘neogeographic’ school emerged in the 2000s and formed one of the key steps 
towards modern crisis mapping.38 In its broadest form, neogeography refers to “a 
blurring of the distinctions between producer, communicator and consumer of 
geographic information.”39 The expansion and incorporation of users into the 
creation of maps was an important practical and theoretical step towards the 
generation of crisis mapping software. 
Today’s crisis mapping technology brings real-time information together in order to 
produce geographical representations. Instead of text, which can be fairly time-
consuming to cognitively digest in urgent disaster situations, maps have been 
recognised for some time as useful mediums for communicating information to 
those in the field. “Maps not only create a common language but can also be 
loaded with information about the resources available along the way. Maps can 
identify in advance information that needs to be regularly updated and invite the 
users to also become a source for those pieces of information.”40 As research has 
shown, maps can also act as a computational tool – easily carrying out spatial 
calculations that would be otherwise laborious.41 In trying to efficiently set up 
logistics operations and distribute resources along often improvised transportation 
networks, these visual representations are immensely helpful. Part of their capacity 
to assist in this is through their bird’s-eye view perspective that they provide: the 
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map “presents the world in a perspective that can never be achieved from any 
actual viewing point.”42 From here, new relations and new patterns emerge, shifting 
the way in which the crisis is seen. 
The information that is visualised varies from crisis to crisis, but 
encompasses a wide range of events. The Libyan crisis map, for instance, included 
“updates on military actions, evacuations, movement of refugees, and street 
fighting.”43 A simulated earthquake exercise aggregated information on food, water, 
shelter, health and medicine resources, people trapped and the location of 
functioning hospitals, among others. One key question is over what data should be 
collected.44 As with any map, there are political choices about how to represent the 
reality of the situation.45 The pragmatic character of crisis maps is clear here, 
insofar as what is needed for aid agencies is not a complete and total representation 
of a crisis – but instead, a simplified yet accurate representation of the most 
relevant elements. 
While the focus here will be on the technological aspects, to be clear, crisis 
mapping also involves the efforts of numerous individuals (for instance, an 
institutionalised volunteer grouping has recently been established).46 The approach 
here, however, is to examine technology as it is implicated within these social 
networks. As with the other case studies, the question is what function does this 
representational technology carry out, and how does it produce new capacities for 
cognition and action that are unthinkable without the introduction of this new 
technology? As opposed to the other technologies examined in this thesis, crisis 
mapping’s advantage over human cognitive capacities lies primarily in its ability to 
collect, filter, and organise mass amounts of data rapidly and efficiently – as 
opposed to providing calculative abilities beyond human means. 
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Initial efforts to try and leverage the new technologies and new conceptualisations 
of mapping in order to assist in humanitarian situations were made over the period 
of 2000-2010. A large number of examples exist from this time period, but one will 
suffice to show the level of development and how the technologies of crisis 
mapping were shifting in the latest generation. The focus in this period was on 
aggregating information and employing it as a shared, static representation 
amongst humanitarian actors. 
The institutional origins of this experiment began during the eastern Zaire 
crisis of 1996, when the UN created the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre 
(UNJLC) in order to coordinate and manage the incoming humanitarian 
resources.47 The specific mandate of the UNJLC was not to act as another UN 
agency, but instead to function as a coordination mechanism between existing 
humanitarian agencies.48 In this regards, the staff worked both to develop new 
means to coordinating logistics and to make the most efficient use of limited 
resources. In 2002, in the wake of the American invasion of Afghanistan, a website 
was established for the UNJLC, designed specifically for assistance in coordinating 
logistics in Afghanistan. The website included information and was constantly, 
 
“…updated and made more comprehensive to reflect planned 
regional and strategic airlifts, status of transportation corridors, 
availability of warehousing, rates for commodities and transport, and 
details like the status of border crossings.” 
 
 The goal of the website was relatively straightforward: to provide a 
centralised hub for useful information that humanitarian agencies could use in 
their logistics planning.49 The UNJLC Chief Information Officer, Nigel Snoad, 
states that the aim was to anticipate the needs of the humanitarian groups and to 
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put this data up on the website for everyone to access.50 Maps were also provided – 
particularly of roads – but most were out-of-date and inaccurate after years of 
conflict and weather had made some roads impassable.51 Notable here is that the 
UNJLC was largely a passive aggregator of information, rather than an active 
coordinator. (Though on the odd occasion it also did this – negotiating between 
local transport businesses and the humanitarian community, for instance.) 
 Yet the surprise of 9/11 and the speed of the ensuing Afghanistan invasion 
meant that the UNJLC website had to be constructed quickly by a local 
programmer.52 The earliest versions of this site were too slow, constrained to 
particular browsers, and in later generations, were quickly overloaded with too 
much information coming in.53 Data frictions and computational frictions were 
adding up. Collecting data typically required establishing trusted contacts with 
organisations on the ground and relying on military intelligence in order to 
generate up-to-date information.54 Both were difficult and time-consuming, and 
presented a real limit on the speed and breadth of the information the UNJLC 
could accurately access. With later developments in crisis mapping, we will see that 
one of the most unique features becomes the ability to very easily collect data from 
many individuals on the ground, thereby overcoming the data frictions of this 
logistics information system. For those in the field (as opposed to regional 
headquarters), most found the website usage was too slow and too intermittent to 
be of much use. Internet connections were spotty, and the technology was not 
available to make the website a ubiquitous tool. It took the rise of mobile phone 
technology in the past decade to make web access pervasive. With it, the threshold 
of usability was passed for web-based information hubs in the field. In later 
iterations of the website, the UNJLC began to take on a forecasting role – 
researching and producing projections for concerns about fuel prices, for 
instance.55 The website began to incorporate a variety of maps for all sorts of 
                                                 
50 Tomasini, Managing Information in Humanitarian Crises: The UNJLC Website, 2. 
51 Ibid., 4. 
52 Ibid., 3. 
53 Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, Humanitarian Logistics, 110–1. 
54 Ibid., 112. 
55 Tomasini, Managing Information in Humanitarian Crises: The UNJLC Website, 7. 
relevant data. In the words of one researcher, “These smart maps with embedded 
data quickly found their way to the walls and desks of the entire humanitarian 
community in one of the world’s largest humanitarian relief efforts.”56 Yet for all its 
innovation in digital humanitarian logistics, the UNJLC remained oriented 
towards providing government agencies and NGOs with information. With the 
emergence of later generations of crisis mapping, this would be transformed to 
include multi-way communication and integration of the local populations. 
A major shift towards greater interactive capacities occurred with a suggestion from 
a Kenyan blogger. In the midst of post-election violence there in 2007-2008, Ory 
Okolloh blogged a small question: “Guys looking to do something – any techies 
out there willing to do a mashup of where the violence and destruction is occurring 
using Google Maps?”57 From this suggestion, 15-20 volunteers worked to produce a 
program called Ushahidi (meaning ‘testimony’ in Swahili) and the website was 
operational within a week. During the period of violence, over 45,000 people 
participated and hundreds of accounts of violence were posted.58 
The software of contemporary crisis mapping (Ushahidi being the most 
famous) allows individuals to submit reports to a centralised computer system. It 
aggregates real-time information from SMS text messages, Twitter reports and other 
social media into a Google Maps-based geographical representation. In addition, it 
distinguishes itself from other crowdsourcing initiatives by mandating a 
geolocation of any information received.59 From its initial development in 2007, 
Ushahidi has “since been used in Afghanistan, Colombia, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Gaza, India, and Lebanon, and […] Mozambique.”60 
More recently, crisis mapping has manifested in Liberia, Sudan, Egypt, and the 
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Libyan revolution.61 Rebels in Libya made use of mapping software to orient their 
mortar fire and target government tanks.62 It has been “used in South Africa to 
track xenophobic violence against immigrants. A more advanced version of the 
software was deployed to monitor violence in the Eastern Congo in 2009.63 Al 
Jazeera-International used it during the Israeli invasion of Gaza in 2009. 
Furthermore, the Ushahidi platform has been used to coordinate relief efforts 
following the devastating earthquake in Haiti and the wildfires in Russia.”64 By 
2012, Ushahidi had been used to produce maps in 140 countries.65 
The essential reason behind crisis mapping’s rapid diffusion is that, as we 
have seen, information is crucial to any humanitarian operation. Traditionally, the 
means for generating information about a crisis has relied on painstaking and 
labour-intensive processes: 
 
“A network of people collects information by going into 
communities. They compile readily available data by speaking with 
the locals and observing the situation. For example, staff members in 
the field would report about fuel prices, exchange rates, security and 
distances, and transportation costs. All this assumes there are 
reliable means of communication for them to share the data with 
analysts.”66 
 
Crisis mapping radically transforms the nature of information gathering 
and the production of situational awareness. Rather than a top-down search for 
information, real-time data on the situation can be built from the ground-up. More 
than this though, modern crisis mapping moves beyond just aggregating knowledge 
about a situation, and instead functions to represent a situation and provide the 
capacity to interact with it. As one Egyptian activist stated, “With Ushahidi, you 
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have the big picture immediately.”67 A meta-level analysis of recent crisis mapping 
invokes a similar shift: 
 
“While these professional actors were, for many decades, most often 
confronted by an information vacuum following a crisis, which 
meant that they were tasked with providing initial assessments,, they 
are now confronted with a deluge of multi-media, user-generated 
content shared on multiple social media channels, often in real-
time.”68 
 
The potential benefits of contemporary crisis mapping are therefore clear. 
Foremost is its ability to allow for real-time coordination – not only of 
organizations and their relief efforts, but also of individuals in the affected 
communities. In terms of existing humanitarian organizations, it allows for a 
clearer picture than ever before of the situation on the ground. This means a more 
effective and efficient use of finite resources, as well as a potentially quicker 
response to the situation. The accuracy of matching needs to supplies and the 
rapidity of the response are both key qualities of effective humanitarian relief.69 
As a piece of software, the original crisis mapping technology was grounded 
upon a merging of the geographical software of Google Maps and OpenStreetMap 
(OSM) with the text-messaging software of Frontline SMS. The former provided 
the malleable geographic representations, while the latter created the capacity for 
users to input data themselves (rather than centrally by an administrator). As 
opposed to climate change modelling, crisis mapping requires nimble, cheap, and 
minimal hardware in order for it to be effective in a disaster situation. Frontline 
SMS software, in particular, is designed to be run on a single computer even 
without an internet connection, thus making it well-suited in areas of poverty and 
destroyed infrastructure.70 Google Maps, on the other hand, was coded in such a 
                                                 
67 Meier, “Ushahidi as a Liberation Technology,” 105. 
68 Mapping the Maps: A Meta-Level Analysis of Ushahidi & Crowdmap, 5. 
69 Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, Humanitarian Logistics, 95. 
70 Marsden, “Stigmergic Self-Organization and the Improvisation of Ushahidi,” 15. 
way as to be eminently open to modification by users, and this ease was eventually 
institutionalised as such in its Application Programming Interface (API).71 Frictions 
between computational requirements and the demands of speed remain though, 
and have led to developments in the basic crisis mapping software. The original 
Ushahidi software required installation on a server, necessitating relatively large 
and expensive equipment and the time to set up the software. This meant that 
Ushahidi was largely too slow to respond to the immediate needs of a 
humanitarian crisis. In response, a cloud-based crisis mapping program was made 
available (Crowdmap) as well as a downloadable and upgraded version of the 
original crisis mapping software (SwiftRiver). In all these developments, the driving 
force has been the friction between the demands of, on the one hand, the 
computational and data requirements of the software versus, on the other hand, 
the demands of easy access and mobility of the service. The former requires some 
degree of material embodiment (even cloud-based services require internet access), 
while the latter seeks to minimise this physical footprint as much as possible. 
 Yet while the software and hardware components are important, by far the 
most significant technological infrastructure of crisis mapping is the global 
dispersal of mobile phones. As mentioned earlier, mobile phones have rapidly 
spread throughout the world, and are particularly gaining widespread dispersal in 
developing countries. Most of these countries are seeing exponential growth in 
mobile phone usage. This spread of mobile phones has led to two shifts: the 
dispersal of means of communication (via mobile phones and wireless internet) 
and the decentralisation of creators of information (towards the affected 
populations).72 The result is a surge of information that can potentially overwhelm 
traditional organisational means of handling data. Therefore, one of the key data 
frictions with the new crisis mapping has been the emergence of mass amounts of 
information that is (and will be) employed in relief operations. By virtue of 
opening up information supply to a much wider range of actors than is typical of 
humanitarian agencies, crisis mapping’s most serious problem has become how to 
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ensure the validity of incoming information. This leads to one of the major 
computational frictions within crisis mapping, which is the need to balance out the 
speed of information with the accuracy and trustworthiness of information. 
Rumours and deliberate lies can be just as easily spread as accurate information, 
and the often anonymous nature of reports makes verification difficult.  
More frictions with crisis mapping’s knowledge production arise in certain 
crisis situations where there is the issue of information being used against the 
sender – the Sudanese and Iranian governments, for instance, have used 
technology to trace back and arrest people sending information.73 To counter this, 
Libyan crisis mapping information was open in real-time to only a select group of 
people, with information becoming publically available only after a 24-hour delay. 
Between the risk of information being misappropriated and the difficulty in 
verifying information, a number of tensions arise that are in fact intrinsic to the 
nature of crisis mapping. In other words, they can be mitigated, but never 
eliminated. Specifically, there is a tension in crisis mapping between the necessary 
publicity of the information, the secrecy of the sender, and the simultaneous need 
to verify the validity of the sender. A further complication arises with the tension 
between the need for real-time information, and the delay it takes to verify 
information.74 Taken together, any one of these tensions can be resolved to some 
degree, but not all three at the same time. The very functions of this technology 
create a necessary impasse which guides future development. A number of means 
have been created to lessen this impasse, including the use of photographs as visual 
evidence, the use of multiple reports to corroborate claims, and the use of 
consciously bounded sets of information producers.75 In this latter case, rather than 
allowing anyone to submit, only specific individuals are allowed by virtue of being 
trustworthy sources. The reputational status of actors becomes a key variable here – 
that is to say, the linkages within a social network. 
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The data frictions involved in this surge of information are compelling 
development towards increased automation. The raw data provided by crisis 
mapping requires analysis in order to be employed usefully, and speed is of the 
essence here.76 Typically this is done by trained individuals, though increasingly 
automated analytics are being implemented as well. Crisis mapping software is 
moving beyond just a raw presentation of incoming data, and instead 
supplementing this with a filtered, calculated, and organised presentation of the 
influx of information. In other words, beyond acting as a mere repository of 
information, crisis maps are beginning to take on a properly adjunctive function 
for cognition. The necessity of this automation can be seen in, for instance, the fact 
that twenty million Hurricane Sandy-related tweets were generated over the course 
of that storm.77 Such quantities of data simply overwhelm even well-trained teams 
of disaster responders. This quantity of data not only necessitates some form of 
automated analysis, but also makes it possible. Earlier attempts at pattern 
recognition relied on relatively few data points, making it difficult (if not 
impossible) to extract useful information.78 With the large datasets emerging now, 
meaningful relationships are becoming possible to unearth. 
 Further developments in crisis mapping software are therefore increasingly 
automating specific functions and making use of computing power to achieve 
actions unattainable by humans alone. For instance, the data from crisis mapping 
is now being combined with data analytics software and data visualization programs 
included in the upgraded program SwiftRiver.79 At its base, 
 
“SwiftRiver is designed to accomplish three tasks: structure 
unstructured data, conditionally filter and prioritise real time 
content, and provide context, especially location. SwiftRiver 
accomplishes these tasks through applications for natural 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 106. 
77 Meier, “The Problem with Crisis Informatics Research.” 
78 Bock, The Technology of Nonviolence: Social Media and Violence Prevention, 106. 
79 <http://swiftly.org> 
language/artificial intelligence processing, SMS and Twitter data-
mining, and information source verification.”80 
 
Part of the automation developments stem from the tension mentioned earlier 
between the quantity of data and the veracity of data, with analytics and tagging 
being employed in order to automatically compare incoming (unverified) 
information with previous (verified) reports – allowing for some mitigation of the 
accuracy problem. This involves distributed cognition, i.e. the outsourcing of 
calculative processes to some sort of technology. In this case, the initial analysis of 
the accuracy of a new piece of information is being automated and judged by a 
piece of software rather than a human user. This is not to discount the continued 
role of individuals in verifying information though, as other features of this 
software include a simple voting system that allows users to collectively judge 
accuracy. Other systems are looking to automate the process of translation, 
bypassing the expensive and relatively rare resource of human translators.81 Yet this 
automation brings its own biases in, as most machine translation has been focused 
on dominant languages and languages in developed countries (where economic 
incentives exist to develop the translation algorithm).82 As a result, developing 
countries and minority languages suffer from less effective automated translation 
processes. 
Further developments allow for this data analysis to be combined with 
software that automatically determines the location focused on by news stories, as 
well as sentiment analysis which monitors emerging trends in news stories and user 
reports. Other technical advances are automating the categorization of incoming 
reports, and the translation of material as well.83 Bayesian modelling is being 
employed in order to automatically sort incoming information, and categorise it 
according to the type of event under discussion.84 All of these technical 
developments are applications of statistical techniques that uncover otherwise 
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imperceptible patterns in the real-time flow of data. With this automation, crisis 
mapping is not simply a replacement of existing human capacities, nor is it 
reducible to human interpretations of it. Instead, crisis mapping is an independent 
factor in its own right which is now altering how crisis situations are perceived and 
responded to. It is transforming the sociotechnical assemblages of humanitarian 
crises. 
Yet this overcoming of incoming data frictions creates its own significant 
computational frictions in crisis mapping: the need to have accurate and quick 
information versus the computational demands of analysing this data. Techniques 
like machine learning, natural language parsers, automated translation, semantic 
analysis, etc. all require intensive levels of computation (or do not even exist yet).85 
In the Haitian situation, obsolete browsers, old computers, and even the internet 
usage policies of humanitarian organisations, all fundamentally constrained how 
crisis mapping could be used.86 A further tension exists within the balance between 
computing power (of smartphones, for instance) and battery power.87 While 
computing power has increased exponentially, battery power remains a 
fundamental constraint. Increasing the former means decreasing the latter – an 
important consideration for areas with widespread power outages. The 
combination of outdated technology, with the demands of some of the new 
automated features will form one of the key tensions for further development in 
crisis mapping. 
A current trend in developments though is towards incorporating 
additional mechanisms for generating a clearer picture of crisis. For instance, 
recent research has used mobile phone data to track population movements in the 
wake of crisis situations. Initial estimates suggest a real-time accuracy that surpasses 
existing methods of tracking data and that can match up to reconstructive surveys 
after the crisis.88 However, such methods of data collection include notable political 
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biases insofar as they underestimate the movements of those without mobile 
phones (youth, the elderly, and the poor).89 
With the advances made possible by this technological platform, crisis mapping 
software is increasingly being employed by a variety of actors in humanitarian crises 
in order to extend their cognitive capacities. Unlike climate modelling (which 
makes nonlinear complex systems intelligible) and financial modelling (which 
created a general equivalent to simplify a variety of market transactions), crisis 
mapping primarily extends cognition by aggregating, sorting, and analysing mass 
amounts of real-time data. 
 In the midst of a crisis situation, information is one of the most significant 
resources. While the traditional problem has been the dearth of information and 
the effort necessary to recover some overarching view, today the problem is of the 
abundance of information and the effort necessary to filter this incoming real-time 
stream into actionable knowledge. While crisis mapping remains relatively new in 
comparison to the other representational technologies in this thesis, it is 
nevertheless already showing a consistent shift towards greater automation, towards 
wider informational inputs, and towards mitigating the material frictions involved 
in computation. 
 As both the computational infrastructure expands (via diffusion of mobile 
technology and eventually smartphones) and as the social habits of inputting data 
via social media are incorporated (a process well underway in developed countries), 
crisis mapping’s data requirements and frictions are consistently growing. 
Increasing automation is the likely result, with a number of recent experiments 
highlighting the possibilities. The combination of machine learning algorithms 
along with monitoring of internet and infrastructure data has been demonstrated 
to be capable of alerting international organisations about troop movements in 
conflict zones as well as violations of ceasefire agreements. “In this way, rapid 
deductive cycles made possible through technology can contribute to rapid 
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inductive cycles in which short-term predictions have meaningful results for actors 
on the ground.”90 Similarly, post hoc studies of the Haitian earthquake showed that 
the 2010 cholera outbreak could have been detected significantly earlier via 
analytics of the large quantity of social media data.91 Such incipient developments 
in the computational realm are likely to continue transforming the ways in which 
crises are perceived by actors. The data frictions involved in the rise of big data for 
humanitarian situations are being slowly overcome through developments upon 
the computational platform. 
Yet for all these technological advancements, problems still exist in 
translating ‘sensing into shaping’, as actionable information is not always 
employed.92 The collection of data is progressing quickly, and the analysis of such 
data is rapidly following on this progress, yet the take up of this information by 
relevant actors often still remains within its infancy.93 Nevertheless, a number of 
examples show how this technology is already being employed to generate shifts in 
how crises are perceived – by both international organisations and by crisis-affected 
communities themselves. 
In outlining the main effects that this representational technology is having, one 
must distinguish between two groups. The first is the institutional perspective: how 
humanitarian organisations are employing this cognitive adjunct in their 
operations. The second is the local community’s perspective: how crisis mapping is 
shifting their perceptions of the crisis they find themselves in. For the former, crisis 
mapping is primarily about the production of situational awareness for their 
organisations – a (potentially) real-time overview of the crisis. For the latter, crisis 
mapping primarily changes their perception of the crisis by allowing them to 
extricate themselves out of their local situatedness, and take a wider and common 
perspective on the crisis. Crisis mapping here allows for stigmergic behaviour: the 
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ways in which “actors can affect the behaviour of other members of the community 
through the traces that their activities leave in shared artefacts”94 – in this case, the 
collectively produced representation of the crisis situation. As a rapidly evolving 
technology, there is also the future potential for crisis mapping to take on 
predictive functions. The example of Ushahidi’s use in the wake of the Haitian 
earthquake will illustrate where these future developments may head. 
The primary novel capacity of crisis mapping, and its deployment by emerging 
cognitive assemblages, is to generate situational awareness of an ongoing crisis. As 
one researcher aptly describes it, 
 
“Ushahidi’s technology can be used by organisations to map what is 
happening, not unlike what one sees in World War II movies, where 
generals smoke cigars and pipes and push what appear to be toy 
tanks, planes, and ships to different locations on huge map tables as 
their strategy evolves over time. Ushahidi provides a digital version 
of such a map table, but it works even better in combining textual 
information with pictures and videos, along with an ability to 
communicate quickly with large groups of people who submitted the 
information posted onto the map.”95 
 
In achieving this, crisis mapping makes use of a number of tools of 
cartographic visualisation in order to make a wide variety of knowledge available to 
the user at a glance. Techniques like query (where clicking on something leads to 
more information), reexpression (allowing the user to alter what information 
appears according to categories like medicine or violence), and linking (where non-
spatial graphics are attached to objects), have all been employed in crisis maps.96 
These tools help generate the subtleties of situational awareness, which is 
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increasingly mediated by computer representations – and the visual interfaces of 
crisis maps.97 As was shown earlier, at least some organisations are already altering 
their internal structures in order to take into account the influx of data coming 
from crisis mapping.98 
Crisis mapping’s effects are not only technical but also shaping possible 
behaviours.99 For instance, the clearer the information about relief work is, the 
easier it is to maintain the humanitarian principle of neutrality by clarifying how 
aid is being distributed. (This is a problem even in the response to natural disasters, 
since there are always existing political divisions in these areas.) The entire logistical 
chain can be made more efficient by having a clearer sense of the different roles 
and needs required. In addition, the information also assists with donors and the 
media – making it more transparent how relief is being distributed. 
This raises the important issue (to be discussed more in the concluding 
chapter) that crisis mapping, in its visual form, elides representational and non-
representational functions. A crisis map purports to provide an accurate image of 
an on-going crisis, yet these maps are also social and political by virtue of being 
constructed in such a decentralised manner. This tension gets partially played out, 
as was shown earlier, in discussions over the validity and accuracy of incoming 
data. Particularly when crisis mapping is employed in the midst of conflicts, there 
are serious political concerns about data-gathering, accuracy, and manipulation. 
Lastly, these crisis maps are making possible not only the spatial analysis of 
disasters, but also the temporal analysis as well. By representing the information in 
these novel visual forms, they are making it easier to discern the patterns involved 
in crises and thereby making it easier to prepare and respond to future crises.100 
Different temporal representations in Ushahidi, for instance, have focused on 
selecting particular slices of time to present simultaneously, and on providing a 
dynamic movie-like overview of the entire crisis. 
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In both its organisational adoption, and its use by crisis-affected communities, 
crisis mapping extends cognition as well by carrying out a stigmergic function: “the 
phenomenon of indirect communication mediated by modifications of the 
environment”.101 In particular, crisis mapping provides a shared – and importantly, 
modifiable – geographical representation around which actors can coordinate, 
plan, and communicate information. Through this cognitive extension, crisis 
mapping provides the medium for the creation of ‘virtual organisations’102 which 
are effectuated primarily via some form of online mediation. These maps 
“‘function as an interface or index to additional information’ in a way that 
facilitates an up-to-date, dynamic, and interactive presentation and dissemination 
of geospatial data to many more users at a minimal cost.”103 
Whereas the production of situational awareness primarily assists 
organisations in managing humanitarian logistics, the stigmergic functions of crisis 
mapping assist local communities as well. Sociological research on crises has found 
that in these situations, individuals will converge together for a variety of reasons – 
ranging from assistance to curiosity to anxiety.104 In many ways, crisis mapping is 
supplementing this often physical convergence with a digital convergence online. 
Crisis mapping establishes the material conditions for a shared awareness of a 
situation.105 With this spatial representation available, crisis mapping software 
becomes about self-organising coordination amongst a large group of dispersed 
actors. It alters existing behaviours by providing a platform for this coordination, 
via the construction of shared representations. 
Communities can and have used these maps for real-time, collective 
problem solving. One study of a post-crisis situation found social media was crucial 
for individuals to ascertain and become aware of the immediate situation they 
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found themselves in.106 While crisis mapping was not specifically involved in this 
situation, similar functions of collating and organising information were employed. 
After the immediate effects, social media was then used to solve various problems, 
particularly related to the sequencing of events and discerning information about 
various people involved in the crisis.107 
Crisis mapping is therefore creating new possible behaviours by shifting 
away from typical top-down humanitarian assistance and towards ground-level self-
organised assistance.108 Individuals within the affected communities can be 
matched up with medical resources nearby, with food and energy supplies lost in 
the confusion of a crisis, and with family members and friends who have been 
separated by the crisis. With crisis mapping information usually available 
publically, there is a new resource for those in the midst of the crisis to organise 
themselves. Rather than information traveling up from those on the ground to 
those at the highest levels of humanitarian groups, with crisis mapping information 
travels horizontally amongst the community members. Crisis mapping can also 
close the circle between sender and receiver by allowing coordinators to send out 
information to those who subscribe to its free service via text, email or RSS feeds.109 
At the same time, many crisis maps are made public online and can be visited by 
any interested parties. 
Despite some early difficulties and after some initial hesitations, there has been a 
quick acceptance by humanitarian agencies of the role of crisis mapping in 
providing information. By the time of the Libyan uprising, requests for crisis 
mapping were coming from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) itself.110 Crisis maps have also been used to prioritise the use of 
resources, as well as to map out possible health centres in the midst of disasters like 
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the Haiti and Japanese earthquakes.111 Software similar to Ushahidi was employed 
for disaster relief after Hurricane Sandy, giving organisers a real-time overview of 
the situation which allowed them to efficiently send out volunteers to help where 
they were most needed.112 Over 150,000 crowdsourced photos were used by the US 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to aid in relief efforts.113 The 
added value of crisis mapping as seen by these humanitarian agencies comes from 
the capacities it permits for communication and coordination in the midst of a 
crisis. 
To date, the most extensive and significant use made of Ushahidi and crisis 
mapping software was in the wake of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The quake 
measured 7.0 on the Richter scale and is estimated to have killed over 300,000 
people, with it affecting a total of 3 million people. In the days after, Ushahidi 
provided the only map which aggregated incoming information – making it a key 
technology for generating a representation of the crisis.114 This role was made 
possible in part by the infrastructure that remained standing: 70-80% of mobile 
phone towers, and over 70% of the population owned a mobile.115 It should be 
made clear that Ushahidi played a role alongside many other actors, but it had a 
particularly visible presence in the relief efforts (including praise from the then US 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton).116 Most of the incoming texts were handled 
through the separate Mission 4636, and only a portion of these reports were ever 
placed on the crisis map.117 Throughout the course of the immediate crisis, 40-
60,000 reports were passed through the overall crowdsourced information system 
(which included a number of other initiatives), with about 3,500 reports ultimately 
being placed geographically on the Ushahidi crisis map.118 
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The Haitian crisis provides a good example though since as well as being 
the largest deployment of the technology, it is also the most thoroughly studied 
case. The aim here is to draw upon this research and examine how the 
representations of crisis mapping are being integrated in practice. The evidence 
from various studies points to crisis mapping being incorporated into 
humanitarian organisations as a means for situational awareness at the upper 
levels, rather than as a rapid response to immediate events in the field.119 Both the 
US military and smaller NGOs were known to have used the maps to strategically 
determine the best areas to place their resources, but individual reports from the 
crisis map were not used as frequently.120 The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, for 
instance, requested Ushahidi's assistance in pinpointing coordinates,121 and the US 
Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) stated that it “provided the 
most comprehensive and up-to-date information available to the humanitarian 
community.”122 It was used to map out possible health centres in the midst of the 
disaster,123 and crowdsourced crisis maps became “the de facto source for Haiti map 
data within most UN agencies and the EC Humanitarian Unit.”124 As these 
examples demonstrate, responders looking for the broad overview of the situation 
found the maps highly useful. For these situational awareness purposes, 
“Visualisation was a key aspect. [For instance, t]he clustering of reports on the map 
closely matched the mandate of the Marines to identity centres of gravity.”125 The 
significance of this is that crisis mapping was being used precisely as a cognitive 
adjunct – a technological means to provide situational awareness of local 
conditions which was otherwise unavailable. While the evidence remains 
anecdotal, the independent report on Ushahidi’s use in Haiti also found that those 
involved believed that crisis mapping did directly help save lives.126 
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This is not to say that the construction of a cognitive assemblage was 
smooth or without problems. A lack of standardisation between the event data on 
the crisis maps and the event data typically used by humanitarian organisations was 
a primary barrier to fully integrating these technologies into a cognitive 
assemblage.127 The types of information were often simply incompatible, though 
the crisis mapping team did attempt to accommodate this during the crisis. 
Translation remained difficult as well, though Ushahidi appeared to have served a 
productive function in that regard. The software was used to translate messages 
between the multiple languages being used by civilians and emergency workers. 
This representational technology made possible the quick mobilisation of 
translators who were effective enough that “the average turn-around from a 
message arriving in Kreyòl to it being translated, categorised, geolocated and 
streamed back to the responders was 10 minutes.”128 Geolocating texts remained 
another hurdle in Haiti because at times mobile providers or users did not supply 
information about where a text had been sent. In response, crisis mappers 
successfully used the social networks of Haitians in order to calculate where texts 
had come from.129 
Finally, highlighting the future of crisis mapping, mobile phones were used 
to track patterns of migration after the earthquake had devastated the country. 
This phone data was used not only to track migration after the earthquake, but also 
to assist in deciding where and how to distribute medicine after a cholera 
outbreak.130 After the crisis, research on 1.9 million mobile phone users in Haiti 
found that the mobility patterns after the crisis were highly predictable when one 
knew normal travel habits.131 Combining this data with crisis mapping can and will 
allow future deployments of the cognitive assemblage to provide an even more in-
depth look at the dynamics of the crisis. 
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This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the emerging cognitive assemblages 
being built by the humanitarian community. In many ways, crisis mapping 
embodies the transformations occurring here: the shift to decentralised 
information-gathering, the rising use of mobile phones and social media, the 
growing glut of usable data, and the adoption of technologies to sort, analyse, and 
spatially represent all this in an actionable interface. In Haiti, these cognitive 
assemblages saw their first significant – if tentative – deployment, and ad hoc use 
was made of these technologies by a variety of actors.  
Crisis mapping is also part of an ongoing transformation in 
humanitarianism to a decentralised form of information-gathering (akin to the 
volatility shift in finance, and the adaptation shift in climate modelling). At least 
some humanitarian organisations have shifted their internal structures in order to 
better process the flood of information coming from crisis mapping.132 One of the 
major ongoing developments is a process of standardization, with attempts to bring 
together all the sources and users of humanitarian information into a common 
framework. Further attempts at institutionalisation and professionalisation include 
the creation of a volunteer taskforce for crisis mapping, with established skills and 
experience in dealing with the information. Others have called for a metadata 
standard, which would allow data from various crises and sources to be more easily 
compared and used.133 This is all in an attempt to overcome ‘information 
fragmentation’ – the gaps, inconsistencies, and lack of communication that exist 
between different information repositories.134 
This transformation of crisis management is extending to the United 
Nations system as well, where the UN Secretary-General has put forth a plan for a 
Global Impact and Vulnerability Alert System (GIVAS) which would construct a 
“system that provides decision makers with real-time information and analysis to 
ensure that responses to global crises take appropriate account of the needs of the 
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most vulnerable populations.”135 These monitoring and early-warning functions are 
intended to be supplemented with a crisis management system, the Emergency 
Preparedness Information Centre (EPIC), which mimics in many ways the 
functions of crisis mapping. Its aims are to aggregate a wide variety of data (real-
time and structural) and present them in “a single place that will present decision 
makers with a simple and efficient way to access all operational emergency 
information.”136 
While it is only in the initial stages, these developments all show that 
humanitarian organisations are turning themselves into cognitive assemblages 
which use technological adjuncts to expand their capacities to perceive a crisis. The 
future only points towards a solidification of these tendencies and the creation of 
more stable and professional cognitive assemblages. 
Yet as the critical geographer John Pickles reminds us, 
 
“What is geography if it is not the drawing and interpreting of a line? 
And what is the drawing of that line if it is not also the creation of 
new objects? Which lines we draw, how we draw them, the effects 
they have, and how they change are crucial questions.”137 
 
Every drawing of a line, every production of a map, is not only a representation, 
but also a pragmatic injunction with political biases. There remain, as with every 
technological representation, political and technical choices about the source of 
the input data. These range from public data, private and commercial data, 
journalistic information, and crowdsourced data.138 Public data often involves more 
scientific and standardised information. The resources of the state can provide 
both the means to produce scientific data, and the capacity to impose a standard 
on information formats. Private and commercial data often tends towards more 
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frequent and specialised information, while crowdsourced information is more 
amenable to real-time interactive data. The choice between these information 
sources carries its own implicit political decisions. Other users have raised concerns 
about the technology over-representing not only those with mobile phones, but 
also those who know about the service.139 
Furthermore, what this geographical mode of visualisation particularly 
leaves out are the structural relations between different entities in a crisis situation 
(especially significant in conflicts). In this regard, the choice to focus on spatial 
information is at the expense of network information.140 These latter forms of 
visualisations would “give additional information about indirect ties (e.g. enemies 
of enemies), density, complexity, and structure of the actors’ network 
environment.”141 There is also the constant threat of intentional manipulation of 
crisis maps in order to further political ends. Rumours and inaccurate information, 
for instance, have been shown to contribute to increased violence in past crises – 
the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya was partly fuelled by radio broadcasts 
announcing false information, and similar spoiler effects occur in many conflict 
situations.142 
Despite these technical and political challenges, this chapter has attempted 
to show that the humanitarian community is coming to realise the significance of 
generating a geographical representation of ongoing crises. Such technologically 
produced entities allow actors to gain situational awareness and make possible a 
variety of new capacities. The next chapter turns away from the details of the case 
studies in these previous three chapters, and steps back to draw out some general 
conclusions about the politics of cognitive assemblages, and about the changing 
nature of power with regard to such technologies. 
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“Technology is the source of our options. Options are the 
basis of a future that keeps us above the level of pawns. 
Those who condemn technology, properly applied, 
eliminate our options. They commit the worst of all 
pollutions – the pollution of our future."1 
 
-Krafft Ehriche 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
In its case studies, this thesis has concerned itself with a specific subset of 
technology – namely, the material technologies that are being used to think about 
complex situations. Yet the most important effects of these technologies will only 
be felt by a wider perspective – in the sociotechnical systems that are becoming 
ubiquitous aspects of contemporary life. In this regard, the case studies reveal 
particular condensations of much broader and more dispersed trends; trends which 
appear bound to continue. Even over the course of researching this work, new 
cognitive assemblages have been constantly introduced by government agencies. 
Technology is increasingly intertwined with cognition and politics, and this 
tendency is only continuing to accelerate. 
In this concluding chapter we intend to step back from the technical details 
of the individual case studies and attempt a synoptic view of what these 
developments might mean. This thesis began with the problem of cognitive 
mapping: how does an individual situate themselves conceptually in the midst of a 
complex system? The answer proposed was that it is technology which allows 
individuals to accomplish this by becoming a necessary adjunct to our internal 
cognitive processes. On one level, this is banal – electronic calculators, for instance, 
have been used for decades now in order to solve problems that evade our inherent 
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mathematical talents. Technology simply is an adjunct to humans (indeed, the two 
have co-evolved throughout history). Yet what is occurring now is different in at 
least two ways: one is that these new technologies are now capable of modelling 
dynamic and complex global systems for the first time in human history. As the 
case studies have attempted to show, these technologies are providing 
representations of these cognitively intractable systems in such a way that they 
become amenable to our finite abilities for thought and action. Secondly, these 
technologies are being massively diffused throughout the social fabric. They are 
beginning to emerge everywhere – ranging from the grand supercomputing of 
climate change models to the mobile phone app that tracks a social network. Our 
phenomenology of the world is increasingly being mediated by these digital 
representations and this pervasiveness is itself a novel phenomenon. The 
problematic to be examined in this concluding chapter can therefore be articulated 
as what are the likely consequences of off-loading and expanding thought processes 
about complex global systems into machines? And what are the consequences if the 
global can only be made intelligible via digital representations? And what does it 
mean for world politics if the ways we think about global problems are increasingly 
filtered through a computational medium? 
In their own way, each of the case studies has attempted to outline how 
these representational technologies are situated in larger cognitive assemblages, 
how the materiality of technology acts as a platform for society and a platform for 
technological development, and how these technologies are constructing new 
modes of perception, cognition, and action. With climate change modelling, major 
material frictions emerge with the significant computational and data requirements 
of the GCMs. Yet on the basis of this infrastructure, new ways of seeing nature 
have been constructed and new political practices have been made possible. The 
ability to see long-term climate changes at local levels has made adaptation policies 
a much more opportune political choice. With financial modelling frictions arise 
between the speed requirements and the complex mathematics employed to model 
options markets. The spread of derivatives valuation models has however 
constructed the possibility of seeing markets in terms of volatility, and has made 
possible a variety of new financial engineering that has opened up the space for 
new behaviours in the markets. In particular, the capacity to see volatility has 
created an entire market devoted to this theoretically derived variable, and new 
modes of hedging market positions have emerged as a result. Lastly, with crisis 
mapping software the major material frictions have arisen between the speed 
demands of the software and the computational limitations of mobile technology. 
However, despite the relatively recent emergence of this technology, it has been 
quickly recognised as an important means to seeing crises in real-time. This 
overarching perspective on various crises has allowed humanitarian organisations 
to generate situational awareness of the crisis, and for affected communities to use 
stigmergic coordination to mobilise their own relief efforts in a decentralised 
fashion. 
A shift to new climate change policies; a transformation of financial 
speculation; and a move to decentralising relief efforts – all of these demonstrate 
ways in which representational technologies are orienting specifically political 
possibilities in the world today. These technologies do not simply alter behavioural 
landscapes, but instead exert a facilitating force on the ways in which political 
worlds of environmental policy, financial markets, and humanitarian relief are 
practiced. 
The remainder of this chapter attempts to draw out some generalisable 
propositions about the political implications of representational technologies and 
cognitive assemblages more generally. The next section outlines a brief historical 
narrative of different global technologies. While recognizing the overlapping and 
co-existing nature of these different technological types, it is nevertheless argued 
that they can be productively periodised according to which technology is 
dominant at a particular time. The third section argues for a first political quality 
of these technologies: their capacity to expand and alter possible behaviors and 
thoughts. The three case studies examined in this thesis are used as illustrations of 
how representational technology can change political actors’ abilities to represent, 
augment, and respond to events. The fourth section demonstrates a second 
political quality of these technologies – their ability to obscure and highlight 
different aspects of the world via both (invisible) algorithms and (visible) interfaces. 
Lastly, the final section concludes by examining the distinct role that 
representational technologies are being used for in order to construct macro-actors 
and construct conduits of power. 
It was shown in Chapter 2 that IR as a discipline has largely ignored technology as 
an independent factor in world politics, yet in practice world politics and 
technology have interacted in a number of significant ways. Drawing upon this 
existing literature – both in IR and elsewhere – these interactions can be 
schematised in three broad and overlapping waves that each contribute to 
materially constructing the global: connection, destruction, and representation. 
While the types of technologies overlap and co-exist, their relative prominence in 
each period allows us to draw out a broad schema. In the contemporary world, 
with connective technologies having already established a closed system,2 and the 
utility of destructive technologies in a period of relative decline, it is representative 
technologies which appear to be quickly rising in significance. 
The first era of global technology emerges properly in the nineteenth century with 
the rise of connective technologies. This refers to the capacities available to move 
goods, people, and information around the world.3 As with the other technological 
eras, what was crucial here was not just the quantitative shift between earlier 
connective technologies and the contemporaneous ones. More important was the 
qualitative shift invoked by these quantitative advances: these technologies passed 
crucial thresholds of usability which allowed European empires to connect their 
territories in significantly new global ways. In principle (and in practice), societies 
had been capable of trading goods around the world for some hundreds of years 
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before the nineteenth century. Even by the thirteenth century, the Eurasia region 
was nearly spanned by a series of regional trading subsystems connected at their 
edges.4 Yet what shifted during the nineteenth century was the level of usability – 
the costs (economic or otherwise) associated with such connections were 
significantly reduced to a point where connection took off. 
This connective capacity meant, above all else, the capacity to transport 
goods and people. Paradigmatic among these technologies was the invention of the 
steam engine which made possible the rise of steamships and railroads. Steamships 
provided a new capacity to travel inland and upstream into Africa and Asia, setting 
the logistical basis for the imperialism of the nineteenth century.5 While ocean-
faring steamships remained unworkable for some time, areas such as the 
Mississippi River and the Ganges River were quickly populated with steamships 
travelling up and down them. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 drastically 
increased the connective capacity across the world system, as steamships became 
considerably more usable in the Europe-Asia route. Similar diffusion of 
technologies occurred with the railroad systems. Locomotives emerged in 1814 and 
by the end of the century over 800,000 kilometres of railroads had been planted 
around the world.6 All of these technologies played a major permissive role in the 
expansion of the European imperialism (and the British Empire in particular), with 
a number of cases being built explicitly for controlling the territory.7 All together, 
these technologies are estimated to have reduced travelling times by 80% over the 
course of the century, making travel accessible to a much wider audience than ever 
before.8 
Yet it was not just the connection of physical objects, but also informational 
content, that was important for this time.9 Particularly significant here was “the 
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separation of information from paper for the purposes of transporting it.”10 In this 
regard, the nineteenth century saw the invention of the telegraph and submarine 
cables which made possible the ability to communicate easily and quickly over vast 
distances.11 As one historian writes, 
 
“The rapid spread of the telegraph (carrying commercial 
information, especially prices) and the steamship (at first mainly for 
mail and passengers) helped to unify the whole vast region from the 
Mississippi to the Urals from the 1830s and ‘40s onward.”12 
 
By the 1860s, Europe was connected with India and China by telegraph as 
well.13 Over the course of the century, the speed of communication between Britain 
and India had dropped from approximately 5-8 months to the same day.14 
Lastly, there were the technologies which opened up the capacity specifically 
for humans to travel into novel territories. This was the technology which 
mitigated the extremes of different environments. Much like the spacesuit made it 
possible for humans to establish a route to the moon in the twentieth century, so 
too did medicine like quinine make the interiors of Africa possible to traverse by 
Europeans in the nineteenth century.15 Until this point, the inland expansion of 
European imperialism had been greatly hampered by the various strands of 
malaria, making attempts to connect with these areas a virtual suicide mission. The 
discovery of quinine and the procedure for its effective use significantly expanded 
the habitable area for European imperialism to travel within.16 
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These three forms of technology – transportation, information, and 
environmental – all contributed to a major increase in the connective capacities of 
the nineteenth century world. 
The second era of global technologies overlapped with the first, but emerged 
primarily in the twentieth century with the newly developed capacities for 
destruction across the globe.17 As opposed to the constructive technologies of the 
earlier era, these technologies were solely means to enact violence on people and 
infrastructures around the world. Moreover, these destructive technologies no 
longer relied as heavily on existing connective technologies to traverse the globe. In 
the previous era, destructive capacities such as soldiers and gunboats could be 
transported around the world (given enough time) but only by following 
constructed paths (e.g. railroads) and natural paths (e.g. riverways). In this new era, 
destructive technologies were separated from this connective foundation and began 
to act directly as global technologies in themselves. 
The most obvious of these technologies was the nuclear bomb, which 
heralded the possibility of immediate and devastating destruction around the 
world. In terms of the global violence, just as significant as its pure destructive 
power was the speed and range with which it could be launched around the world. 
Its mere existence shifted the strategy of security from mobilisation to deterrence.18 
The importance of a front in a war declined as nuclear bombs could be delivered 
across national boundaries and frontlines. As important as the nuclear bomb 
though, was the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) which made possible its 
ability to traverse the globe. The V-2 rocket of WWII heralded this new approach 
to warfare, and its use against Britain demonstrated the novel capacity to wreak 
devastation across increasingly large expanses.19 The continued development of 
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missile technology (combined with the driving force of the Cold War) soon led to 
the first proper ICBM and the subsequent envelopment of the entire world within 
striking distance of the superpowers.20 While the ICBM was arguably a 
transportation technology, it broke free of the need to rely on artificial and natural 
pathways and could immediately be delivered to any space. At this point, the global 
had not only been constructed via connective infrastructures, but also by 
destructive capacities. 
Thus, whereas the earlier connective age had heightened the interactive and 
constructive possibilities between different areas of the world, the new destructive 
era made it possible for violence to be dealt across the globe without the medium 
of a connective technology. 
Today sees the surfacing of a new era of global technologies – the representational 
technologies which have been the focus of this thesis. As has been demonstrated, 
they represent large-scale complex phenomena by employing sophisticated models 
to track and generate a representation of the system in question. Unlike the earlier 
industrial technologies that operated primarily on nature, these technologies tend 
to operate immediately on culture – on texts, images and other representations.21 
As the focus of this thesis, three technologies have been taken as emblematic of 
this representational era: general circulation models, option pricing models, and 
crisis mapping software. Each of them in their own way models and produces a 
human-sized representation of a complex global phenomenon. To be sure, 
representational technologies have played important roles prior to the twenty-first 
century.22 Modern maps, for instance, arose in fifteenth and sixteenth century 
Europe23 and went on to play a significant role in articulating and forming the basis 
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for territorial authorities in the early modern era.24 Yet truly global and accurate 
representations remained obscure for some time. As late as 1774, for instance, the 
most sophisticated maps in existence still referred to Alaska as an island.25 In 
addition, contemporary representational technologies distinguish themselves from 
previous technology by introducing new possibilities of mapping dynamic and 
complex global phenomena. Such technologies find no parallel in the early modern 
era. Most significantly though, today’s representational technologies are capable of 
being manipulated in a wide variety of ways, thereby allowing individuals to 
experiment and reason with them.26 They here take on the characteristics of an 
extended cognitive system, and begin to augment individual and institutional 
capacities for thinking and perceiving. 
The origins of the contemporary shift can be seen to have developed out of 
the demands of the Cold War, the requirements of industrialised economies, and 
the cybernetic revolution of the time.27 It was the Vietnam War which saw the use 
of one of the first real-time computer-mediated representations of a warzone.28 Here 
was a situation where computers were being used not simply to calculate, but 
instead to act as a perception on a complex situation. Sensors were placed along 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail (disguised as natural artefacts) and used to track 
movement, sound, body heat, and distinct odours. All of this data was filtered into 
a computer system and predictions were automatically generated about the future 
path of the abstract entity that appeared on the operators’ screens. It did not, in 
other words, construct the system in question – but it provided a representation of 
it that had been unavailable before the rise of the technology. 
Today’s global representations follow in the path set by these military 
applications – yet they are both quantitative and qualitative differences from these 
immediate predecessors. In the first place, they are simply significantly more 
accurate: in their explanations of past events, in their tracking of real-time events, 
and in their forecasting of future events. While earlier systems had authority solely 
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by virtue of being labelled ‘scientific’ approaches, the contemporary models often 
have a long track record of success to back up these claims. In addition, early 
representational technologies remained almost entirely tied to static formations 
and simple systems. It is only with the late twentieth century that the capacities to 
represent dynamic, complex, and nonlinear systems start to emerge in widespread 
ways. Finally, there is the emerging trend of ‘big data’ – where massive new datasets 
allow for a transition from deductive models to inductive inferences, i.e. from 
modelled assumptions to empirical data. 
In summary, the era of global representational technology is the latest in a 
series of global technologies. Whereas the first era made possible the construction 
of a truly global world, the second made possible its destruction, and it is the 
contemporary era which is beginning to make possible its widespread 
representation. 
With the increasing ubiquity of representational technologies, two broad political 
implications emerge. This section examines the first of these (the expansion of 
possible thoughts and actions), while the next section will highlight the second 
political aspect (the implicit and explicit biases built into digital representations). 
As has been shown, technology determines society not by making specific outcomes 
or behaviours or social formations inevitable; instead it determines the general 
landscape of possible actions and thoughts that actors are capable of carrying out. 
The focus in this section is therefore to supplement the diverse literature on how 
quantification and similar forms of technical representation help to govern and 
regulate people and things,29 with a focus on how digital representations determine 
the behavioural landscape in particular ways. This section will draw upon the case 
studies to illustrate that digital representations have three functions which form the 
basis for expanding the behavioural landscape: their primary function as (1) 
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representational, and two supplementary functions as (2) augmentative, and (3) 
pragmatic. While not every representational technology participates in every aspect 
to the same degree, the scope of the new capacities being made available can be 
suggested through these examples. 
The most obvious function of representational technologies is to represent some 
entity or system in the world, and in this regard, contemporary technologies are 
greatly expanding what it is possible to represent.30 The case studies have shown 
that nonlinear systems, massive datasets, obscure correlations, and newly 
quantifiable social interactions are all expressions of this expanded capacity to 
represent the world in knowledge. These tools are subsequently being used in order 
to construct new objects, subjects, and relationships for manipulation.31 With these 
emerging conceptual objects in knowledge, emerge new political possibilities to act 
upon those entities. Not merely to regulate or govern them, but also to shape them, 
intervene in them, interact with them, and support them. As representational 
technologies expand to encompass these new areas, they are simultaneously 
expanding the realms which actors can have control over. Insofar as politics is the 
art of shaping and controlling others, these representational technologies are 
producing the political via expanding what it is possible to shape and control. 
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In this regard, the general circulation models used to study climate change 
provide one of the clearest examples of how the representational function of digital 
representations makes new political behaviours possible. Recall that these massive 
and intricate computer models form the material infrastructure for all of our 
knowledge about how the earth’s climate will be modified over the coming 
decades.32 Their successful adoption and use is also almost entirely dependent on 
how well they represent the climate system. While pragmatic and material 
limitations are always necessary considerations, nevertheless the normative goal of 
these particular models is to accurately represent a complex system. As chapter 4 
showed, in the last decade the pursuit of this goal and the technological 
development of GCMs have made local-level forecasting increasingly possible – 
both by incorporating elements of the climate system relevant to the local level, as 
well as by increasing the resolution of the models.33 With this new capacity to 
represent how climate change will affect local levels has come the capacity to react 
and plan for it. In other words, with today’s GCMs, regional and local climate 
adaptation has become a meaningful possibility. The sorts of representational 
knowledge necessary to adequately respond to and adapt to local climate change 
were simply unavailable prior to the development of this technology, despite the 
political desire for it (seen as early as the 1970s).34 The representational function of 
these knowledge producing technologies has been expanded, and with it has come 
an expansion of possible political behaviours. Climate change policy and the 
constraints that actors face up to are partly shaped by the material infrastructure 
which expands the capacity to control, intervene, and manipulate a complex system 
like nature. 
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Since digital representations can generate in addition to representing, they also 
have a supplementary capacity to augment our world with new images. With this 
function, instead of representing something else, they come to fully replace that 
‘something else’. They construct a world, instead of representing a world. In the 
works of Jean Baudrillard and Vilém Flusser, ‘simulation’ and ‘technical images’ 
are taken to efface the classical distinctions between the real and the fake, the true 
and the false, the artificial and the natural.35 Whereas traditional images emerged 
from the depiction of an object, digital images instead operate by creating the 
object itself.36 As Baudrillard famously writes, 
 
“The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is 
nevertheless the map that precedes the territory – precession of 
simulacra – that engenders the territory, and if one must return to 
the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the 
extent of the map.”37 
 
In this ‘hyperreal’ world, the problem is not how to go from the real to modelling 
it in a simulation, but instead how to start from simulation and install a sense of 
the real.38 Rather than represent new objects, subjects, and relationships, the 
augmentative function seeks to create them. 
 With contemporary technologies, the representational function typically has 
primacy over the augmentative function. Yet, the world of option pricing 
demonstrates how this supplementary function operates. As chapter 5 revealed, 
today’s option pricing models seek to generate a perspective on derivatives markets 
in terms of ‘volatility’ – a theoretical entity originally intended as a constant in the 
equations underpinning these models. The vagaries of the markets and traders led 
to this unassuming element in an equation coming to instead be the focus of the 
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option pricing models. Its usefulness in providing a general language with which to 
compare across asset classes, strike prices, and expiry dates, led to volatility become 
a key medium of perception for options markets. Today, while having a tenuous 
basis in a real phenomenon, what options traders are concerned with are primarily 
the visual representations of three-dimensional volatility surfaces and how they 
correspond to the rapidly fluctuating prices on their screens.39 The reality of the 
model is their focus, or in other words, the technology has provided an augmented 
version of the markets. On the basis of this augmentation of financial markets, it 
has become possible to trade and hedge volatility itself – leading to the recent 
creation of a market for products based on the Volatility Index. The VIX, in 
addition, has become a primary indicator of market sentiment, commonly referred 
to in the press as an important gauge of fear.40 The rise of global volatility markets 
finds its condition of possibility in the vision of options markets constructed by the 
various derivative valuation models. Yet throughout this, volatility remains a 
theoretical entity, one found only in the models used by traders. It is a 
construction of models, an augmentation of reality, yet its effects have been 
widespread in allowing a variety of new economic behaviours in global markets. 
 The significance of the augmentation function is therefore to highlight ways 
in which digital representations can have autonomy above and beyond their 
representational functions. Images are projections onto an environment – they are 
not just representations, but also overlays. In this sense, one must reject the ‘digital 
dualist’ thesis which argues that the digital world is in opposition the ‘real’ physical 
world.41 As the augmentation function reveals, they are both real – digital 
representations simply add a new layer to the world. They augment reality by 
constructing new worlds and objects without any necessary reference to a physical 
process. Once one recognises their reality, one also recognises their effects as well. 
For example, once one is informed that gait recognition software codes pacing up 
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and down subway platforms as ‘suspicious’, one is likely to change one’s behaviour 
as a result.42 
The final function of digital representations is their pragmatic function: the ways in 
which representations can encode orders and responses into themselves. Beyond 
just representing a phenomenon, and beyond constructing an augmentation, 
digital representations also do things. “Technical images signify models, 
instructions about the way society should experience, perceive, evaluate, and 
behave.”43 In this way, algorithms can have agency delegated to them; they carry out 
some series of actions.44 Moreover, given a computer-mediated representation, we 
are often predisposed to act in accordance with what it represents – and neglect 
what it does not represent.  
At the most basic level of coding this pragmatic function is embodied in the 
fact that algorithms are instructions.45 As one software theorist succinctly puts it, 
“code is the only language that is executable.”46 While natural language also 
contains orders, the orders of a software code pass directly through the physical 
world without requiring the mediation of a human mind.47 
 At the more intuitive, everyday level, the pragmatic force of digital 
representations can be seen to operate by virtue of ‘order-words’.48 These words “do 
not concern commands only, but every act that is linked to a statement by a ‘social 
obligation’.”49 They are akin to a generalised speech act; a demand made by the 
representation as a result of its being embedded in a social world. They effectuate 
not only transformations in the social standing of that which is modelled (placing 
it under a category, for instance), but also impart demands on the user of the 
model. Insofar as models construct a world, they project a series of behaviours and 
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interactions that would be properly adapted to that world. Even the seemingly 
transparent interface of contemporary technologies shapes the way we act.50 It can 
also include the imperatives of action, particularly in situations with little reaction 
time (as in emergencies). 
 In these regards, crisis mapping software provides a good illustration of this 
function. As was shown, this is software which is being employed to produce real-
time maps of resources, emergencies, and events in crisis situations, thereby giving 
international humanitarian organizations an unprecedented perspective on these 
situations.51 Yet insofar as the representations produced are situated in a social 
context of urgency and finite resources, the crisis maps simultaneously impose 
demands on the humanitarian agencies and individuals using them. These 
demands can range from (relatively rare) cases of immediate emergency needs to 
(more common) cases of situational awareness revealing where resources need to be 
distributed and what may need to be coordinated.52 It is on the basis of these 
representations that crisis mapping software has made it possible for international 
humanitarian agencies to gain an increasingly god’s eye-like perspective on rapidly 
changing crisis situations and to therefore delegate relief workers and resources as 
efficiently and effectively as possible. The massive and difficult effort of getting 
relief agencies into the field to gather information about the disaster situation has 
been greatly simplified by this new representational technology. Simultaneously, 
this technology has opened up new capacities for local individuals affected by a 
disaster to interact with relief agencies, giving new self-organising power to those on 
the ground. While this capacity has existed beforehand, what is novel is the ability 
to do so immediately and with near real-time multi-way communication between 
the relevant actors.53 In particular, crisis mapping provides a shared and – 
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importantly – modifiable geographical representation around which a variety of 
actors can coordinate, plan, and communicate information. 
 In summary, representational technologies have representational, 
augmentative, and pragmatic functions. Any particular technology will combine 
each of these functions to different degrees: for climate modelling, representation 
is primary. For option pricing, augmentation is primary. And for crisis mapping, 
pragmatism can be considered the main purpose. Yet each of them are expanding 
the possible thoughts and actions of what political actors can do, thereby 
demonstrating how technology determines society by shaping behavioural 
landscapes. 
Beyond the explicit shaping of political possibilities, these technologies also come 
with various implicit political consequences – the origin of which can be found in 
digital representation’s augmentative capacity. The model becomes the reality, and 
in doing so, it effaces its representational function and sharpens the force of its 
pragmatic function. This contributes to the immense power of digital 
representations – the global becomes immediately visible via a glance at a screen.54 
Yet is also raises an inevitable problem of the model – the active forgetting of the 
disjuncture between the model and the modelled. This, however, is an aspect 
inherent to digital representations: they require that the processing and 
mechanisms which produce a visual to disappear into the background. A webpage 
which foregrounded the source code, for instance, would be illegible to all but 
specialists. Similarly, a graphical representation of local climate change effects 
would be incomprehensible if it attempted to include every individual data point 
behind it. This section aims to shed light on this obscured quality and highlight 
some of the ways in which the algorithms and interfaces of digital representations 
are encoding political assumptions, values, and demands.55 
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Beyond the superficial appearance of the interface – the visible component of the 
digital representation – lies the software that encodes an algorithm. Algorithms, at 
their most basic, are simply sets of rules to be followed – with an input leading 
deterministically to a corresponding output. At this abstract level, algorithms have 
existed in some form for as long as recorded human history (the Babylonians used 
them in their system of law, for instance).56 Yet today’s algorithms are embedded 
into machines rather than the flesh of a human body, and they are vastly more 
complex than these early algorithms. As one recent summary of the state of 
algorithms puts it, 
 
“[Today], algorithms have already written symphonies as moving as 
those composed by Beethoven, picked through legalese with the 
deftness of a senior law partner, diagnosed patients with more 
accuracy than a doctor, written news articles with the smooth hand 
of a seasoned reporter, and driven vehicles on urban highways with 
far better control than a human.”57 
 
Algorithms now permeate nearly every aspect of our lives, yet most 
attention on the politics of a digital world has been given to the issue of data 
privacy and ensuring the transparency of what information has been collected by 
governments and companies. Much less attention has been paid to its necessary 
correlate: the opaqueness of the algorithms, predictive analytics, and statistical 
work that is turning this raw data into meaningful indicators. This is particularly 
significant as increasing amounts of political decisions are being shaped and even 
made by these obscured sets of technical instructions. 
By definition, “an algorithm selects and reinforces one ordering at the 
expense of another. [As a result,] they affect what can be said and done.”58 
Encapsulated in this quote is the notion that, at their most general level, 
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algorithms are responsible for the translation of raw (and often complex and 
massive) data into amenable representations. They, in other words, form the basis 
for how we know things about complex systems. The algorithms act as the 
mechanisms to produce knowledge from data, making them a form of ‘software 
epistemology’.59 Digital cameras, for instance, have built into themselves algorithms 
to sharpen edges, heighten contrasts, and reduce blurring.60 The image that 
emerges on the screen is not the image that entered into the lens of the camera. 
This small, everyday example encloses within itself the fact that today – via 
algorithms – much of what we take as immediate perception is in fact heavily 
filtered through a particular digital mode of constructing knowledge. While data 
exists essentially as number, its translation into an amenable visual form always 
involves technical, aesthetic, and political choices that are often invisible – and it is 
algorithms where these decisions are being played out. 
Some of these political issues are quite obvious, as with the coding of 
human individuals. Iraqis who self-identified as Iraqi, for instance, were surprised 
to be coded in the US biometric system as Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds.61 While 
categorizing individuals has always occurred (and always been a political gesture), 
the significant difference from previous attempts to collect and analyse data is the 
automation of the procedures now.62 This quantitatively expands the possibilities of 
analysis. Today, “modern data-mining techniques abstract, represent and calculate 
population groups that cannot be observed directly; which may therefore only exist 
in the imagination of the sovereign and the columns of databases.”63 
This is especially prevalent with predictive algorithms in the field of 
security. In these cases, automated learning algorithms hunt through the wealth of 
data available today about the public. Financial transactions, travel patterns, phone 
interactions, goods shipped, and so on, are all examined in an effort to find 
distinctive ‘threat’ patterns.64 Invisible to the human eye, the algorithms alone are 
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capable of finding these patterns within a huge amount of data and visualizing 
them for their human operators. On the basis of this, predictions are made about 
likely future behaviours. And as technologies to disperse this knowledge are 
constructed, the everyday becomes permeated with increasingly constant 
surveillance and analysis. The surveillance of the border is abstracted from its 
particular location and becomes extended to wherever credit cards, mobile phones, 
subway cards, and CCTVs are being used. Algorithms not only make visible 
particular relations, they also act as imperceptible censors. Certain words can be 
automatically filtered, or simply made more difficult to access (try typing a 
profanity into Google and see how few are autocompleted).65 
Algorithms therefore encompass within themselves a number of actions 
that are easily recognised as political: they encode, sort, categorise, calculate, draw 
out patterns, and establish regimes of what is visible and invisible. Most 
significantly, unlike previous classification mechanisms they sort knowledge 
according to engineered principles rather than through expert judgments,66 and 
they do so in an obscured fashion. Yet they remain political through and through, 
even when the representational function dominates in a particular technology.67 
For most actors though, algorithms remain hidden and their interaction with 
digital representations centres on the interface. From this perspective, models turn 
the messy reality of the world into a smooth image. Despite this advantage, the 
gradual adoption of simulations and models into various areas has been met with 
suspicion. Worries continuously arise that such technologies effectively distance 
the user from the reality of the phenomenon, by leaving the mediating steps 
opaque.68 Users rarely know precisely how the models work, let alone how the 
hardware works or the physics of computer screens and processors. As a result, the 
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inevitable errors, simplifications, limits, and biases of the mediating model are left 
obscure. Yet the black-boxing of computer models is a necessary step. The 
advantage and limitation of digital representation is that it black-boxes such 
intermediary steps, allowing human cognition to extend chains of inferences 
beyond what is possible with the naked mind. 
The risk is that digital images distance the viewer from the effects which are 
not modelled. One can know perfectly well on an abstract level that the model is 
imperfect, yet still be persuaded by the constructed reality on the screen. Despite 
the acknowledgement that machines make errors, that the simulations are not real, 
and that garbage in means garbage out, digital representations still take on a reality 
of their own whereby the appear more real than what they are supposed to 
represent.69 Precision can be mistaken for validity, and the digital model mistaken 
for the reality.70 Debates over the distributional effects of climate change have 
sometimes hinged on whether a particular factor is included in the general 
circulation model.71 Architects have made major engineering errors by mistaking 
the simulated image for the reality of the project.72 In our era of nuclear test bans 
and highly sophisticated simulations of nuclear explosions, the sense of the 
destruction wrought by these weapons is being lost in a flurry of flashy interactive 
simulations of molecular constituents.73 In the financial world, the demands for 
tractable probability distributions (and not the ‘monstrous’ probability 
distributions that Benoit Mandelbrot discovered) and usable technologies meant 
that the long tail of risks were erased from the models’ outputs.74 In crisis mapping, 
the technical questions of how data is verified lead to different representations of 
the situation – representations that can be manipulated by parties with a desire to 
confuse international humanitarian agencies. And perhaps the most pertinent 
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example is the widespread ignorance of a coming financial crisis by the economic 
mainstream.75 A reliance on general equilibrium models and an absence in 
modelling the effects of banks on the credit system meant that the most popular 
economic models all failed to forecast a coming crisis. 
In response to these tendencies to mistake the model for the modelled, 
some modellers play with the authority of digital representations: some 
intentionally degrade a representation in order to highlight its ambiguities, while 
others will improve images in order to hide uncertainties.76 In any case, political 
possibilities of what is visible and invisible are being shaped by the intentional use 
of such representations. Yet regardless of these disruptive practices, there remains a 
tendency towards naturalizing the cognitive aspects of machines – they go from 
being contentious adjuncts to our thought processes, to being internalised and 
necessary components. In addition, digital images come to project authority by 
virtue of being easily transportable without any informational loss as well (what 
Latour calls an ‘immutable mobile’).77 Their autonomy means they take on a life of 
their own and they can emanate a form of authority that appears to be beyond 
political intrigue.78 
Yet what is at issue here is more than just the delegation of authority to 
experts; it is the delegation of authority to nonhuman technological systems. This 
acceleration of technological development is generating a progressive erasure of the 
space for human decision.79 This is perhaps one of the most novel aspects of this 
new regime of technological governance: whether it is in the form of autonomous 
drones, algorithmic traders, automated surveillance techniques, or the automation 
controlling urban flows. The question that this all raises is “what does govern mean 
when no decisions need to be made and where administration is automatic?”80 The 
trust we tend to delegate to these representations risks closing off political options 
rather than expanding them. 
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Many have taken a look at the issues raised above and argued that the 
problem is with modelling itself. An over-reliance on economic models is what led 
to the crisis. An over-reliance on a particular type of risk modelling obscured the 
real risks. Yet the argument of this thesis is that modelling is a necessary correlate 
of a technologically advanced world such as our own. The infrastructures which 
sustain our standards of living are far too complex for an un-augmented human 
mind to deal with. There is a large body of literature which has established human 
individual’s poor capacity to think about nonlinear phenomena. Even our 
mathematics – the most systematic form of thought – has only recently 
incorporated nonlinear equations. Yet in a complex system like the climate system, 
nonlinearities are prevalent and prominent. It is models which, again, give us the 
capacity to recognise how small shifts can produce large effects, and how 
interacting mechanisms can offset or accentuate each other. Moreover, a ratcheting 
effect emerges from these technologies; they are used to make complexity 
intelligible, but they then allow for more complexity to emerge, which then calls 
forth the need for more technology, and so on. The answer to these issues is not to 
reject advanced representational technologies, but to make explicit their political 
implications and their openness to manipulation. 
As is hopefully clear by now, the politics of representational technologies are 
increasingly significant, ubiquitous, and invisible. As big data analytics, neural 
networks, machine learning, and computational social science grow and expand, 
they also function to efface their own operations. The user interface becomes the 
sole medium of interaction for most, and the political question of how 
representations are constructed is hidden beneath the shiny veneer of a screen. The 
specifically political question of by whom and for whom these modes of perception 
are being created is increasingly cloaked in technical jargon. 
This veneer of seemingly authoritative technical jargon is particularly 
deceptive once the limits of these new representational technologies are accounted 
for. With any representational medium there are certain benefits and certain 
limits: language, mathematics, images, and models all have their own specific 
constraints in representing the world.81 While the latest representational 
technologies have made significant advances into modelling new phenomena, they 
nevertheless run into inherent limits.82 In particular, limits exist in the ability to 
solve differential equations, and in the ability to model randomness. With the 
former, many differential equations remain impossible to find a solution for, 
forcing researchers to discretise a continuous function into a finite difference 
equation.83 In doing so though, a gap is introduced between the discrete model and 
the continuous reality – a gap which can be ameliorated to some degree, but which 
can never be fully eliminated. For linear systems (i.e. simple systems), these 
ameliorations may not be a problem, yet for nonlinear systems (i.e. complex 
systems) this gap can lead to significant uncertainty about the future trajectories of 
the system. 
In a second limitation, the problem stems from the very nature of 
algorithmic modelling. In a real complex system, the outcome is unpredictable as 
the system is sensitive to initial conditions. The limits of measurement mean that 
there will always be an element of chaos and unpredictability to the system. So if 
one were capable of exactly replaying the real system over and over again, the 
outcomes would vary. By contrast, with models the outcome is deterministically 
decided in advance by the model itself: replaying the same system with the same 
initial conditions results in the same outcome. This limitation stems from the 
discrete nature of computation: whereas the initial conditions are a continuum and 
a variation, the translation into the digital medium entails turning them into 
discrete elements that lose this intrinsic variation.84 In order to overcome this 
problem various ad hoc solutions have been developed: modelling complex systems 
now usually entails adding in pseudo-random generators or ‘perturbed’ physics 
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after the fact, or blocking ‘monstrous’ probability distributions.85 Yet at this point, 
“the causal structures differ profoundly, even if the imitation is excellent.”86 
These limitations – fundamental or contingent – are nevertheless secondary 
when it comes to the question of how representational technologies are being used 
to construct power. Power is not something that pre-exists, nor is it a natural 
property of some actor, nor is it a self-generated cause. Power is an effect of 
construction – both material and social. The significance of actor-network theory is 
precisely to highlight this entanglement of the material and the social. Without the 
stability, resiliency, and objectivity of material elements, social relations fluctuate 
and become difficult to navigate: 
 
“Although in order to stabilise society everyone – monkeys as well as 
men – need to bring into play associations that last longer than the 
interactions that formed them, the strategies and resources may vary 
between societies of baboons or of men. For instance, instead of 
acting straight upon the bodies of colleagues, parents and friends, 
like baboons, one might turn to more solid and less variable 
materials in order to act in a more durable way upon the bodies of 
our colleagues, parents and friends. In the state of nature, no one is 
strong enough to hold out against every coalition. But if you 
transform the state of nature, replacing unsettled alliances as much 
as you can with walls and written contracts, the ranks with uniforms 
and tattoos at td reversible friendships with names and signs, then 
you will obtain a Leviathan.”87 
 
With a material infrastructure though, social relations become sedimented, locked 
into hierarchical and materialised patterns. In the same way that contemporary 
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societies rely upon a material infrastructure in order to take on their consistency 
and stability, so too does power require a material infrastructure. As Michael 
Mann’s exemplary work has thoroughly demonstrated, power is reliant upon 
networks of allied entities in order to be exercised.88 Different social formations 
can be distinguished by the differing capacities for how quickly, how far, and how 
intensively commands can be issued. Each of these capacities is in turn 
transformed by the technological platform in existence for that society. As the 
technological platform develops, it eventually becomes possible for global actors to 
exist: those actors who can affect more or less directly social relations around the 
world. What is missing in Mann’s analysis (and similar approaches towards the 
infrastructures of power) is an analysis of the ways in which actors can control 
others. Technology here alters not only the spatial diffusion of commands, the 
speed of commands, and the intensity of the commands; it also alters what 
commands can be issued. This is one of the primary contributions of 
representational technologies – they alter and augment the possible points of 
intervention into a sociotechnical world. In this way, representational technologies 
are appendages for power. 
With the technologies examined in this thesis, the focus has been on ones 
which have extended the power capacities of already powerful actors: national 
politicians, financial traders, and international organisations. Indeed, many of the 
emerging representational technologies are being embedded within sociotechnical 
assemblages that are oriented towards intensifying divisions of power capacities. 
Bioinformatic algorithms coexist with a view of life as patentable pieces;89 high 
frequency trading algorithms are embedded in an economic system premised upon 
cunning;90 and crisis mapping algorithms exist alongside a humanitarian system 
oriented towards a contested paradigm of liberal peace.91 In an age where 
automated surveillance, climate reengineering, and large-scale data tracking are 
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already occurring, the question of which actors are being constructed and 
augmented via these technologies is highly significant. 
The issue of resistance arises here. If representational technologies are 
necessary for complex societies, if they have a ratcheting effect that tends towards 
greater complexity, and if they augment the power capacities of political actors, 
then the risk is that they simply exaggerate existing political hierarchies. An 
important research question that this thesis leaves open is precisely how can these 
technologies be employed by those without power in order to transform society in 
a progressive manner? It is obvious that there are severe hurdles in the critical 
appropriation of these technologies though. One of the more important effects of 
such technologies is to accelerate a ‘proofs war’ whereby the amount of effort going 
into producing a piece of knowledge must be (typically) matched by an equal effort 
to overturn it.92 Yet the amount of resources required to mobilise and produce 
counter-knowledge against dominant models is immense and poses a serious 
problem for any critical approaches. In James Scott’s terms, “not every actor can 
‘see like a state’ because the wherewithal to impose such simplifying order on 
complex masses of humanity lies, for better or worse, outside the competence of 
most social actors.”93 Yet knowledge of these technologies is increasingly crucial for 
understanding the modern operations of power. Regardless of whether one seeks 
to compete with these technological prostheses or limit and regulate them, it still 
requires comprehension of the intricacies of the technical details in order to 
contend with the changing modes of representing the ‘global’. 
A satisfactory answer to the question of resistance would require an entire 
book in itself, yet a direction can be provided here for further research. As was 
argued in Chapter 1, there is an important distinction to be made between global 
actors who build networks of power and global actors who manipulate existing 
networks of power. While the former typically require intense amounts of 
resources in order to build and sustain, the latter instead become powerful via 
manipulating existing networks. Rather than competing on the basis of sheer force 
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(a losing proposition for any resistance), competition here occurs on the basis of 
cunning and strategic action.94 These are akin to weapons of the weak – tools used 
to subtly shift social situations to the advantage of those without institutional 
power.95 With representational technologies, such tools have the potential to 
generate cognitive maps of complex situations in such a way as to create leverage 
points within an existing hierarchical order. The barriers facing these projects 
should not be underestimated (particularly for those with a lack of monetary 
resources), yet they are examples that these technologies can be used for resistance 
and change, as well as power and structure. Technology, it must be remembered, is 
not a means to overcoming social conflicts; it is rather a tool that is employed by 
political struggles. Technology is no panacea, but by transforming the material 
platform of society it shapes how conflicts are carried out and what potentials there 
are for progressive changes.  
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